Dated: May 31, 1949
Mr. Das says that his province has got competent persons to be Governors of province I said yesterday that all provinces have able men and there should be no grouse that a particular province has been ignored, for the purpose of appointing Governors; Mr. Das cheered what I said. But today he seems to have understood something different and he raises points of order every time. I do feel, Sir, that whosoever may be Prime Minister in the future, whosoever may be President, he should see that the question of all the provinces is borne in mind. It is not as if able men exist only in a few provinces. Able men exist today in all the provinces, and in making selections, the President should bear in mind this fact. He should not look with any narrow vision, and he should see that able men in the other provinces also get their chance. The view that a person from his province should not be appointed a Governor, I strongly hold, and I tell you if that policy is adopted we will simply bring the Governor into disrepute. With these words, Sir, I whole-heartedly support the amendment.
The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha: Sir, I move:
"That the question be now put."
Shri B. Das: Sir, before the closure is moved, I would request that I may be given an opportunity of clarifying certain points, though I am bound to vote for the amendment.
Mr. President: It is any use speaking against the amendment when you are going to vote for the amendment. I cannot allow the kind of thing.
B. Das: We have been tied down.................
Mr. President: If you are tied down you have tied down yourself in this House everybody is free to vote as he likes.
The question is:
"That the question be now put."
The motion was adopted.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:(Bombay: General) : Mr. President, Sir, after such a prolonged debate on the amendment I think it is quite unnecessary for me to take the time of the House in making any prolonged speech. I have risen only to make two things clear: one is to state to the House the exact correlation between the two alternatives that have been placed by the Drafting Committee before the House and amendment No. 2015 which has been debated since yesterday. My second purpose is to state the exact issue before the House, so that the House may be able to know what it is that it is called upon to bear in mind in deciding between the alternatives presented by the Drafting Committee and the new amendment.
Sir, the first alternative that has been put by the Drafting Committee is an alternative which is exactly in terms of the decision made by this House some time ago in accordance with the recommendations of a Committee appointed to decided upon the principles governing the Provincial Constitution. The Drafting Committee had no choice in the matter at all because according to the directions given to the Drafting Committee it was bound to accept the principle which had been sanctioned by the House itself. The question, therefore, arises: why is it that the Drafting Committee thought it fit to present an alternative? Now, the reason why the Draft Committee presented an alternative is this. The Drafting Committee felt, as everybody in this House knows, that the Governor is not to have any kind of functions-to use a familiar phraseology, "no functions which he is required to discharge either in his discretion or in his individual judgment." According to the principles of the new Constitution he is required to follow the advice of his Ministry in all matters. Having regard to this fact it was felt whether it was desirable to impose upon the electorate the obligation to enter upon an electoral process which would cost a lot of time, a lot of trouble and I say a lot of money as well. It was also felt, nobody, knowing full well what powers he is likely to have under the Constitution, would come forth to contest an election. We felt that the powers of the Governor were so limited, so nominal, his position so ornamental that probably very few would come forward to stand for election. That was the reason why the Drafting Committee thought the another alternative might be suggested.
It has been said in the course of the debate that the argument against election is that there would be a rivalry between the Prime Minister and the Governor, both deriving their mandate from the people at large. Speaking for myself, that was not the argument which influenced we because I do not accept that even under election there would be any kind of rivalry between the Prime Minister and the Governor, for the simple reason that the Prime Minister would be elected on the basis of policy, while the Governor could not be elected on the basis of policy, because he could have no policy, not having any power. So far as I could visualise, the election of the Governor would be on the basis of personality: is he the right sort of person by his status, by his character, by his education, by his position in the public to fill in a post of Governor? In the case of the Prime Minister the position would be : is his programme suitable, is his programme right? There could not therefore be any conflict even if we adopt the principle of election.
Other arguments is, if we are going to have a Governor, who is purely ornamental, is it necessary to have such a functionary elected at so much cost and so much trouble? It was because of this feeling that the Drafting Committee felt that they should suggest a second alternative. Now so far as the course of debate has gone on in this House, the impression has been created in my mind that most speakers feel that there is a very radical and fundamental difference between the second alternative suggested by the Drafting Committee and this particular amendment. In my judgment there is no fundamental distinction between the second alternative and the amendment itself. The second alternative suggested by the Drafting Committee is also a proposal for nomination. The only thing is that there are certain qualifications, namely, that the President should nominate out of a panel elected by the Provincial Legislature. But fundamentally it is a proposal for nomination. In that sense there is no vital and fundamental difference between the second alternative proposed by the Drafting Committee and the amendment which has been tabled by Mr. Brajeshwar Prasad. In other words, the choice before the House, if I may say so, is between the second alternative and the amendment. The amendment says that the nomination should be unqualified. The second alternative says that the nomination should be a qualified nomination subject to certain conditions. From a certain point of view I cannot help saying that the proposal of the Drafting Committee, namely that it should be a qualified nomination is a better thing than simple nomination. At the same time I want to warn the House that the real issue before the House is really non nomination or election-because as I said this functionary is going to be a purely ornamental functionary: how he comes into being, whether by nomination or by some other machinery, is a purely psychological question-what would appeal most to the people-a person nominated or a person in whose nominated the Legislature has in some way participated. Beyond that, it seems to me it has no consequence. Therefore, the thing that I want to tell the House is this: that the real issue before the House is not nomination or election, but what powers you propose to give to your Governor. If the Governor is a purely constitutional Governor with no more powers than what we contemplate expressly to give him in the Act, and has no power to interfere with the internal administration of a Provincial Ministry, I personally do not see any very fundamental objection to the principle of nomination. Therefore my submission is..........
