MAY 09, 2024

By Kishori Lal, Former Principal Commissioner, Customs & Indirect Taxes

1. Meaning of interpretation

A legislation, be it a statutory Act or a statutory rule or a statutory notification, may physically consists of words printed on papers. However, conceptually it is a great deal more than an ordinary prose. There is a special peculiarity in the mode of verbal communication by a legislature. A legislation is not just a series of statements, such as one finds in a work of fiction/non-fiction or even in a judgment of a court of law. There is a technique required to draft a legislation as well as to understand a legislation. Former technique is known as legislative drafting and latter one is to be found in the various principles of "interpretation of statutes". Vis-à-vis ordinary prose, a legislation differs in its provenance, layout and features as also in the implication as to its meaning that arise by presumptions as to the intent of the maker thereof. ¹

Interpretation is of importance because of the inherent nature of legislation as a source of law . Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of a statute by giving the words of the statute their natural and ordinary meaning. Words in any language are not scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning, and language is but an imperfect medium to convey one's thought, much less of large assembly consisting of persons of various shades of opinion. Language is inherently imprecise, especially at the "penumbra" as Professor Hart described it. ² Words and phrases can bear multiple meanings. Indeed, the very same sentence could bear contradictory meanings, depending on whether it was expressed sincerely or sarcastically. As a result, the process of ascertaining meaning by relying on the dictionary alone can be iterative in nature and is liable to frustrate more than it might illuminate. ³ It is impossible even for the most imaginative legislative to forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances that may emerge after enactment of a statute where its application may be called for. ⁴ There is a technique required to draft a legislation as well as to understand a legislation. ⁵

In this regard the following observations of the Constitution Bench made in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited ⁶ are relevant:

"There is a special peculiarity in the mode of verbal communication by a legislation. A legislation is not just a series of statements, such as one finds in a work of fiction/non-fiction or even in a judgment of a court of law. There is a technique required to draft a legislation as well as to understand a legislation. Former technique is known as legislative drafting and latter one is to be found in the various principles of "interpretation of statutes". Vis-a-vis ordinary prose, a legislation differs in its provenance, layout and features as also in the implication as to its meaning that arise by presumptions as to the intent of the maker thereof." [Para 27]

It is essential to be stated that consistency and certainty in tax matters is necessary. In cases relating to "Indirect Taxation", this principle is even more important. Clarity in this regard is a necessity and the interpretative vision should be same.⁷

The principles applicable to interpretation of statutes are four-fold in nature:-

(1) such statutory provisions as create or take away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective; they can be retrospective if made so expressly or by necessary implication and the retrospective operation must be limited only to: the extent to which it has been so made either expressly or by necessary implication,

(2) the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the words used by it, giving them their plain, natural & grammatical meaning,

(3) if any provision of a legislation the purpose of which is to benefit a particular class of persons is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meanings the meaning which preserves the benefit should be adopted.,

(4) if the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency, such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose will be put on the words, if necessary, even by modification of the language used:

In fact, the Apex Court has held that if the words are unambiguous, clear and explicit, there need be no recourse to any rules of interpretation. In this context reference can be made to judgment in Surendran v. Mavelikara Primary Co-op. Agrl. & R.D. Bank Ltd. ⁸, holding the view that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequence. A construction that results in hardship serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which avoids such results.⁹ In other words an interpretation of the statutory provision which defeats the intent and purpose for which the statute was enacted should be avoided.¹⁰

It is well accepted that a statute must be construed according to the intention of the legislature and the courts should act upon the true intention of the legislation while applying law and while interpreting law. ¹¹ If a statutory provision is open to more than one meaning, the Court has to choose the interpretation which represents the intention of the legislature. ¹² The Court will seek to ascertain the meaning and intention of Parliament from the language of the statute itself; but with the motives of Parliament it has no concern. It is not for the Court to express, or indeed to entertain, any opinion on the expediency of a particular piece of legislation, if it is satisfied that it was within the competence of the Legislature which enacted it; nor will it allow itself to be influenced by any considerations of policy, which lie wholly outside its sphere.¹³

Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the "language" is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. ¹⁴ The Court will seek to ascertain the meaning and intention of Parliament from the language of the statute itself; but with the motives of Parliament it has no concern.¹⁵

