2018-TIOL-INSTANT-ALL-585
31 August 2018   

 GST - Mend and Amend: Technical Session - Legislative Amendments

GST - Mend and Amend: Technical Session - Legislative Amendments

CASE STORIES

GST - Petitioners, tax practitioners, are not espousing cause of a weaker section of the society who are unable to knock door of justice - PIL jurisdiction cannot be exercised: High Court

I-T - Unpaid tax dues of private company should not be recovered from its directors, without establishing that non-recovery is on account of misfeasance on part of directors in relation to affairs of company: HC

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CASE LAWS

2018-TIOL-113-HC-AHM-GST + Case Story

RAJ SANJAYBHAI TANNA Vs UoI: GUJARAT HIGH COURT (Dated: August 30, 2018)

GST - Petitioners, a practicising Advocate and a Tax Consultant, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 47 of the CGST Act, claiming that government is is trying to recover penalty in the guise of late fee charges and, therefore, the dealers lost their valuable right to file appeals as well as the right to explain the cause of delay in filing appeal; that in all previous laws which have been repealed by the statutes enacted under the new GST regime, such charges were categorized as penal in nature.

Held - The present case is not one which warrants exercise of PIL jurisdiction – Petitioners, being active tax consultants and tax practitioners, are obviously indirectly concerned with the same - By the petitioner's own account, there happen to be not less than 1.30 crore dealers who are affected by the provisions of Section 47 - There is nothing to suggest that none of these affected persons can take up the cause and approach the Court of law as may be advised – Majority, if not all of them, would be persons with proper means who can also avail proper legal advice - This is not a case where the petitioners are espousing the cause of a weaker section of the society who, on account of hardships and handicaps inherently faced by them, are unable to knock the door of justice - There is no reason why such an issue should be examined in a public interest petition when, as noted above, the group of persons whom the statute affects does not suffer from any handicap preventing them from taking up the litigation themselves and pursuing it – Petition dismissed: High Court [para 2 to 4]

Writ petition dismissed

2018-TIOL-112-HC-DEL-GST

A B PRINT PACK VS PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER : DELHI HIGH COURT (Dated: August 29, 2018)

GST - The assessee company was aggrieved by the fact that an amount of input tax credit inadvertently permitted in the Form TRANS-1 was not taken into account - Hence it sought that an amount of ITC on stock of goods, which could not be claimed under Form TRANS-II owing to technical glitches, also be considered.

Held - The assessee claimed to have made several representations in the GST portal - Hence the Nodal Officer concerned is directed to look into such grievances and pass appropriate orders: HC

Writ petition disposed of

2018-TIOL-111-HC-MAD-GST

ANKIT ISPAT PVT LTD Vs GST COUNCIL : MADRAS HIGH COURT (Dated: August 21, 2018)

GST - the assessee company sought to avail an amount of input tax credit carried forward as on the date of migration to GST - However, it claimed that such amount of credit did not reflect in the electronic credit despite compliance with the provisions for transition of credit - It also claimed to have filed Form GST TRAN-1 - The assessee also claimed to have apprised the GSTN of this issue but elicited no response - Hence the present writ seeking appropriate directions.

Held - The assessee is directed to approach the jurisdictional Assessing Officer or GST Officer as per the mandate of CBIC circular dated 03.04.2018 and make representations in this regard within two weeks - Such officer would forward the application to the Nodal Officer concerned within one week - The Nodal Officer would forward the same to the Grievance Committee of the GSTN, which would expeditiously take appropriate action within six weeks: HC (Para 4,6)

Writ petition disposed of

2018-TIOL-110-HC-MAD-GST

M ELANGOVAN Vs ASSISTANT COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER (SD) : MADRAS HIGH COURT (Dated: August 28, 2018)

GST - The assessee had engaged a contractor for getting some work done - The assessee was later served an SCN proposing to levy duty and impose penalty on such transaction - The assessee challenged such levies on grounds that the invoice for such work had been raised before 01.07.2017.

Held - The assessee is entitled to raise all objections by means of the reply to SCN - Hence it is for the officers concerned to look into the objections raised by the assessee and pass orders on merits - As any view expressed in an SCN is prima facie the assessee cannot claim that the issue has been pre-determined against it - The present writ is pre-mature & being filed to contest an SCN, it is not maintainable - Nonetheless the Asst Commercial Tax Officer is directed to pass appropriate orders within four weeks - Meanwhile no coercive measures be taken against the assessee: HC (Para 3,6,8)

Writ petition disposed of

2018-TIOL-1776-HC-AHM-IT + Case Story

SADHNA RAMCHANDRA JESWANI Vs ITO : GUJARAT HIGH COURT (Dated: August 27, 2018)

Income tax - Writ - Section 179

Keywords - recovery from ex-Director - mis appropriation of funds - outstanding dues of company