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari: Can he contemplate any situation, where a Governor-whether you call him a mere symbol or not-will not have the power to form the first Ministry? Will he not be competent to call upon any one, whether he has a big majority or a substantial minority? And that is a very big power of which he cannot be deprived under any circumstances.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Well that power an elected or a nominated Governor will have. If he happens to call the wrong person to form a Ministry, he will soon find to his cost that he has made a wrong choice. That is not a thing that could be avoided by having an elected Governor. Such a Governor may have a friend of his choice whom he can call in to form a Ministry and that issue can be settled by the House itself by a motion of no-confidence or confidence. But that is not the aspect of the question which is material. The aspect of the question which is material is: Is the Governor going to have any power of interference in the working of a Ministry which is composed of a majority in the local Legislature? If that Governor has no power of interference in the internal administration of a Ministry which has a majority, then it seems to me that the question whether he is nominated or elected is a wholly immaterial one. That is the way I look at it and I want to tell the House that in coming to their decision they should not bother with the more or less academic question - whether the Governor has to be nominated or to be elected - they should bear in mind this question: What are the powers with which the Governor is going to be endowed? That matter, I submit, is not before us today. We shall take it up at a later stage when we come to the question of articles 175 and 188 and probably by amendment or the addition of some other clause which would give him powers. The House should be careful and watchful of these new sections that will be placed before them at a later stage. But today it seems to me. If the Constitution remains in principle the same as we intend that it should be, that the Governor should be a purely constitutional Governor, with not power of interference in the administration of the province, then it seems to me quite immaterial whether he is nominated or elected.
Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi: Is the honourable Member accepting the amendment?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: I am leaving it to the House.
Mr. President: I shall then put amendment 2015 moved by Shri Brajeshwar Prasad to the vote.
The question is:
"That for article 131, the following be substituted:-
'131, The Governor of a State shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal.'"
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: I think after this all the other amendments to this article fall to the ground and therefore I shall put the article as amendment to the vote.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That article 131, as amendment, stand part of the Constitution."
The motion was adopted.
Article 131, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
* Article 132
Mr. President: We have a number of amendments to this article. Now that we have decided in favour of one alternative, all the amendments to this article. Now that we have decided in favour of one alternative, all the amendments favouring the other alternative naturally fall to the ground. So we shall take up only those amendments which are concerned with the article as now amended. The first amendment is No. 2033 in the name of Shri Brajeshwar Prasad.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: I am not moving it.
Mr. President: There is an amendment by Dr. Ambedkar.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:
"That with reference to amendments Nos. 2033 and 2041 of the List of amendments for article 132, the following article be substituted:-
'Term of office of Governor.-132 (1) The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.
(2) The Governor may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President; resign his office.
(3) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this article, a Governor shall hold office for a term of five years from teh date on which he enters upon his office:
Provided that a Governor shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office.'"
Now, Sir, this article.........
Prof Shibban Lal Saksena: On a point of order. Amendment No. 2033 has not been moved. There is another amentment 2014, to which this is an amendment. But even that has not been moved.
Mr. President: But that has nor been moved.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: amendment No. 2041, stands in the name of Dr. Ambedkar.
Mr. President: Well, he may formally move it.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: I have said that I am moving this in place of that amendment.
Mr. President: Dr. Ambedkar is moving No. 2041.
Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava (East Punjab: General): The practice has been that all these amendments are taken as moved and a person is entitled to move any amendment.
Mr. President: We have not been following that practice.
Then you move your own amendment.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: Sir, I move:
"That for article 132, the following be substituted:-
'132 The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.'"
I commend this amendment for acceptance by the House and I have no further comments to make.
Mr. President: If this amendment is carried, all other amendments fall to the ground. Therefore we shall take up this amendment as covering all the other amendments.
The amendment and the article are for discussion.
Prof. K. T. Shah (Bihar : General): Is my amendment No. 2034 not to be moved? It suggests that the governor shall be irremovable and therefore cannot be included under the amendment moved.
Mr. President: If the five-year term is carried, that falls to the ground.
Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: The main point is whether as he is going to hold office during the pleasure of the President he cannot be removed by the President.
Mr. President: If the amendment of Dr. Ambedkar is carried, then 2034 falls to the ground. But Prof. Shah can speak upon it.
Prof Shibban Lal Saksena: Sir, both may be moved and the House may then choose one of the two.
Mr. President: If Professor Shah wants it he may move it now.
Prof. K. T. Shah: I beg to move:
"That in article 132, after the word 'office' where it occurs for the second time, the words 'and shall during the term be irremovable from his office' be inserted."
The amended article would read:
"The Governor shall hold office for a term of five years from the data on which he enters upon his office and shall during that term be irremovable from his office."