Interpretation in legal context refers to the process by which meaning is ascribed to the expressions found within a provision of the statute. Such meaning can be ascertained from two possible perspectives. The first is to apply an objective test of interpretation to ascertain what a reasonable person would understand the provision of the statute to mean. This is the approach adopted under the common law. On the other hand, the subjective approach requires the judge to ascribe meaning to the text by having regard to what, it perceives or discerns, were the actual intentions of the legislature.¹⁶ This is prevalent in civil law systems and is also reflected in a number of international conventions on commercial transactions, for example, in the Vienna Convention ¹⁷. "So we see that the primary and foremost task of a Court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed." ¹⁸ According to Gray ¹⁹ the process by which a judge(or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who has occasion to search for the meaning of a statute)constructs from the words of a statute-book, a meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to it, is called "interpretation"

As observed by Lord Dunedin ²⁰ "A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission of clear direction makes that end unattainable."

When the law to be applied in a given case prescribes interpretation of statute, the court has to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. Interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. It is the function of the legislature to say what shall be the law and it is only the court to say what the law is.²¹

2. Need for interpretation

A legislation, be it a statutory Act or a statutory rule or a statutory notification, may physically consists of words printed on papers. However, conceptually it is a great deal more than an ordinary prose. There is a special peculiarity in the mode of verbal communication by a legislature. A legislation is not just a series of statements, such as one finds in a work of fiction/non-fiction or even in a judgment of a court of law. There is a technique required to draft a legislation as well as to understand a legislation. Former technique is known as legislative drafting and latter one is to be found in the various principles of "interpretation of statutes". Vis-à-vis ordinary prose, a legislation differs in its provenance, layout and features as also in the implication as to its meaning that arise by presumptions as to the intent of the maker thereof.²²

Interpretation is of importance because of the inherent nature of legislation as a source of law . Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of a statute by giving the words of the statute their natural and ordinary meaning . Words in any language are not scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning, and language is but an imperfect medium to convey one's thought, much less of large assembly consisting of persons of various shades of opinion. Language is inherently imprecise, especially at the "penumbra" as Professor Hart described it.²³ Words and phrases can bear multiple meanings. Indeed, the very same sentence could bear contradictory meanings, depending on whether it was expressed sincerely or sarcastically. As a result, the process of ascertaining meaning by relying on the dictionary alone can be iterative in nature and is liable to frustrate more than it might illuminate.²⁴ It is impossible even for the most imaginative legislative to forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances that may emerge after enactment of a statute where its application may be called for.²⁵ There is a technique required to draft a legislation as well as to understand a legislation. ²⁶

In this regard the following observations of the Constitution Bench made in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited ²⁷ are relevant:

"There is a special peculiarity in the mode of verbal communication by a legislation. A legislation is not just a series of statements, such as one finds in a work of fiction/non-fiction or even in a judgment of a court of law. There is a technique required to draft a legislation as well as to understand a legislation. Former technique is known as legislative drafting and latter one is to be found in the various principles of "interpretation of statutes". Vis-a-vis ordinary prose, a legislation differs in its provenance, layout and features as also in the implication as to its meaning that arise by presumptions as to the intent of the maker thereof." [Para 27]

It is essential to be stated that consistency and certainty in tax matters is necessary. In cases relating to"Indirect Taxation", this principle is even more important. Clarity in this regard is a necessity and the interpretative vision should be same.²⁸

The principles applicable to interpretation of statutes are four-fold in nature:-

(1) such statutory provisions as create or take away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective; they can be retrospective if made so expressly or by necessary implication and the retrospective operation must be limited only to the extent to which it has been so made either expressly or by necessary implication,

(2) the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the words used by it, giving them their plain, natural & grammatical meaning,

(3) if any provision of a legislation the purpose of which is to benefit a particular class of persons is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meanings the meaning which preserves the benefit should be adopted.,

(4) if the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency, such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose will be put on the words, if necessary, even by modification of the language used:

In fact, the Apex Court has held that if the words are unambiguous, clear and explicit, there is no need to recourse to any rules of interpretation. In this context reference can be made to judgment in Surendran v. Mavelikara Primary Co-op. Agrl. & R.D. Bank Ltd. ²⁹, holding the view that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequence. At the same time a construction that results in hardship serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which avoids such results. ³⁰ An interpretation of the statutory provision which defeats the intent and purpose for which the statute was enacted should be avoided.³¹