The assessee is an ex-director of one Brajvashi Caterers Private Limited. For the A.Y 2010-11, the AO passed an order of assessment in case of said company imposing demand of unpaid tax of Rs. 17.06 lacs. However, since the company did not pay the same, the AO desired to invoke section 179 and issued notice to the assessee requiring him to show cause as to why he should not be recovered for outstanding dues of the company in his capacity of Director. In response, the assessee opposed the notice contending that she had already resigned as Director from the company w.e.f. Dec 29, 2009. Since her resignation, she had no association with the company and the affairs of the company were managed by one Narendrasinh Chauhan along with his brother Kalpeshkumar Chauhan and another. The assessee explained that these directors had defrauded the company and the Revenue. Thus, it was pleaded that there was no negligence, misfeasance or breach of duty on her part as a director which led to revenue defalcation. The AO however, ignored such pleas and passed an order asking her to pay up dues of the company, observing that no provision was made by the company or any of its Directors to ensure payment of government dues which were bound to arise on account of deliberate and known acts of gross neglect, misfeasance and breach of duty by all directors of the company.

On Writ, the HC held that,

Whether Section 179 permits lifting of corporate veil for recovery of unpaid tax dues of a private company from its directors, without establishing that non-recovery was on account of misfeasance or breach of duty on part of such directors in relation to affairs of company - NO: HC

++ it is noticed that section 179 would enable the Revenue to recover unpaid tax dues of a private company from its director, unless he proves that the non-recovery cannot be attributed to any gross negligent, misfeasance or breach of duty on his part in relation to the affairs of the company. Of course this requirement is cast in the negative and the burden is on the person who was a director of the company at the relevant time to establish the relevant facts. Nevertheless, it would be the onus of AO to draw the primary facts to the notice of assessee on the basis of which, he proposes to invoke powers u/s 179 of the Act. Essentially, this statutory provision provides for lifting of corporate veil and enable the Revenue to recover the unpaid tax dues of a private company from its directors, provided the requirements referred to in sub-section (1) of section 179 are satisfied;

++ it is found that in the showcause notice, the AO has not laid down sufficient foundation for invoking section 179, leave alone broadly pointing out he has not even alleged that non-recovery was on account of gross negligent, misfeasance or breach of duty on part of assessee in relation to the affairs of the company. His final conclusions in the order are therefore based on the material at his command which was never shared with the assessee. In the result, the order passed by AO is set aside only on this ground making it clear that nothing stated in the order would prevent the AO from initiating fresh exercise for the same purpose, if so advised and, if the material at his command is sufficient to permit him to do so.

Assessee's petition allowed

2018-TIOL-1777-HC-MAD-CX

BHEL Vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER CGST & CE: MADRAS HIGH COURT (Dated: August 27, 2018)

CX - The assessee company is a PSU, engaged in manufacture of boilers, steam generators, parts of water tube boilers, valves, parts of valves, pressure vessels and heat exchangers, parts of pressure vessels and heat exchangers - It availed credit of EC & SHEC and Krishi Kalyan Cess (KKC) on input goods - Such credit was utilized during clearance of final products - As the assessee was unable to carry forward such amounts paid, it claimed refund of the same - The Department issued SCN directing the assessee to produce requisite documents and appear for hearing - However, the assessee received the notices on the date of the hearing itself - Hence it sought a fortnight's period of time to appear with relevant records - However, the Revenue proceeded to reject the refund claim without permitting personal hearing - Hence the present writ alleging violation of principles of natural justice.

Held - The assessee's contention of delayed receipt of SCN is not contested by the Revenue - Its request seeking extention of time for producing relevant documents was not considered - The Revenue could not have passed the order rejecting the refund claim without giving the assessee an opportunity to make its case - An order so passed is in contravention of the principles of natural justice - Hence the orders are set aside and the matter is remanded for fresh consideration - Assessee directed to appear for personal hearing and produce requisite documents: HC (Para 2,4,5)

Writ petition allowed

2018-TIOL-1775-HC-MAD-IT

CHEMPLAST SANMAR LTD Vs ACIT : MADRAS HIGH COURT (Dated: August 7, 2018)

Income tax - abandoned project - pre operative expenses - revenue expenditure

The assessee company is engaged in the business of manufacture of PVC and caustic soda and also in the business of shipping. For the relevant A.Y 2000-01, they filed their return admitting 'NIL' income under normal computation and Rs.9,67,19,274/- under the provisions of Section 115JA, and paid tax to the tune of Rs.3,72,36,920/- u/s 115JA. The said return was also processed u/s 143(1). of the Act. Subsequently, it came to the notice of AO that the assessee had intended to start a textile business in the A.Y 2000-01 and since the project did not materialize, the assessee decided to abandon the project and in view of the same, they incurred an expenditure of Rs.2,38,25,383/- and treating the expenditure as revenue expenditure, it was returned in the books. The AO therefore, while considering the preoperative expenses of taxable project, held that the act of assessee in debiting the capital expenditure to its P&L A/c was not in accordance with the provisions of law and accordingly, disallowed the same.