This is, as I conceive it, different fundamentally from the appointment during the pleasure of the President. The House, I am aware, has just passed a proposition by which the governor is to be appointed by the President and it would be now impossible for any one to question that proposition. I would like, however, to point out, that having regard to the appointment as against the elective principle, we must not leave the governor to be entirely at the mercy or the pleasure of the President. We should see to be acting in accordance with the advice of his ministers, if we desire to remove any objection that might possibly be there to the principle of nomination, we should see to it that at least while he is acting correctly, in accordance with the Constitution following the advice of his ministers, he should not be at the mercy of the President who is away from the Province and who is a national and not a local authority. This is all the more important pending the evolution of a convention, such as was suggested by one of the previous speakers, that the appointment, even if agreed to, should be on the advice of the local Ministry. I do not know if such a convention can grow up in India, but even if it grows up, and particularly if it grows up, it would be of the utmost importance that no non-provincial authority from the Centre should have the power to say that the governor should be removable by that authority; So long as he acts in accordance with the advice of the constitutional advisers of the province, he should I think be irremovable during his term of office, that is, five years according to this article.
There is of course a certain provision with regard to resignation voluntarily or other contingencies occurring whereby the Governor may be removed. But, subject to that, and therefore to the entire Constitution, the period should be the whole period and not at the pleasure of the President.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: We have passed the provision that he should hold office during the pleasure of the President.
Prof. K. T. Shah: That has not yet been passed. Because you moved it, if it is to be treated as passed, I have no objection.
Mr. President: There is an amendment by Mr. Gupta which has to be moved. I see that he is not moving it. Then there are the amendments of Saiyid Jafar Imam and Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad. They are not moving them.
Professor Shah may now move his amendments Nos. 2048, 2049 and 2051.
Prof. K. T. Shah: Sir, I move:
"That is clause (b) of the proviso to article 132, after the word 'Constitution', in line 21, the words 'or if found guilty of treason, or any offence against the safety, security or integrity of the Union', be inserted."
That would make, Sir, if accepted, the removal of the governor possible by his own resignation or his being proved guilty of certain offences. This is by way of providing for possible contingencies, not that any one expects or even thinks that it is in the normal course likely that persons of that importance 'would be guilty of such offences. I therefore commend this amendment.
I now move my amendment No. 2049:
"That in article 132 after the existing proviso (b) the following new proviso be added:-
'(b-1) A Governor may be removed from office by reason of physical or mental incapacity duly certified, or if found guilty of bribery or corruption, or as provided for in article 137.'"
These, again, are contingencies which may occur and therefore there must be constitutional authority for the removal of the governor. I think it is nothing but rounding off of the occasions where this extraordinary power may have possibly to be exercised, namely the proving of the governor as guilty of bribery or corruption or mental or physical incapacity duly certified, not merely suspected of such incapacity, but properly certified, and in that case automatically the governor should be removable.
Sir, I now move my next amendment:
"That after article 132, the following new article 132-A be added:-
`132 A. The office of the Governor shall fall vacant by his death before completion of the term of office, or by resignation duly offered and accepted, or as provided for other wise by this Constitution. In the event of the office of the Governor falling vacant at any time, the arrangements made for the discharge of the functions of the Governor during such vacancy shall hold good only pending the election of another Governor as provided for in this Constitution.'"
For this purpose, he will have to be not appointed but elected. This again is providing for a contingency, for an interregnum if I may say so, that is to say, the office of the Governor falling vacant by death, resignation or for any other reason specified in the Constitution, and his successor not being available for the time being. Provision must be made for the discharge of the functions belonging to the Governor during this interim period during which there is no Governor whether appointed or otherwise provided for. I trust that these simple provisions would prove acceptable to the House.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena: Sir, the amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar makes a very great change in the provision originally made in article 132. I am sorry he has not given any reason why he has suggested his fundamental change. Just now we have accepted a provision whereby the Governor shall be nominated by the President. Already we feel that here democracy has been abandoned. Now, Sir, comes this provision whereby the Governor shall hold office only at the pleasure of the President. Even in the case of the Supreme Court, we have provided that once the Judges of the Supreme Court have been appointed, they will be removable only after an address presented by both the Houses of Parliament, and by two-third majority of the members present and voting. In the case of the Governor, you want to make a different provision. It seems to me, Sir, to be an extraordinary procedure and it completely takes away the independence of the Governor. He will be purely a creature of the President, that is so say, the Prime Minister and the party in power at the Centre. When once a Governor has been appointed, I do not see why he should not continue in office for his full term of five years and why you should make him removable by the President at his whim. It only means that he must look to the President for continuing in office and so continue to be subservient to him. He cannot be independent. He will then have no respect. Sir, Dr. Ambedkar has not given any reason why he has made this change. Of course, the election of the Governors has been done away with, but why make him removable by the President at his pleasure? The original article says:-
"A Governor may, for violation of the Constitution, be removed from office by impeachment in the manner provided in article 137 of this Constitution."