It is well accepted that a statute must be construed according to the intention of the legislature and the courts should act upon the true intention of the legislation while applying law and while interpreting law. If a statutory provision is open to more than one meaning, the Court has to choose the interpretation which represents the intention of the legislature.³² The Court will seek to ascertain the meaning and intention of Parliament from the language of the statute itself; but with the motives of Parliament it has no concern. It is not for the Court to express, or indeed to entertain, any opinion on the expediency of a particular piece of legislation, if it is satisfied that it was within the competence of the Legislature which enacted it; nor will it allow itself to be influenced by any considerations of policy, which lie wholly outside its sphere.³³

Notwithstanding the conventional principle that the duty of Judges is to expound and not to legislate, the courts have taken the view that the judicial art of interpretation and appraisal is imbued with creativity and realism and since interpretation always implied a degree of discretion and choice, the courts would adopt, particularly in areas such as, constitutional adjudication dealing with social and defuse rights. Courts are therefore, held as "finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing". ³⁴

3. General approaches to statutory interpretation

Sir Rupert Cross, in his book titled, "Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed, 1995)", suggested that the English approach involves not so much a choice between alternative rules as a progressive analysis in which the judge first considers the ordinary meaning of the words in the general context of the statute, a broad view being taken of what constitutes the "context", and then moves to consider other possibilities where the ordinary meaning leads to an absurd result. This unified "contextual" approach is supported by dicta in decisions of the House of Lords where general principles of statutory interpretation have been discussed.

Reference is now frequently made by judges to the concept of "purposive" statutory construction, i.e. one that will "promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provisions" ³⁵. There will be a comparison of readings of the provision in question based on the literal or grammatical meaning of words with readings based on a purposive approach. In Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart ³⁶, Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to "the purposive approach to construction now adopted by the courts in order to give effect to the true intentions of the legislature" .

However, a purposive interpretation may only be adopted if judges "can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation of an expression of Parliament's purpose or policy". ³⁷

The British Law Commission (1969) also emphasised the importance, in interpretation of a provision, of the general legislative purpose underlying it. The Renton Committee on the Preparation of Legislation (1975) approved this.

Professor John Willis' observation ³⁸ that "a court invokes whichever of the rules produces a result that satisfies its sense of justice in the case before it" thus indicates that the so called interpretive rules discussed in chapters 2 to 6, hereafter, are not the rules in the strict sense. These are not codified. These are more in the form of guidelines laid down by superior Courts for observance by themselves and by the inferior courts in order to maintain uniform approach in the judgments rendered and to uphold the rule of law.

4. Interpretation of statutes in general

It matters how judges decide cases. It matters most to people unlucky or litigious or wicked or saintly enough to find themselves in court. Learned Hand, who was one of the America's best and most famous judges, said, he feared a lawsuit more than death or taxes. ³⁹ Law suits always raise, at least in principle, three different kinds of issues; issues of fact, issues of law and the twined issues of political morality and fidelity. First, what happened? Did the man at the lathe really drop a wrench on his fellow worker's foot? Second, what is the pertinent law? Does the law allow an injured worker damages from his employer for that sort of injury? Third, if the law denies compensation, is that unjust? If so, should judges ignore the law and grant compensation any way. ⁴⁰

If the words of a statute are susceptible of only one meaning there is hardly any need for any rules of interpretation or interpretation for that matter. Enacted laws, specially, the modern Acts and Rules are drafted by legal experts and it could be expected that the language used therein will leave little room for interpretation or construction. But the experience of all those, who have to bear and share the task of application of law, has been different.⁴¹ It is general judicial experience that in matters of law involving questions of constructing statutory or constitutional provisions, two views are often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably possible views, the process of decision making is often very difficult and delicate.⁴² It must however be remembered that as between two interpretations, that which sustains the validity of the law must be preferred.⁴³

Judge Robert Earl, has stated "It is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the makers. The writers of laws do not always express their intention perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that judges are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only, and this is called rational interpretation"⁴⁴

Rutherforth, in his Institutes (p. 407), says: "When we make use of rational interpretation, sometimes we restrain the meaning of the writer so as to take in less, and sometimeswe extend or enlarge his meaning so as to take in more than his words express." Plain words thereof are relevant and not the supposed intention. ⁴⁵ A well-settled rule of construction of statutes is that where two interpretations are possible, one of which would preserve and save the constitutionality of the particular statutory provision while the other would render it unconstitutional and void, the one which saves and preserves its constitutionality should be adopted and the other rejected.⁴⁶

