Ancient principles of interpretation - the Mimansa principles

By Hon'ble Justice Markandey Katju,
Judge, Supreme Court of India

IT is deeply regrettable that in our Courts of Law, lawyers quote Maxwell and Craies but nobody refers to the Mimansa Principles of Interpretation.   Few people in our country are aware about the great intellectual achievements of our ancestors and the intellectual treasury they have bequeathed us. The Mimansa Principles of Interpretation is part of that intellectual treasury, but it is distressing to note that apart from a reference to these principles in the judgment of Sir John Edge, the then Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court, in Beni Prasad v. Hardai Devi, (1892) ILR 14 All 67 (FB), and in the judgments Markandey Katju, J. while a Judge of Allahabad High Court (which have been annexed to the Second Edition of K.L. Sankar's book),   there has been almost no utilization of these principles even in our own country.       

It may be mentioned that the Mimansa Rules of Interpretation were our traditional principles of interpretation laid down by Jaimini in the 5th Century B.C. whose Sutras were explained by Shabar, Kumarila Bhatta, Prabhakar, etc. The Mimansa Rules of Interpretation were used in our country for at least 2500 years, whereas Maxwell's First Edition was published only in 1875.   These Mimansa Principles are very rational and logical and they were regularly used by our great jurists like Vijnaneshwara (author of Mitakshara), Jimutvahana   (author of Dayabhaga), Nanda Pandit, etc. whenever they found any conflict between the various Smritis or any ambiguity or incongruity therein.   There is no reason why we cannot use these principles on appropriate occasions even today.   However, it is a matter of deep regret that these principles have rarely been used in our law Courts.   It is nowhere mentioned in our Constitution or any other law that only Maxwell's Principles of Interpretation can be used by the Court.   We can use any system of interpretation which helps us solve a difficulty.   In certain situations Maxwell's principles would be more appropriate, while in other situations the Mimansa principles may be more suitable.   One of the Mimansa principles is the Gunapradhan Axiom, and since we are utilizing it in this judgment we may describe it in some detail. 'Guna' means subordinate or accessory, while 'Pradhan' means principal.   The Gunapradhan Axiom states :  

If a word or sentence purporting to express a subordinate idea clashes with the principal idea, the former must be adjusted to the latter or must be disregarded altogether.

This principle is also expressed by the popular maxim known as 'matsya nyaya', i.e. 'the bigger fish eats the smaller fish'.   According to Jaimini, acts are of two kinds, principal and subordinate.   In Sutra 3 : 3 : 9 Jaimini states :

Guna mukhya vyatikramey tadarthatvan mukhyen vedasanyogah

Kumarila Bhatta, in his Tantravartika (See Ganganath Jha's English Translation Vol. 3, p. 1141) explains this Sutra as follows:

When the Primary and the Accessory belong to two different Vedas, the Vedic characteristic of the Accessory is determined by the Primary, as the Accessory is subservient to the purpose of the primary.

It is necessary to explain this Sutra in some detail.   The peculiar quality of the Rigveda and Samaveda is that the mantras belonging to them are read aloud, whereas the mantras in the Yajurveda are read in a low voice.   Now the difficulty arose about certain ceremonies, e.g. Agnyadhana, which belong to the Yajurveda but in which verses of the Samaveda are to be recited.   Are these Samaveda verses to be recited in a low voice or loud voice ?   The answer, as given in the above Sutra, is that they are to be recited in low voice, for although they are Samaveda verses, yet since they are being recited in a Yajurveda ceremony their attribute must be altered to make it in accordance with the Yajurveda.

In the Shabar Bhashya translated into English by Dr. Ganga Nath Jha, published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series, the Sutra is read as follows :

Where there is a conflict between the use and the substance greater regard should be paid to the use

Commenting on Jaimini 3 : 3 : 9 Kumarila Bhatta says :

The Siddhanta laid down by this Sutra is that in a case where there is one qualification pertaining to the Accessory by itself and another pertaining to it through the Primary, the former qualification is always to be taken as set aside by the latter.   This is because the proper fulfillment of the Primary is the business of the Accessory also as the latter operates solely for the sake of the former.   Consequently if, in consideration of its own qualification it were to deprive the Primary of its natural accomplishment then there would be a disruption of that action (the Primary) for the sake of which it was meant to operate.   Though in such a case the proper fulfillment of the Primary with all its accompaniments would mean the deprival of the Accessory of its own natural accompaniment, yet, as the fact of the Accessory being equipped with all its accompaniments is not so very necessary (as that of the primary), there would be nothing incongruous in the said deprival.(See Ganganath Jha's English translation of the Tantravartika, vol. 3 p. 1141).

The Gunapradhan Axiom can also be deducted from Jaimini 6 : 3 : 9 which states :

When there is a conflict between the purpose and the material, the purpose is to prevail, because in the absence of the prescribed material a substitute can be used, for the material is subordinate to the purpose.

To give an example, the prescribed Yupa (sacrificial post for tying the sacrificial animal) must be made of Khadir wood.   However, Khadir wood is weak while the animal tied may be restive.   Hence, the Yupa can be made of Kadar wood which is strong.   Now this substitution is being made despite the fact that the prescribed wood is Khadir, but this prescription is only subordinate or Accessory to the performance of the ceremony, which is the main object.   Hence if it comes in the way of the ceremony being performed, it can be modified or substituted.

(Extracted from the latest Judgement delivered by the SC - 2006-TIOL-127-SC-CUS)