It means that a Governor can only be removed by impeachment by both the Houses. Now, he will be there only at the pleasure of the President. Such a Governor will have no independence and my point in that the Centre might try to do some mischief through that man. Even if he is nominated, he can at least be independent if after he is appointed he is irremovable. now, by making him continue in office at the pleasure of the President, you are taking away his independence altogether. This is a serious deviation and I hope the House will consider it very carefully. Unless he is able to give strong reason for making this change, I hope Dr. Ambedkar will withdraw his amendment.
Shri Lokanath Misra (Orissa : General): Mr. President, Sir, after having made the decision that Governors shall be appointed by the President, it naturally follows that the connected provisions in the Draft Constitution should accordingly be amended, and in that view, I accept the amendment that the Governor shall be removable as the President pleases, that is, a Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President and that whenever he incurs the displeasure of the President, he will be out. When the President has appointed a man, in the fitness of things the President must have the right to remove him when he is displeased, but to remove the evil that has now crept in by doing away with election for the office of the Governor, it would have been much better if the State legislature too had been given the power to impeach him not only for violation of the Constitution but also for misbehaviour. I use the word 'misbehaviour' deliberately because, when a Governor who is not necessarily a man of that province is appointed to his office, it is but natural that the people of the province should have at least the power to watch him, to criticise him, through their chosen representatives. If that right had been given, in other words, if the provision for the impeachment of the Governors by the State legislatures had been there, it would have been a safeguard against improper appointment of Governors by the President. One of the main objections to the appointment of the Governor by the President has been that he will be a man who has no roots in the province and no stake, that he will be a man who will have no connection with the people, that he will be a man beyond their reach and therefore can go on merrily so long as he pleases the President, the Prime Minister of the Union and the Premier of the Province. But they are not all. It would have been much better if the Governor's removal had been made dependent not only on the displeasure of the President but on the displeasure of the State legislature also which represents the people and that would have been a safeguard against the evil that has been caused by the provision for the appointment of Governors by the President.
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Sir, the position is this: this power of removal is given to the President in general terms. What Professor Shah wants is that certain grounds should be stated in the Constitution itself for the removal of the Governor. It seems to me that when you have given the general power, you also give the power to the President to remove a Governor for corruption, for bribery, for violation of the Constitution or for any other reason which the President no doubt feels is legitimate ground for the removal of the Governor. It seems, therefore, quite unnecessary to the burden the Constitution with all these limitations stated in express terms when it is perfectly possible for the President to act upon the very same ground under the formula that the Governor shall hold office during his pleasure. I, therefore, think that it is unnecessary to categorize the conditions under which the President may undertake the removal of the Governor.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That with reference to amendment Nos. 2033 and 2041 of the List of Amendments, for article 132, the following article be substituted:-
Term of office of Governor.-(1) The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.
(2) The Governor may, be writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office.
(3) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this article, a Governor shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office:
Provided that a Governor shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office'."
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
" That article 132, as amended, stand part of the Constitution."
The motion was adopted.
Article 132, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
* Article 133
Mr. President: There are several amendment that this article should be deleted. Those are not amendments to be taken up. They are practically negatives ones, and therefore, I take it that they need not be moved.
Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: I would like to say that are unnecessary in the context of the previous article.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That article 133 stand part of the Constitution."
The motion was negatived.
Article 133 was deleted from the Constitution.
* Article 134
Mr. President: We have dropped the first alternative, and we have to take the amendments only to the second alternative, and I think amendment No. 164 standing in the name of Dr. Ambedkar would cover.
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:
"That with reference to amendment No. 2061 of the List of Amendments, for article 134, the following be substituted:-
'Qualification for appointment as Governor-"No person shall be eligible for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India and has completed the age of thirty-five years'."
Sir, may I take it that the amendment is moved?
Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: Mr. President, the Chair and the House can permit the substitution of an amendment.
Mr. President: You need not read the amendment in full.
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Sir, I moved Amendment No. 2061. Sir, I also move that for amendment No. 2061, the following be substituted:-
'Qualification or appointment as Governor.-"No person shall be eligible for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India and has completed the age of thirty-five years'."
(Amendment Nos. 2062, 2065 to 2071, 2075 to 2082, 2084 to 2087, 2089 and 2090 were not moved.)
Mr. President: The question is:
" That with reference to amendment No. 2061 of the List of Amendment, for article 134, the following be substituted:-
'Qualification for appointment as Governor.-"No person shall be eligible for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India and has completed the age of thirty-five years'."
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That article 134, as amended, stand part of the Constitution."
The motion was adopted.
Article 134, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
Mr. President: We may now go to article 135.
Shri A. Thanu Pillai (Travancore): May I know, Sir whether clause (2) of that article stands, or that also goes?
Mr. President: The whole article has been substituted by the amendment.
Shri A. Thanu Pillai: Sir, the amendment reads thus:
"That with reference to amendment No. 2061 of the list of amendments, for article 134, the following be substituted." The original amendment reads thus: " That for the existing clause (1) of article 134, the following be substituted:-"The ultimate effect seems to be, that only sub-clause (1) has been amended and clause (2) will stand as it is.
Mr. President: The effect of the amendment which has been carried is to substitute the whole of article 134 by the amended article.
We may go to article 135.
* Article 135
Mr. President: The motion is:
"That article 135 from part of the Constitution."