5. Interpretation of taxing statutes

The unique features of tax law, including its high level of detail, frequent revision, and largely self-contained nature, require a special set of interpretive tools. In particular, scholars have argued that the underlying structure or "purpose" of the Code may dictate results that are difficult or impossible to reach using non-tax interpretive methods. The fiscal statute has to be interpreted very strictly.⁴⁷ In Partington v. A.G.⁴⁸,

In a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. ⁴⁹ It is the settled law that any ambiguity in a taxing statute should enure to the benefit of the subject/assessee. ⁵⁰ It is the axiomatic construction of law that in interpretation of fiscal statutes the court must lean in favour of the citizen rather than revenue because it is expropratory in character.⁵¹

The Supreme Court of India has summarized the afore stated position in a very recent judgment rendered in Shabina Abraham's case ⁵² in the following manner:-

"33. This Court has, in a plethora of judgments, referred to the aforesaid principles. Suffice it to quote from one of such judgments of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Modi Sugar Mills ⁵³:-

"In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statute so as to supply any assumed deficiency.""

After thoroughly examining the various precedents and after giving their anxious consideration, the Apex Court held that every taxing statute including, charging, computation and exemption clause (at the threshold stage) should be interpreted strictly. Further, in case of ambiguity in a charging provisions, the benefit must necessarily go in favour of subject/ assessee, but the same is not true for an exemption notification wherein the benefit of ambiguity must be strictly interpreted in favour of the Revenue/State. ⁵⁴ Three important aspects which come out of the discussion are (i) the recognition of horizontal equity by the Court as a consideration for application of strict interpretation, (ii) subjugation of strict interpretation to the plain meaning rule and (iii) interpretation in favour of exclusion in light of ambiguity.⁵⁵

6. Interpretation of goods and services tax (GST) statutes

The Goods and Services Tax enactment subsumes various enactments including the Central Excise Act, the Finance Act providing for the levy of Service Tax and State Value Added Tax Acts. Thus, the interpretation given to the provisions of the aforesaid statutes would equally govern the working of the present statute (GST) as well. No doubt, the interests of the revenue are paramount and have to be protected, but the actions of the Revenue Department draw power only from a wholistic interpretation of the statutory provisions. Any excess in this regard would vitiate the legitimacy of the exercise. ⁵⁶ It is settled law that a distinction has to be made by court while interpreting the provisions of a taxing statute between charging provisions which impose the charge to tax and machinery provisions which provide the machinery for the quantification of the tax and the levying and collection of the tax so imposed. While charging provisions are construed strictly, machinery sections are not generally subject to a rigorous construction. The courts are expected to construe the machinery sections in such a manner that a charge to tax is not defeated.⁵⁷

7. Interpretation of exemption notification

An exemption notification is to be interpreted in a manner different from any other statuary provision. Taxing Statute has to be construed liberally while exemptions are to be interpreted strictly . The rule that in case of ambiguity, a taxing statute should be construed in favour of the assessee, does not apply to the construction of an exception or an exempting provision, as the same have to be construed strictly. There is no question of equity here, an exemption is a stand-alone process. Either an industry claiming exemption comes within it or it does not. ⁵⁸

It is the law that any ambiguity in the exemption clause of exemption notification must be conferred in favour of revenue and such exemption should be allowed to be availed only to those subjects/assesses who demonstrate that a case for exemption squarely falls within the parameters enumerated in the notification and that the claimants satisfy all the conditions precedent for availing exemption.⁵⁹

Thus even in fiscal statutes different parts need to be interpreted differently. That is the exemption notification has to be read strictly ⁶⁰ whereas machinery provisions which provide the machinery for the quantification of the tax and the levying and collection of the tax so imposed are not to be construed so rigorously. Further if the goods fall within the ambit of notification, on strict interpretation liberal interpretation may be given thereafter. As the taxing statutes put burden on the tax payer it should be construed strictly and unless the subject falls within the four walls of the charging section, he should not be subjected to tax. ⁶¹ However, the exemption/exception puts extra burden on other tax payers, their provisions need strict interpretation. An exemption is a stand-alone process and there is no equity in its regard. Either an industry claiming exemption comes within it or it does not. A mere mistake or error committed by Court cannot be a ground for restitution; It is well known that due diligence must be exhibited by the party to seek equity.⁶²