On appeal, the FAA relied upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of EID Parry (India) Ltd. Vs. CIT - 2003-TIOL-292-HC-MAD-IT and held that since the expenditure was incurred for the purpose of setting up a new project, which was subsequently abandoned, the nature of expenditure would not change from capital to revenue. On further appeal, the Tribunal concurred with the findings of the FAA and held that the textile project was totally a new project for the assessee, therefore, the expenditure incurred in attempt to commence production of new article could only be construed as capital expenditure.

On appeal, the HC held that,

Whether the proper test to be applied for deciding allowability of expenses incurred on a new project, is the unity of control, management & common fund, but not the nature of new business - YES: HC

++ the assessee's case is that the decisive factors for allowance of expenditure are unity of control, management inter connection, inter lacing, inter dependent, common fund, etc. In other words, if these factors are fulfilled, then the expenditure should be allowed even if the project is a new one. In this regard, it is noticed the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Jay Engineering Works Ltd., which took into consideration all the relevant decisions on the point, some of which are identical to the facts of the present case in the sense that the assessee ran a particular line of business and wanted to start a different line of business, for which, expenditure was incurred and subsequently, the business was abandoned and the question was as to how the expenditure had to be treated. The Delhi High Court in the said case of Jay Engineering Ltd, observed that: "....the nature of the new business is not a decisive test for determining whether or not there is an expansion of an existing business. What is of importance is that the control of both the ventures, the existing venture as well as the new venture, must be in the hands of one establishment or management or administration. The place of business of the existing business and the new business may not be in close proximity. However, the funds utilised for management of both the concerns must be common as reflected in the balance sheet of the company...." Thus, it is clear that if unity of control, management and common fund are with the assessee, then it is no matter as to whether a totally different line of business is started by the assessee. Thus, unity of control is the decisive test and not the nature of two lines of business;

++ a perusal of the order of CIT(A) shows that, it has been observed that all the heads, under which, expenditure relating to textile project was incurred, are generally revenue expenditure. It is not known as to what made the Authority to take a different decision after having accepted that they are revenue expenditure and however, ultimately, the CIT(A) concluded that on account of new line of business, the expenditure was a capital expenditure, which has been held as not a decisive test. As admitted by the CIT(A), the preoperative expenses are all generally revenue expenditure and by applying a wrong test, which is not the decisive test, the Authorities had concurrently committed an error in treating the expenditure as capital expenditure. For all these reasons, the order passed by the Tribunal calls for interference.

Assessee's appeal allowed

2018-TIOL-1774-HC-MAD-IT

ARUL MARIAMMAL TEXTILES LTD Vs ACIT : MADRAS HIGH COURT (Dated: August 7, 2018)

Income tax - Sections 80I, 80IA, 147 & 148

Keywords - eligible industrial undertakings - foreign letter of credit - interest income - margin money

The assessee company had filed return for the A.Y 1996-1997 claiming that in respect of two units, one situated at Pondicherry and another outside, a total interest income on the monies kept with the bank by way of margin money for taking foreign Letter of Credit by the Assessee to the tune of Rs.74,34,478/-, was eligible to be claimed as deduction u/s 80IA. The assessment was however completed u/s 143(3) r/w/s 147 disallowing the interest income.

On appeal, the CIT(A) reversed the order of AO. Challenging the same, the Revenue preferred appeal before the ITAT, whereby it was allowed, holding that the income derived from eligible business of an undertaking alone was eligible for deduction and the interest income derived from an industrial undertaking was not eligible for deduction u/s 80IA. This was challenged by the assessee by way of a Miscellaneous Petition for recall of its order. Though the Tribunal allowed Miscellaneous Petition and restored the matter for deciding afresh, the assessee did not co-operate for the disposal of appeal and sought for adjournment, which, in the opinion of the Tribunal was a delaying tactic. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the wordings of Section 80I and 80IA were identical and both the Sections use the expression "any profits and gains derived from industrial undertaking".

On appeal, the HC held that,

Whether accrual of interest on FDs kept by an industrial undertaking with banks as a pre-condition, so as to enable them to import critical component for purpose of manufacturing, is no basis to deny deduction u/s 80IA - YES: HC

++ it is seen that the Tribunal reiterated its earlier order, wherein, the Revenue's appeal was allowed and even at that stage, the Assessee did not appear before the Tribunal. The Tribunal followed the decision in Pandian Chemical's case and held that Assessee is not entitled for deduction u/s 80IA. The application filed by the Assessee to recall the said order was allowed and the Tribunal afforded one more opportunity to the Assessee. Nevertheless, the Assessee appeared before the Tribunal and sought for adjournment, which in the opinion of the Tribunal was a delaying tactics and accordingly, it reiterated its order and held that the interest earned from bank deposit for the purpose of margin money do not qualify for deduction. Thus, this Court is first required to examine as to whether the decision in Pandian Chemical's case would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. Referring to the factual position in assessee's case, it is seen that the margin money by way of fixed deposit was available with the Assessee's bankers so as to enable the Bank to open a Foreign Letter of Credit, which was essential for the purpose of import of critical components for the purpose of manufacture of the wind mill for generation of electricity. As far as the case of Pandian Chemical's is concerned, it arose out of a claim u/s 80HH, and the Supreme Court referring to the decision of Privy Council in case of CIT V. Raja Bahadu Kamakhaya Narayan Singh - 2002-TIOL-677-SC-IT-CB, held that although electricity may be required for purposes of an industrial undertaking, the deposit required for its supply is a step removed from the business of industrial undertaking and the derivation of profits on deposits made with the Electricity Board cannot be said to flow directly from the industrial undertaking itself;