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Sir, I moved"
"That in clause (1) of article 135, for the words 'either of Parliament or,' the words of either House of Parliament or of a House' be substituted."
This is a formal amendment.
Sir, I move:
"That in clause (1) of article 135-
(a) for the words 'member of Parliament or' the words 'member of either House of Parliament or of a House' be substituted,
(b) for the words 'in Parliament or such legislature as the case may be' the words in that House' be substituted."
Sir, I moved:
"That in clause (2) of article 135, for the words 'or position of emolument' the words 'of profit' be substituted."
(Amendments Nos. 2092 and 2095 were not moved.)
Shri H.V. Kamath (C.P. & Berar: General): Mr. President, I move:
"That in clause (3) of article 135 the words 'The Governor shall have an official residence, and' be deleted."
Mr. President: "There" also must be deleted.
Shri H.V. Kamath: "There" will remain. "There shall be paid to the Governor such emoluments, etc.,". I wonder why our Constitution should be cumbered with minutiae such as this. This matter about the official residence of the Governor, is, in my estimation, not even a tremendous trifle. Our Constitution would not be less sound if we omitted therein any reference to or mention of the Governor's official residence. Certainly, it stand to reason that the Governor shall have a residence. We do not contemplate that the Governor will be without an official residence. Don't you visualise the Premier in the province having a residence? But have we made mention of such a thing in the Constitution? I do not know whether this was bodily lifted from some of the unimportant constitution of the world. Because, I am sure, the American Constitution makes no mention of the official residence of the President or the State Governors. I do not know which Constitution has given the inspiration to Dr. Ambedkar and his colleagues of the Drafting Committee.
An Honourable Member: Irish Constitution.
An Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: We have passed article 48 exactly in the same terms with reference to the President. Here, we are merely following article 48.
Shri H.V. Kamath: I was coming to that point. I do not know why, simply because the President's residence has been mentioned, the Governor's residence should also be mentioned. It is logical, is it rational, or does Dr. Ambedkar think that because we have committed one little mistake-I should not say that-we should repeat it?
This point was raised by me in the course of the discussion on article 48, Dr. Ambedkar, in his reply to the debate could not give my convincing reply. May I, Sir, for his benefit and to refresh his memory, read from what he said on that occasion? Even with regard to the President's residence, his reply was far from convincing. We have now a nominated Governor. The President, of course, is much higher dignitary than the Governor of a State. It certainly beats me why the Governor's official residence of the President, this is what Dr. Ambedkar said:
"But, the question I would like to ask Mr. Kamath is this. Does he not intend that the President should have an official residence and that Parliament should make provision for it? And is there very much of a wrong if the proposition was stated in the Constitution itself?"
I do not say that it is wrong at all. We are not perpetrating any wrong by mentioning it in the Constitution. But, where is the necessity for this thing to be brought into the Constitution? He went on to say: This is merely a matter of logic". (I wonder what strange logic it was that he had in mind) " I want to know if he does or does not support the proposition that the President should have an official residence." I then interrupted him: "May I know whether the Prime Minister will or will not have an official residence?" He did not give any reply to that, but proceeded: If he accepts that proposition, then it seems to me a matter of small import whether a provision is made in the Constitution itself or whether the matter is left for the future Parliament to decide. The reason why we have introduced this matter in the Constitution is that in the Government of India Act, in the several Orders in Council which have been issued by the Secretary of State under the authority conferred upon him by the Second Schedule of the Government of India Act, official residences, both for the Governor-General and the Governors have been laid down." Simply because the Government of India Act has mentioned that, should we copy it blindly without deliberating at all any further about it? I think that the Constitution is, as I have said already, an elephantine one and it has been encumbered with much unnecessary detail. We are mentioning this here because we are following the Government of India Act, whether logically or illogically. It might have been usefully and reasonably omitted.
One last point. The Governor may have more than one official residence. He may have two residences. Suppose he is to be given two residences; but since the Constitution mentions only one residence, what will happen? I hope Dr. Ambedkar and his wise men will give some thought to this matter. I move, sir
(Amendment Nos. 2097 to 2102 were not moved.)
Mr. President: The amendments and the original article are open for discussion.
Shri B. Das: Mr. President, article 135 deals with Governors' perquisites, honorarium, and housing problem. It is presumed that the Governors should be Congressmen or should have Congress ideals. Although my honourable Friend Dr. Ambedkar did not move his amendment where he wanted to fix the salaries of Governor at Rs. 4,500 p.m. the problem of salaries of Governors, Governor-General or President had been agitating most of us for the last few months. If Governors are to be Congress-minded people, are to follow Congress ideals, the ideals that our worthy leader Rajagopalachari started that every Congressman should live up to Rs. 150 and nothing more-that problem Congressmen in this House at least must face once for all. Why should the Governor-General have at present Rs. 7,500 free of Income-tax? Why should the Drafting Committee or Dr. Ambedkar fix a Salary of Rs. 4, 500 for the Governors? Of course it is presumed income-tax will be deducted from that money.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena: On a point of order. Are we passing the schedule also along with this article.
Mr. President: We are not.
Shri B. Das: I am discussing the principle.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena : We shall have an opportunity of discussing that later on.