Law is well-settled that exemption notification has to be read strictly. Exemption notification has to be interpreted in terms of its language. When language is plain and clear, effect must be given to it.⁶³ It is also a well settled rule of interpretation that the courts must assume that every word used in the exemption notification was intended to be given effect to and more so, in the taxing statute. It must also be borne in mind that plain words of a statute are relevant and not the supposed intention. ⁶⁴ In other words the intention of the legislature should be ascertained from the plain words of the statute and not supposed. The doctrine of substantial compliance seeks to preserve the need to comply strictly with the conditions or requirements that are important to invoke a tax or duty exemption and to forgive non-compliance for either unimportant and tangential requirements or requirements that are so confusingly or incorrectly written that an earnest effort at compliance should be accepted.⁶⁵

8. Retrospective effect of law

The Apex Court⁶⁶, has elaborately discussed the scope and ambit of an amending legislation and its retrospectivity and held that every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedur al law. ⁶⁷ "Matters of procedure are, however, different and the law affecting procedure is always retrospective."⁶⁸

To give retrospective effect, it need not be stated so expressly. Intent/object of legislature can be culled out from background facts. If Government wanted to extend the benefits only with prospective effect it would have made it explicitly clear. Hence it can be safely assumed that by substituting a word it intended to give benefits with retrospective effect. ⁶⁹ Procedural law is retrospective meaning thereby that it will apply even to acts or transactions under the repealed Act.⁷⁰

Declaratory/Procedural enactments, normally have retrospective effect. ⁷¹Remedial enactment has enlarging/restraining effect. It normally does not have retrospective effect in absence of contrary intendment. ⁷² Considerations of equity are wholly out of place in a taxing statute. ⁷³ Though equity and taxation are often strangers, attempts should be made that these do not remain always so and if a construction results in equity rather than in injustice, then such construction should be preferred to the literal construction. ⁷⁴

9. The applicability of foreign decisions

In a reference made Inthe matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, (XIV of 1938)⁷⁵, the US Federal Court observed thus:

"The decisions of Canadian and Australian Courts are not binding upon us, and still less those of the United States, but where they are relevant, they will always be listened to in this Court with attention and respect, as the judgments of eminent men accustomed to expound and illumine the principles of a jurisprudence similar to our own; and if this Court is so fortunate as to find itself in agreement with them, it will deem its own opinion to be strengthened and confirmed. But there are few subjects on which the decisions of other Courts require to be treated with greater caution than that of federal and provincial powers, for in the last analysis the decision must depend upon the words of the Constitution which the Court is interpreting; and since no two Constitutions are in identical terms, it is extremely unsafe to assume that a decision on one of them can be applied without qualification to another."

10. Foreign law is always a question of fact

It is a settled principle of private international law that foreign law is always a question of fact which is required to be pleaded and proved by the party whose rights or obligations flow from such foreign law.⁷⁶

[The views expressed are strictly personal.]

¹CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd . - 2014-TIOL-78-SC-IT-CB, para 27

² H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 at 607

³ "THE INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS: SAYING WHAT THEY MEAN OR MEANING WHAT THEY SAY" By Sundaresh Menon, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Singapore

⁴ G. P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation; 10 th Edn. Page 3

⁵Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited, (2015) 1 SCC 1 = 2014-TIOL-78-SC-IT-CB

⁶ (2015) 1 SCC 1 = 2014-TIOL-78-SC-IT-CB

⁷ Commissioner of Commercial Tax, U.P Vs Oswal Greentech Limited ; 2016-TIOL-184-SC-CT

⁸2005 (4) KLT 619: 2005 Lab IC 4062

⁹ See Johnson v. Moreton [(1978) 3 All ER 37: (1978) 3 WLR 538: 1980 AC 37 (HL)] and Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. [(1978) 1 All ER 948: (1978) 1 WLR 231 (HL)]

¹⁰P. Nirathilingam v. Annaya Nadar , (2001) 9 SCC 673, para 20

¹¹ "Interpretation of Indirect tax statutes including GST", by Kishori Lal, 2 nd edition at p 28

¹²Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co. - 2018-TIOL-302-SC-CUS-CB, para 20

¹³In the matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, (XIV of 1938), 1938 SCC OnLine FC 2: (1938-39) 43 CWN 1 : (1939) 1 FCR 18 : AIR 1939 FC 1 : (1939) 1 Mad LJ 1 : (1939) 49 LW 36 at page 7 Per   Gwyer, C.J.