++ it is noted that Section 80I, 80IA and 80IB have a common scheme and from a reading of those Sections, it is clear that said sections provide for incentive in the form of deductions, which are linked to the profits and not to investment, whereas, in the other provisions, namely, Sections 80H, 80HH, 80HHA, 80HHB, 80HHBA and 80HHC, the scheme is different. In fact, this distinction was noticed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in K.Ravindranathan Nair V. DCIT - 2003-TIOL-72-HC-KERALA-IT, wherein, the Court, while considering the decision of Apex Court in Karnal Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited, pointed out that the said decision was not rendered in the context of all the provisions of Section 80HHC, as the decision in Karnal Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited followed the decision in the case of CIT V. Bokaro Steels Limited - 2002-TIOL-161-SC-IT. In Karnal Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited, the deposit of money was directly linked with the purchase of plant & machinery and therefore, it was held that any income earned on such deposit was incidental to the acquisition of assets for the setting up of plant and machinery. Therefore, the Tribunal committed an error in allowing the Revenue's appeal by merely placing reliance on the decision in the case of Pandian Chemical's, which arose out of a case u/s 80HH and this error committed by the Tribunal goes to the root of the matter affecting the very correctness of the order passed by the Tribunal. In the case of CIT V. M/s.T.T.G. Industries Limited - 2012-TIOL-739-HC-MAD-IT, the Court pointed out that Section 80IA/80IB has a common scheme and a reading of Section 80IA makes it clear that the only requirement for the applicability is deriving of income by an undertaking or an enterprise from any business referred to in sub section (4) and thus, any profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking from any business would qualify for deduction u/s 80IA;

++ similarly, in the case of CIT V. Shree Rama Multi Tech Limited - 2018-TIOL-153-SC-IT, the Apex Court analysed the purpose of deposit and held that it was not for some additional income, but to comply with the statutory requirements and the interest accrued on such deposit is merely incidental. Thus, this will be the right test to be applied to the present case. Further, in the case of CIT V. Jaypee DSC Ventures Ltd - 2011-TIOL-172-HC-DEL-IT, the High Court held that the deposit made by the Assessee was not the surplus money lying idle with it to earn interest, but it was the amount of interest earned from fixed deposit, which was kept in the bank for the purpose of furnishing the Bank Guarantee. In the present case, the requirement of the Assessee to furnish the fixed deposit was a pre-condition to enable the assessee to open a foreign Letter of Credit for the purpose of import of critical components for the manufacture of wind mill. This incidentally had earned some interest. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Shree Rama MultiTech Limited, it is not the assessee's surplus money, which was deposited by way of fixed deposit, which had earned interest; on the contrary, it was a pre-condition for the purchaser/Assessee to enable him to import the critical component for the purpose of manufacturing. Furthermore, it is not the case of the Revenue that the amount was deposited in fixed deposit solely for the purpose of earning interest nor it is the case of the Revenue that the amount, which was deposited in fixed deposit was a surplus money, which was lying idle in the hands of assessee. Therefore, whatever income accrued is merely incidental and not the prime purpose of doing the act in question, which resulted into accural of some additional income and therefore, the said income is not liable to be assesseed and is eligible to be claimed as deduction.

Assessee's appeal allowed

2018-TIOL-1773-HC-AHM-IT

SHOBHABEN KIRANKUMAR VASANI Vs ITO : GUJARAT HIGH COURT (Dated: August 14, 2018)

Income tax - Writ - Sections 143(1), 147 & 148

Keywords - cash payments - reasons for reopening - undisclosed investment

The assessee, a real estate developer, had filed its return declaring "Nil" income and the same was accepted without scrutiny u/s 143(1). Subsequently, an information was received from ACIT, Ahemdabad showing seizure of various incriminating materials from the premises Venus Group, on the basis of search proceedings conducted u/s 132. As per the seized material, it was found that the present assessee was one of the parties to the transaction of several land properties with the Venus Group in various years. The total amount of cash transaction included in the sale of land at Tarapur/Sargasan carried out by the group was Rs.33,24,89,500/- and the total area was 84,732 Sq. metres, whereas the share of assessee on the land at Sargasan was 53,813 sq. Meters, which worked out to 63.51%. Therefore, assessee's share in the unaccounted portion of cash transaction was Rs. 21,11,62,931/-. Thus, the source of cash investment of Rs. 2,95,62,810/- for purchase of land during the previous year was unaccounted income of assessee, which remained unexplained. In view of the same, the AO had reasons to believe that unaccounted cash expenditure had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147, and accordingly, he issued reopening notice u/s 148. Upon being supplied reasons for such reopening, the assessee raised objections, but in vain.