Mr. President: Let him develop the argument and I shall see.
Shri B. Das: The moment we pass this article, we give the privilege to the Legislature to fix the salary and we know what is happening. The Parliament on the other side fixed the salary of the Governor-General of Rs. 7,500 free of Income-Tax.
Mr. President: Are you quite correct Mr. Das, about the figure? I understood it was 5,500.
Shri B. Das: No, Sir. Some Honourable Members : It is Rs. 5,500.
Shri B. Das: I am sorry, Sir, I accept that correction. But to me, a Congressman who was fed with the idea of Rs. 150 for every Congress Minister it sound a big sum and we know the Governor-General is drawing a sumptuary allowance of Rs. 63,000.
Mr. President: I think you had better not refer to the Governor-General.
Shri B. Das: The Governor in every province draw sumptuary allowances also. There is something like Rs. 6,000 in poorer provinces and more in rich provinces like Bombay and Madras and it is spent in paraphernalia and in imitation of British pomp and splendour. Is it necessary that this sovereign House would permit or approve the idea that Governors should spend huge sums of money in pomp and splendour and should draw big salaries? Why should a Congressman draw beyond Rs. 3,000 which is maximum limit that my Central Ministers are drawing? I hope Governors are patriots. I know there are certain benighted Knights who have been made Governors. Rs. 3,000 is pretty big sum for them but when everything is new and there is the honour of being called H. E. and being nominated by President, that should I think be sufficient. I am sorry I could not participate in the debate on the previous clauses: but the only thing emerges that these nominated Governors who are actually drones would now apply to the President or the Governor-General that they are candidates for Governors of Provinces: The Drafting Committee and the House has accepted article 133 whereby such nominated creatures will go on all their lives as Governors. The Draft article 133 was that he will hold office only once more.
In another article we discussed about the Supreme Court. We did not want the Judges to accept jobs and hang round in the corridors of Dr. Ambedkar or Sardar Patel. Now we find we create a class of drones in India who will hang round in the corridors of the Governor-General or the Prime Minister of India, and who would like to be perpetual Governors in spite of their being eighty-eight years old or until they fall down. These are things which agitate me most and I hope the House should be very careful in fixing emoluments of the these Governors. The very fact that one is a nominated Governor is enough and if he is a Congressman he will be happy and serve the country and if he is a non-Congressman it is a high honour for him. The emoluments should be fixed either by this House or by the Provincial Legislatures on the Congress standard and I do except the Governors to behave as Congressmen and not as some of the Governors behaved in the past.
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari: Sir, I am glad that this section has been allowed partically to stand as it is. I only do not understand the position taken up by my honourable Friend Mr. Kamath. He was one who has been advocating nomination of the Governor; but it seems that after having nominated him, he wants to throw him away. He wants to leave him to his own resources. He perhaps forgets that this nominated Governor has to go to another Province where he has very few friends. It is different with the Ministers. Ministers in most provinces in India have their residences provided officially. Not only do they have their official quarters, they have also got their furniture, screens, motor-cars, and everything supplied to them.
Shri H. V. Kamath : May I know whether these are mentioned in the Constitution?
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari: They are not in the Constitution, but I am coming to that. That is not in the Constitution because the Ministries are always in the hands of the majority party, and therefore they can have whatever they want. Look at the position of the poor Governor. He is sent out from one province to another province where probably he knows very few persons, where he has probably been foisted upon that province against the will and consent of the Ministry itself. In that case, the least that you can help him is with shelter. If he has a Government Official residence, he can straightaway drive into that place, at least he will have a shelter, and he can look for his food afterwards. But if this is not provided for, then he has to go to this friend and that friend, and ultimately he may fall into the hands of a commercial magnate who will give him shelter, and we know commercial magnates are known to give shelter to this kind of persons holding high positions. But the Governor will fall under the obligation of some merchant Prince of the place.
Dr. P. S. Deshmukh ( C. P. & Berar: General): He may have even to go back to his own province for want of a house. (Laughter)
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari: So I say that official residence will have to be provided for the Governor, otherwise it will be impossible for him to carry on in that Province.
The provision which enables the Provincial Legislature to fix the salary of the Governor is also a very sound proposition, because if the Ministry does not approve of a particular governor, it may reduce his salary to Re. 1 and thus compel him to leave the Province. That is a very strong and good safeguard which has yet been left in this article, because if the majority of the members of the legislature who are bound to reflect the opinion of the province consider that the Governor is not a suitable person for their province, then they can reduce his salary to Rs. 2 or Re. 1 as was done during the days of dyarchy when the Ministers' salaries were reduced to Re. 1 or Rs. 2. This is a mighty weapon in the hands of the Provinces, and I am glad this weapon has been left in the hands of the people of the province.