¹⁴ State of Jharkhand v Govind Singh (2005) 10 SCC 437, para 12

¹⁵ In the matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, (XIV of 1938), 1938 SCC OnLine FC 2: (1938-39) 43 CWN 1: (1939) 1 FCR 18: AIR 1939 FC 1: (1939) 1 Mad LJ 1 : (1939) 49 LW 36 at page 7 Per   Gwyer, C.J.

¹⁶ "Interpretation of Indirect tax statutes including GST", by Kishori Lal, 2 nd edition, at p 3

¹⁷ United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Art. 8(1)

¹⁸Girdhari Lal & Sons v Balbir Nath Mathur , 1986 AIR 1499 SC, 1986 SCR (1) 383, (1986) 2 SCC 237 , Para 9

¹⁹Gray,  The Nature and Sources of the Law , 2nd Edn., pp. 176-78

²⁰in Whitney v Commissioners of Inland Revenue; [1926] AC 37; (1925) 10 TC 88

²¹National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Laxmi Narain Dhut , (2007) 3 SCC 700: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 142, para 28

²²CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd . - 2014-TIOL-78-SC-IT-CB , para 27

²³ H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 at 607

²⁴ "The Interpretation of Documents: Saying what they mean or meaning what they say" By Sundaresh Menon, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Singapore

²⁵ G. P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation; 10 th Edn. Page 3

²⁶ Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited - 2014-TIOL-78-SC-IT-CB

²⁷ (2015) 1 SCC 1 - 2014-TIOL-78-SC-IT-CB

²⁸Commissioner of Commercial Tax, U.P Vs Oswal Greentech Limited ; 2016-TIOL-184-SC-CT

²⁹2005 (4) KLT 619: 2005 Lab IC 4062

³⁰ See Johnson v. Moreton [(1978) 3 All ER 37: (1978) 3 WLR 538: 1980 AC 37 (HL)] and Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. [(1978) 1 All ER 948: (1978) 1 WLR 231 (HL)]

³¹ P. Nirathilingam v. Annaya Nadar , (2001) 9 SCC 673, para 20

³²Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co. - 2018-TIOL-302-SC-CUS-CB, para 20

³³In the matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, (XIV of 1938), 1938 SCC OnLine FC 2 : (1938-39) 43 CWN 1 : (1939) 1 FCR 18 : AIR 1939 FC 1 : (1939) 1 Mad LJ 1 : (1939) 49 LW 36 at page 7 Per   Gwyer, C.J.

³⁴see  Corocraft Ltd.  v.  Pan American Airways  [(1968) 3 WLR 714: (1969) 1 QB 616 : (1968) 2 All ER 1059] , All ER at p. 1071 D, WLR at p. 732,  State of Haryana  v.  Sampuran Singh  [(1975) 2 SCC 810 : AIR 1975 SC 1952] , AIR at p. 1957

³⁵ per Lord Denning MR in   Notham v London Borough of Barnet ; [1978] 1 WLR 220

³⁶[1993] AC 593

³⁷ per Lord Scarman in   R v Barnet LBC   [1983] 2 AC 309

³⁸in his influential article "Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938)

³⁹ Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin, 2 nd Edition– P-1

⁴⁰ Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin, 2 nd Edition P-3

⁴¹ G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation 12 th Edition 2010; P -1

⁴² Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v C.I.T - 2002-TIOL-1543-SC-IT-CBat P 1644

⁴³ Avinder Singh v State of Punjab - 2014-TIOL-78-SC-IT-CB at page 155

⁴⁴ Riggs v palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22N.E. 188 (1889) at p 189

⁴⁵ Bharat Cottage Industries v UOI; 1992(59) E.L.T. 30 (Bom.), Headnotes

⁴⁶ Union of India and Another v Tulsiram Patel and Others; 1985 AIR 1416, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 131

⁴⁷ Commissioner Sales Tax, U.P. Vs Modi Sugar Mills Ltd - 2002-TIOL-977-SC-CT-CB

⁴⁸ (1869) LR 4 HL 100 at 122

⁴⁹ Hemraj GordhandasVs. H.H. Dave; 2 E J 350; 1964(7) TMI 4 Supreme Court of India; 2002-TIOL-351_SC-CX

⁵⁰Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai Vs Dilip Kumar and Company; 2018-TIOL-302-SC-CUS-CB, 2018 (361) ELT 577 (SC), para 28, (2018) 9 SCC 1, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 747 para 36

⁵¹ The Central India Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. The Municipal Committee; AIR 1958 SC 341

⁵²Shabina Abraham and Ors Vs Collector of Central Excise and Customs; 2015-TIOL-159-SC-CX: 2015 (322) E.L.T. 372 (S.C.)