On Writ, the HC held that,

Whether sufficient material available on record to form a belief that cash payments were made during relevant year for purpose of undisclosed investment, necessitates reassessment - YES: HC

++ in in the present case, the assessment of both the assesses were made u/s 143[3] without any scrutiny. As per the AO, there is prima facie material to suggest cash payments for purchase of land in different proportion by the assessees. It is seen that larger issues were examined by this Court in the judgment dated April 02, 2018 which cover number of assesses of the same group and concerned respective notices for reopening of their assessments for earlier A.Y 2010-2011. All contentions for and against were examined and petitions were dismissed. Broadly, the very same issues arose in the present petitions except an additional element that no taxing event took place during the present year. Such contention cannot be accepted. Prima facie, the AO has material at his command to form a belief that payments in cash were made not for purchase of land property and these payments were made during the period relevant to the year under consideration. If these facts are ultimately established, the question of taxing the assessees for such undisclosed investment would immediately arise. Reopening of the assessments therefore cannot be quashed.

Assessee's petition dismissed

2018-TIOL-1772-HC-DEL-CX

MOTHERSON SUMI ELECTRIC WIRES Vs UoI: DELHI HIGH COURT (Dated: July 12, 2018)

CX - Whether the petitioner who has manufactured and supplied goods (after payment of excise duty via the cenvat credit route) to a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) is entitled to claim refund of Terminal Excise Duty (TED).

Held: The Policy Relaxation Committee's [PRC] decision is neither consistent nor even handed - though the petitioner obtained refund of TED for the quarter April, 2011 to June, 2011 and July, 2011 to September, 2011 despite PRC's earlier decision of 04.12.2012, the third application for the quarter October, 2011 to December, 2011 was rejected despite the facts and circumstances of the case being pari materia with other two quarters - PRC and the respondent no.3 should have acceded to the petitioner's request for grant of TED for the quarter October, 2011 to December, 2011 as it was a period which fell prior to the issuance of the amendment notification No.4 dated 18.04.2013 - Circular No.16, dated 15.03.2013 cannot impact the application(s) for refund pertaining to the period prior to 18.04.2013 - FTP 2009-2014 conferred a right on the petitioner, who, admittedly, was a DTA supplier, at the relevant point in time, to seek refund of TED, as the supplies had been made to 100% EOUs, albeit, under a non-ICB route - the argument that since excise duty was not paid via cash but was paid by utilizing the cenvat credit route and hence, the petitioner would not be entitled to claim refund is unsustainable as there is no bar in law in paying duty by utilizing cenvat credit - writ petition allowed - the impugned communication dated 21.04.2016, issued by respondent no.3, whereby the petitioner's claim for refund was declined is set aside - the respondents are directed to refund TED to the petitioner, albeit, to the tune of Rs.83.64 lakhs for the period spanning between October, 2011 and December, 2011 after due verification : HIGH COURT [para 9, 14, 15, 15.1, 19]

Writ Petition allowed

2018-TIOL-1771-HC-MAD-CUS

RAVINDRA KUMAR Vs CC: MADRAS HIGH COURT (Dated: August 11, 2018)

Cus - The Single Judge, vide impugned order - 2018-TIOL-733-HC-MAD-CUS., rejected the prayer of the appellant for desealing the godown or the return of the consignments and directed the respondents/Department to issue fresh summons to the appellant - appellant in writ appeal before High Court.

Held : Customs Authorities can seal the godown, alongwith the goods inside as a preventive measure to restrain the godown owner from using the godown for keeping illegally removed goods, atleast till such time, the proceedings of confiscation, regarding the goods, being adjudicated upon - the owners of these goods have not claimed for release of these goods - this leads to the very strong suspicion that these goods had been removed from CFS without proper documentation or on forged papers - investigation regarding these goods is going on - the respondent, by order dated 24.4.2018, has extended the period to issue SCN and this order has not been challenged - the authorities are directed to complete the investigation forthwith and pass orders - desealing cannot be permitted till the finality of the proceedings initiated under section 124 of the Customs Act - hence, the writ appeal is dismissed : HIGH COURT [para 11, 17, 18, 19]

Writ Appeal dismissed

2018-TIOL-1770-HC-AP-CUS

ANDHRA PETROCHEMICALS LTD Vs UoI: ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT (Dated: July 31, 2018)

Cus - Grievance of the petitioner is with regard to the Final Findings dated 28.11.2017 recorded by the Designated Authority [DA], Directorate General, Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties, terminating the investigation undertaken by him under the Rules of 1995 - a direction is sought to set aside the said findings and to direct the said DA to recommend to the Central Government to levy anti-dumping duty on imports of normal Butanol or N-butyl Alcohol, originating in and exported into India from Saudi Arabia.