Secondly, I am interested in the allowances of the Governor. Next to his salary. I like that the Governor should have his allowances. He should have sumptuary allowance. This sumptuary allowance is intended for giving parties, dinner parties, lunch parties and so on to different people. And I should think particularly they should be given and it should be laid down that preference in this matter should be given and it should be laid down that preference in this matter should be given to the members of the legislature. There is no attempt to interface with this sumptuary allowance and therefore, the Governor enjoys this allowance. And if he gets this sumptuary allowance, he must have some official residence. It does not look well that the Governor should give his dinner parties and lunch parties and tea parties in different hotels. He must have a residence for these parties at least. Mr. Kamath is not against this sumptuary allowance, but he does not want the Governor to have a house where he can utilise this sumptuary allowance. What is the Governor to do with the allowance then? The first and foremost duty of a Governor today is to give parties,-dinner-parties, tea-parties and parties of various other kinds. He has got to do it in order to maintain his own popularity, and also to maintain the popularity of the Ministry. If he finds anything wrong anywhere, he has to go out there and deliver some lectures in support of the Ministry. Besides these, there are functions like Prize-distributions, important marriages in high life, - all these things the Governor has got to attend to keep up his popularity. Therefore. I submit that his having an official residence should not be interfered with and this clause should be passed as it stands.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: Mr. President, Sir, I think this is the proper place where I can suggest to the House, and to the members of the Drafting Committee in particular, that they should incorporate some provision to the effect, that the same person may be appointed Governor of two or three or more provinces at a time.
Mr. President: You did not move any such amendment.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: I am not moving any amendment, but I am only suggesting to the House, to change this article so as to accommodate the suggestion that I am making. I feel that my suggestion will effect a great deal of economy, if one Governor is made responsible as the Constitutional Head for the administration of more than one province.
Formerly the provinces of Bihar, Bengal, Orissa and Assam were under one Governor. Ultimately these Provinces will become one once again. With this end in view I am suggesting that the same person may be appointed Governor of two or more Provinces at a time.
Dr. P. S. Deshmukh : Sir, on a point of order. This is contrary to the clause we have already passed that each province shall have a Governor. (Hear, Hear).
Mr. President: I am in entire agreement with Dr. Deshmukh. We have already passed an article that every province shall have a Governor.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: Then I have nothing more to add.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena: Sir, My Friend Mr. B Das raised the question of emoluments of the Governors given in the Schedule mentioned in this article. The question of emoluments attached to our high offices is a very important question. I do not think that under this article we can properly discuss the emoluments given in the Schedule, but as you have ruled that these might be discussed. I would like to say a few words. We as Congressmen are pledged to certain scales and to certain standards of life. But I am sorry to have to say that we have forgotten all that we said before. In Karachi Congress we passed a resolution that the maximum salary of the highest official shall be only Rs. 500 and in view of the present increase in the cost of living it may now be fixed at Rs. 2,000. But here we are providing for a salary of Rs. 4,500 for the Governors. The Governor is merely a cipher, without any function and holding office only during the President's pleasure. I do not think this large amount is necessary for him. In addition to this salary he has his allowances also. When the proper Schedule comes up, I will say more. But here I will only say that by accepting this article, we are not accepting the amounts fixed in the Schedule.
Shri M. Thirumala Rao: Mr. President, Sir, I was under the impression that the Drafting Committee's amendment No. 2100-
"That the following proviso be added to clause (3) of article 135:-
'Provided that the emoluments of the Governor shall not be less than four thousand and five hundred rupees per month.' will be moved.
I think, Sir, that there should be a uniform policy adopted in regard to the emoluments and salaries of these Governors which I think now obtains. There is no use leaving the matter to the sweet will of the respective Legislatures, which may be swayed by so many considerations in fixing the salaries of the Governors. If necessary, Governorships may be divided into different categories, e.g., first-rank, second-rank, etc., according to the income of the provinces. But the Governors' emoluments should not be so variable as to depend upon the respective influences of the legislatures. Governors are expected to enjoy a status, though not power, above the Legislatures and the Ministries and they have to uphold certain tradition and prestige in the eyes of the public. Therefore, their salaries should not be made the play-thing of legislative forms where different parties may have their own motives for reducing the emoluments of the Governors. I suggest, Sir, that both for the President as well as for the Governors the Constitution should fix a certain amount of salary as well as sumptuary and other allowances which should not be subject to the influence of the Legislatures. I wish the Drafting Committee will take up this matter and bring in suitable amendments in this behalf.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: Sir, I want your ruling as to how my amendment is not pertinent. Article 149 says that there shall be a Governor for each State. If only means that there cannot be a Province without a Governor. The article does not debar the same person from being appointed as Governor of two or more provinces at a time.
Mr. President: No occasion for a ruling arises, because the honourable Member did not move his amendment.
I shall now put the amendment to vote. The first amendment is that moved by Dr. Ambedkar.
The question is:
"That in clause (1) of article 135,
for the words 'either of Parliament or' the words 'of either House of Parliament or of a House' be substituted."
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That in clause (1) of article 135-
(a) for the words 'member of Parliament or' the words member of either House of Parliament or of a House' be substituted.
(b) For the words 'in Parliament or such Legislature as the case may be' the words 'in that House' be substituted."
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That in clause(2) of article 135, for the words 'or position of emolument' the words 'of profit' be substituted."
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That in clause (3) of article 135 the words "The Governor shall have an official residence, and' be deleted."
The amendment was negatived.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That article 135, as amended, stand part of the Constitution."
The motion was adopted.