⁵³[1961] (2) SCR 189 at 198

⁵⁴Commr. Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co . ,(supra), Para 41

⁵⁵Commr. Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co . ,(supra), Para 49;

⁵⁶Jayachandran Alloys Pvt Ltd Vs The Superintendent of GST and Central Excise Salem. , 2019 (25) GSTL 321 (Mad.), 2019-TIOL-1021-HC-MAD-GST, Para 33

⁵⁷ quoted in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. V. Commercial Tax Officer, Kota & Ors.1981 AIR 1887 1982 SCR (1) 563 (1981) 4 SCC 578; 1981 SCALE (3)1338; India United Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Bombay [1955] 1 S.C.R. 810 - 2002-TIOL-1278-SC-IT-CB, Gursahai Saigal v. Commissioner of Income-tax Punjab [1963] 3 S.C.R. 893 Commissioner ofIncome-tax v. Mahaliram Ramjidas, A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 124 and Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1926] A.C. 37, referred to.

⁵⁸State of Gujarat & Ors Vs Essar Oil Ltd &Anr ; 2012-TIOL-05-SC-CT; Para 89

⁵⁹ Commissioner Customs (Import), Mumbai Vs Dilip Kumar and Company; 2018-TIOL-302-SC-CUS-CB, Para 36

⁶⁰ Commissioner of C. Ex., Jaipur Versus Mewar Bartan Niraman Udyog; 2008(231) E.L.T. 27 (S.C.) - 2008-TIOL-188-SC-CX

⁶¹ Suttons & sons (supra)

⁶²State of Gujarat & Ors Vs Essar Oil Ltd & Anr; 2012-TIOL-05-SC-CT; Para 77

⁶³ Commissioner of C. Ex., Jaipur Vs Mewar Bartan Niraman Udyog; 2008(231) E.L.T. 27 (S.C.) - 2008-TIOL-188-SC-CX

⁶⁴ Bharat Cottage Industries Vs UOI; 1992(59) E.L.T. 30 (Bom.)

⁶⁵ Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi Versus Hari Chand Shri Gopal&Others ; 2010 (0) AIOL 783:2011 AIR(SCW) 1119: 2010 (260) ELT 3: 2010 (12) JT 563:2010 (12) Scale 122: 2011 (1) SCC 236: 2010 (8) SLT 422: 2010 (8) Supreme 225; para 24 - 2010-TIOL-95-SC-CX-CB

⁶⁶ in Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury AIR 1957 SC 540, New India Insurance Co. Ltd vs Smt. Shanti Misra, Adult (1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v State Of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087, Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath v State Of Bihar And Ors ; (1999) 8 SCC 16 and Shyam Sunder And Others v Ram Kumar And Another (2001) 8 SCC 24

⁶⁷Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. v Union of (2011) 6 SCC 739, para 25; followed in B.K Educational Services Pvt Ltd v Parag Gupta and Associates; (2019) 11 SCC 633

⁶⁸Dayawati v Inderjit , (1966) 3 SCR 275: AIR 1966 SC 1423, para 9

⁶⁹Government of India v Indian Tobacco Association; 2005-TIOL-109-SC-CUS

⁷⁰Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. v Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 739, Para 24

⁷¹ Coral Cosmetics Ltd. v UOI, 2008 (225) ELT 412 (Bom.)

⁷² Coral Cosmetics (supra)

⁷³ Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy v Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd 2006-TIOL-24-HC-DEL-CUS, 2006 (206) ELT 108 (DEL)

⁷⁴Commissioner of Income Tax v Sri J.H. Gotla, Yadagiri, 1985 AIR 1698, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 711, para 47

⁷⁵1938 SCC OnLine FC 2 : (1938-39) 43 CWN 1 : (1939) 1 FCR 18 : AIR 1939 FC 1 : (1939) 1 Mad LJ 1 : (1939) 49 LW 36 at page 8

⁷⁶Transport Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Ganesh Polytex Ltd. , (2015) 3 SCC 571 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 906, para 31