Held: Refusal by the DA to look into any possible threat of injury or material retardation to the establishment of any industry in India falls short of the statutory mandate - the findings recorded by the DA clearly demonstrated sufficient evidence of dumping within the short span of three months by the exporters/producers from Saudi Arabia and also the injury caused to the domestic industry thereby - therefore, the DA could not have taken recourse to Rule 14(b) of the Rules of 1995 for justifying the termination of investigation - in fact, none of the clauses in Rule 14, which deals with termination of investigation, had application whereby the designated authority could have taken such a step - when the DA found that several other countries who were exporting the very same product to India had been subjected to anti-dumping measures, allowing exporters/producers from Saudi Arabia to do so without subjecting them to the same anti-dumping measures, even though their activities within a short span of three months clearly indicated their invasive capturing of the domestic market and the consequential injury to domestic industry, was clearly not warranted - the DA, having recorded findings in support of the injury sustained by the domestic industry by dumping of like products by exporters/producers from Saudi Arabia, failed to carry through on the same note and strangely did a volte-face, when it came to the final recommendation - this was on the strength of his misconceived notion that a three month span of dumping was insufficient for recording a finding - there is no such mandate in the Rules of 1995 - the Final Findings dated 28.11.2017 are set aside and the matter is remitted to the DA for consideration afresh - the writ petition is, accordingly, allowed to the extent indicated: HIGH COURT [para 23, 24, 25, 27, 28]

Writ Petition allowed

2018-TIOL-1767-HC-KERALA-IT

NORTRANS MARINE SERVICES PVT LTD Vs ACIT : KERALA HIGH COURT (Dated: August 6, 2018)

Income Tax - Section 36(1)(v).

Keywords - Deduction - Indemnification of the gratuity & Premium policy.

The assessee company, involved in the business of one Trans Asian Shipping Services Pvt.Ltd exclusively carrying on the agency of Norasia Lines (Malta) Ltd. Further, when the business was taken over, the employees of the earlier company was also took over on specific agreement as to continuation of service without any break, as also statutory benefits including gratuity. Accordingly, the assessee took out a policy from the Life Insurance Corporation of India to indemnify the gratuity payments of the retiring employees. Further, the assessee claimed deduction u/s 36(1)(v). During the assessment proceeding, the AO computed the initial contribution at Rs 32,90,843/- and disallowed the excess claim of the assessee. Hence, the disallowance was made when the employees were not employed under the present appellant/assessee. On appeal, the FAA and Tribunal agreed with the order of the AO.

On appeal, the High Court held that,

Whether LIC premium paid for the policy taken for indemnification against the gratuity liability is allowable deduction u/s 36(1)(v) - YES: HC

++ the entire contributions paid by the appellant/assessee to the LIC as premium for the policy obtained for indemnification of the gratuity liability towards the employees even for the prior years, when the employees were in the employment of the Company taken over, would be eligible for deduction u/s 36(1)(v).

Assessee's appeal allowed

SHAMBHUBHAI MAHADEV AHIR Vs ITAT : GUJARAT HIGH COURT (Dated: August 20, 2018)

Income Tax - Sections 153A.

Keywords - Additional income - Agriculture income & Search proceedings.

The assessee-individual was going under the search proceeding, for which, he was required to file return in response to which a notice was issued u/s 153A. In the search proceeding, it was found that the was having cash which he disclosed further as income in addition to what the assessee had disclosed in the original returns. During the assessment proceeding, the AO however, framed assessment during such additionally disclosed income as income from undisclosed sources. Further, the matter eventually went up to the Tribunal, where by an order accepted the assessee's contentions and confirmed the position that the additional income disclosed by the petitioner was also agriculture income.

After hearing the parties, the High Court held that,

Whether when the Tribunal has recorded the finding based on materials on record that the additional income disclosed by the assessee post-search is agricultural income, the recalling such an order is an error - YES: HC

++ the Tribunal committed an error in recalling its earlier order. It was an order based on submissions made before the Tribunal and upon consideration of materials on record. The fundamental issue was the the additional income disclosed by the assessee post search, was also agriculture income or that the AO was correct in discarding such a theory of the assessee and treating his income from other sources. Hence, the Tribunal, referred to evidence on record and held that the AO had referred to the submissions of other evidence and to come to a conclusion that the assessee's declaration of the source of income is quite believable. Thus, the Tribunal also noted that no evidence was collected by the Revenue during the search or post search inquiry to hold that the additional income disclosed was not agriculture income.

Assessee petition disposed of

DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF CENTRAL EXCISE INTELLIGENCE Vs VINOD KUMAR GUPTA : DELHI HIGH COURT (Dated: July 26, 2018)

CX - The petition was filed in March 2016 questioning the legality and propriety of the order of anticipatory bail of respondent - It has been pending for the last almost two and half years - It is the case of petitioner that material came to light that certain bogus firms were operating wherein certain accounts were being used in name of dummy parties for fraudulent transactions leading to false claims of CENVAT credit being claimed, such facts indicating violation of provisions of CEA, 1944, meriting, inter alia, criminal action, the offences concededly being cognizable and non-bailable - The role of respondent also came under scrutiny in said matter and he was called for inquiry - Against this backdrop, the respondent get anticipatory bail subject to certain conditions - When the petitioner was called upon to make his submissions, his only argument was that there was no move initiated to put the respondent under arrest and, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Sessions court under Section 438 Cr. PC was bad in law - On being asked about the status of investigation of the case and as to what evidence against the respondent as to his involvement or complicity had come up in the investigation that has been undertaken thus far, the court was informed that the investigation was still incomplete - Such non-serious pursuit of matter cannot take the petitioner anywhere - The petition cannot continue to hang like a democle's sword over the head of the respondent indefinitely - The petitioner would have the liberty to oppose the grant of regular bail to the respondent in the event of a case being presented upon conclusion of the investigation for cognizance thereupon to be taken up by the competent court it leading to issuance of the process against the respondents: HC

Petition dismissed

KINGFISHER AIRLINES LTD Vs CST: BOMBAY HIGH COURT (Dated: August 27, 2018)

CX -Even in respect of a lis which arose prior to 06/08/2014, provisions of amended Section 35F of CEA, 1944 would apply where appeal has been filed after 06/8/2014 – Issue is now stands concluded against assessee and in favour of Revenue by decision in Nimbus Communications Limited 2016-TIOL-1708-HC-MUM-ST - Thus, no interference is, called for: HC

Appeal dismissed

A B PAUL & COMPANY Vs UoI : BOMBAY HIGH COURT (Dated: August 27, 2018)

Cus - Penalty - This petition challenges an order passed by Additional Commissioner of Customs who confirms a penalty of Rs.15 lakhs on petitioner under Section 114 (i) of Customs Act, 1962 - The impugned order is dated 30th January, 2012 while the petition has been filed on 18th March, 2016 and there is no explanation in petition for the delay/ laches in moving this Court - Petitioner states that appeals were filed from impugned order to Commissioner (A) and Tribunal which were dismissed - This appeal came to be finally rejected on 18th May, 2015 for failure to comply with the predeposit order dated 29th September, 2014 - Thus, it is submitted that there has been no laches on the part of petitioner - Even, then there is no explanation for above period of 10 months - On the ground of delay alone, court is not inclined to entertain this Petition.

So far as alternate remedy is concerned, petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 30th January, 2012, before Appellate Authority by placing reliance upon Section 28 of the Act to submit that an imposition of penalty beyond a period specified under Section 28 of the Act, to raise demand, is bad in law - Therefore, there is a period of limitation which has been provided under the Act and whether the same applies only for demand of customs duty or extends to imposition penalty, is a question which would entirely depend upon the interpretation of the Act by the Authorities under the Act - Therefore, it is not a case where the authorities under the Act are required to determine the issue outside the four corners of the Act.

Therefore, court is not inclined to entertain the petition on account of laches and more particularly, also on account of fact that Petitioner has alternative remedy available under the Act of filing an appeal to the Appellate Authorities: HC

Petition dismissed

AMBATTUR INFRA DEVELOPERS Vs ACIT : CHENNAI ITAT (Dated: August 01, 2018)

Income Tax - Section 194I

Keywords - Business income - Income from House Property - IT park - Leasing of space - Maintenance services

The assessee company, engaged in building, selling & leasing out of information technology parks, had rented out one such park. On assessment for the relevant AY, the AO noted from the agreements that the assessee received rental receipts as well as maintenance charges. The AO also noted that although the assessee reflected its income as 'Income from Business & Profession', the lesses had deducted TDS u/s 194I on the payments made to the assessee. Hence the AO opined that such income was classifiable under head 'Income from House Property'. Considering the assessee's submissions, the AO also noted that the supporting services such as uninterrupted power supply, air conditioning & communication network were inseparable from the activity of renting out property and that such services had been provided for securing higher rent. The AO accordingly framed assessment order. On appeal, the CIT(A) relied on a plethora of judgments and upheld the findings of the AO.

On appeal, the Tribunal held that,

Whether income arising from leasing out IT park as well as from providing maintenance services, is taxable as business income, where nature of agreement between lessor & lessee amply clarifies intent to only provide space on rent - YES: ITAT

++ The question before us is whether the payments received by the assessee through these two agreements are to be considered under the head income from house property or income from other sources or income from business. The AO himself had observed that assessee had leased out the space along with a host of supporting features which helped its business. Assessee had obtained approval from Department of Information Technology, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India through a letter dated 30.06.2009;

++ Considering the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Velankani Information Systems (P) Ltd what is to be looked into is intention of the parties while entering into the lease. Admittedly, the agreements entered by the assessee with the lessees were contemporaneous. Objects of the lease was to allow enjoyment of the entire property with all services related to its use as technology centers;

++ Contemporaneous nature of the agreements entered by the assessee with its lessees, nature of the premises rented out and object of the assessee firm all demonstrate its intention to provide the space on lease, as a part and parcel of its business; Hence the income of the assessee both from leasing the space as well as providing maintenance services had to be considered only under the head income from business. The Assessing Officer fell in error in treating such amounts under the head income from house property. Hence the assessee's income has to be considered only under the head "income from business".

Assessee's Appeals allowed

2018-TIOL-1395-ITAT-MUM

MUMBAI SEZ LTD Vs DCIT : MUMBAI ITAT (Dated: July 11, 2018)

Income Tax - Sections 143(3) & 263; Rule 8D(i), (ii) & (iii)

Keywords - Power of revision - Social welfare expenses - Twin test for revision

The assessee company, engaged in developing & operating infrastructure facilities & SEZs, filed returns for the relevant AY, reflecting income of Rs 3.06 crores. On assessment, the AO made disallowance of about Rs 11.2 lakhs while also holding that interest income of about Rs 41.02 crores was revenue in nature and so liable to be taxed. While such assessment was completed u/s 143(3), the CIT exercised power of revision u/s 263 to hold that such order was erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue's interests. The CIT directed the AO to examine & quantify expenses to be disallowed u/s 14A r/w Rule 8D & to determine whether welfare expenses if incurred wholly & exclusively for business purposes could be capitalized towards work in progress. The CIT also directed to look into why the assessee had to borrow a sum of Rs 1850 crores when it did not immediately require such funds. It was also directed to look into the assessee's decision to give about Rs 1505.56 crores on grounds of commercial expediency. Hence the present appeal against such findings.

On appeal, the Tribunal held that,

Whether the CIT has the jurisdiction to exercise revisionary powers u/s 263 when the issue of disallowance u/s 14A is pending before the CIT(A) - NO: ITAT

Whether the CIT can exercise power of revision without showing how the original assessment order is erroneous or merely because the AO examined a particular issue in a certain manner - NO: ITAT

++ it is noted that the AO while passing assessment order under section 143(3) made disallowance of Rs 11,26,507/-. The AO made disallowance by invoking the provisions of Rule 8D. The AR for the assessee while making submissions submitted that the disallowance u/s 14A r/w Rule 8D was challenged in appeal before the CIT(A). This fact is not controverted by DR while making his submission. Therefore, as per clause (c) of Explanation 1 of section 263 the CIT has no jurisdiction to revise the disallowance u/s 14A. Hence, the assessee succeeds on this issue;

++ regarding the CIT's findings about social welfare expenses, no query was raised by the AO while passing assessment order u/s 143(3). The assessee has not place any material before us to substantiate if any inquiry was made by the AO during assessment. However, the AR for the assessee in support of his submissions relied on the decision of Apex Court in Sri Venkata Satyanarayan Rice Mill Contractors Co Vs CIT. In Sri Venkata Satyanarayan Rice Mill Contractors Co. the Apex Court held that contribution to Public welfare fund, whether voluntarily or at the instance of authorities for public cause in public interest not opposed to public policy is allowable expenditure. Further in CIT Vs Velumanickum Lodge the Madras High Court held that construction of Hockey Stadium by assessee with a view for the use of Public at large and for generating goodwill and such construction is not prohibited by law, therefore, allowable u/s 37 of the Act. Considering the contention of AR for the assessee it is held that the expenses incurred on Social welfare are allowable expenses. However, as this issue was not examined by AO during assessment, the AO is directed to verify the facts and the expenses and allow relief to the assessee;

++ regarding the issue of securing loan at higher rate of interest and lending at lower rate to DIHL & capitalized as work in progress in absence of commercial expediency, the AO called for the necessary details and after examining taxed it accordingly. The mere facts that in the view of the CIT, the AO has not examined the issue in a particular way are not correct. The Jurisdictional High Court in CIT Vs Gabriel India held that if the AO is acting in accordance with law & makes a certain assessment, the same cannot be branded as erroneous by the Commissioner simply because, according to him, the order should have been written more elaborately. This section does not visualize a case of substitution of the judgment of the Commissioner of Income Tax for that of the ITO, who passed the order, unless the decision is held to be erroneous. Cases may be visualized where the ITO while making an assessment examines the accounts, makes enquiries, applies his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and determines the income either by accepting the accounts or by making some estimate himself. The Commissioner, on perusal of the records, may be of the opinion that the estimate made by the officer concerned was on the lower side and left to the Commissioner he would have estimated the income at a figure higher than the one determined by the ITO. That would not vest the Commissioner with power to reexamine the accounts and determine the income himself at a higher figure. It is noted that the CIT has not given any finding that order passed by AO is erroneous. The CIT held that issue of non-capitalization of interest, not required to be borne by assessee, will have revenue affect in future as and when capital work in progress is sold or at the time of claiming depreciation. Thus, the twin condition order prescribed under section 263 are not satisfied. The AO has taken a reasonable and possible view. Therefore, the assessee also succeeded on this issue.

Assessee's appeal partly allowed

 

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