Article 135, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
Mr. President: There is notice of an amendment by Professor Shah suggesting the addition of a new article 135.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Before we go to the next amendment I would like to suggest that in article 135, the word "elected" be dropped.
Mr. President: That is understood.
* New Article 135-A
Prof. K. T. Shah : Sir I beg to move:
"That after article 135 the following new article 135-A, be added:-
'135-A. Every Governor shall, on completion of his term of office and retirement, be given such pension or allowance during the rest of his life as the State Legislature may by law provide;
'Provided that during the life-time of any such Governor who has retired, the pension or allowance granted to him shall not be varied to his prejudice;'
'Provided further that such pension shall be allowed only on condition that any such Governor in retirement does not hold any other office of profit in the State or under the Government of India.'"
Sir, I want by this amendment to secure to eminent public servants and distinguished sons of India who rise to such offices as the Governor of State a decent retirement allowance, so that they should not be exposed to any want or penury, or to any temptation which might lead them to use their influence acquired in the past by holding such offices in any undesirable manner.
The Constitution, Sir, does not provide any such consideration for people who rise to high offices in the State, except in regard to the Judiciary. In the Judiciary this has been provided by the Constitution. Speaking for myself, I do not see any reason why exalted public servants and officers, who have served the State and the country in such high capacities like that of the President, or the Governor, should not be provided for for the rest of their lives, so that they should be free from any want or temptation to utilise their influence in any undesirable manner.
I have not deliberately indicated the scale of such pension. I have also suggested the condition that the pension is payable only if the person concerned retires. That is to say, he really devotes himself for the rest of his life to the honorary service of the country in whatever way may be open to him free from any want, and that he does not hold any other office of profit in the State in which he has been Governor or under the Government of India. If, of course, he holds any other office which carries its own emoluments, he will have to choose between either the pension or those emoluments,. But subject to this, that he holds no other office, the pension should be available to him for the rest of his life in retirement.
The object of providing such security for the persons who have risen to this high level is the same as that which now secures to every workman in civilized nations an old-age pension, a pension or super-annuation allowance, which would be calculated to suffice to maintain him in the standard of life to which he was accustomed while at work. A pension is deferred pay, not paid to the worker while at work; and the analogy will hold here also. This also is a type of work-perhaps the highest of its kind-which should not go unprovided for altogether by the State for the rest of the period on earth of the Parties who have served so eminently the State.
I take it, Sir, that no one would be appointed or elected Governor, who has not in the past, before being so appointed also rendered service, which has earned him the distinction, the eminence of public position that makes him fit for selection as a Governor. That being so, and his services being of that level culminating in his appointment as Governor should, I think in the fitness of things be recognized and rewarded in some such manner as I am suggesting. As I said before, it is not necessary in this Constitution to provide the actual scale of such allowances or pension. All that is necessary is that the principle should be recognised, and I would leave it to the State Legislature to make the necessary provision, on condition however, that the provision once made by law, shall not be varied to the prejudice of the holder of such pension while he enjoys it in retirement. This is a very simple and in my opinion a very fair proposition, provided the House will accept it.
Dr. P. S. Deshmukh: Sir, my Friend Prof. K. T. Shah wants that pensions should be provided for the Governors. I have considerable sympathy for the point of view that he has placed before the House, because as a rule, except under exceptional circumstances, we shall be appointing men from the public life of India to these offices and in Public life there are not many people who have large balances or considerable property. So I think there is everything to be said in favour of making some provision for a public man who, at the fag end of his life more or less, becomes a Governor and is so appointed by the President under the Constitution we are framing but when after the completion of his term of office he retires, has nothing to fall back on. But in spite of all our sympathies we will have also to admit that if we accept the amendment, there are many difficulties that will arise. First and foremost, what would be defined as his term of office? Suppose a person is appointed in a bye-vacancy and he also completes his term of office, whatever it may be. It might six-months, or one year or two years. Does he, Prof. Shah, propose that even such a person should have proportionate pension or whether he would propose something less? Secondly, I do not think this has been followed at any time anywhere so far and those who have had the good fortune of being appointed Governors I do not think, have claimed it or asked for it. On the whole, I think the advantage will remain in not giving any such pension. Of course my Professor friend has advanced the argument that this would be by way of a reward, and if he accepts any other office, then he should not be entitled to any pension. But I think a public man who offers himself for this appointment, will have to content himself with whatever salary that might be given to him during his tenure of office, and I do not think any one would be right in looking forward to a pension. If we provide pension for such people, we will have next to consider the cases of the Ambassadors and many other persons more or less of similar categories. A whole set of people will then be coming forward for these pensions and probably a very large portion of our revenues will have to be spent on these pensions alone. On principle, also, I do not thing it is a good proposal and I therefore oppose it.
Sardar Hukam Singh (East Punjab: Sikh) : Sir, I come here to oppose this motion. I feel there is no justification for lending this additional lustre to our Governors. We have been told that they are figure-heads only and ornamental heads and that they shall have no authority or powers. Again in the way that we are proceeding, I think we are depriving them in the States and Provinces of every authority that they could have. All powers are being centralised. The residuary subjects are also with the Centre. Under such circumstances, when the Governors have to do nothing, when they are only constitutional heads, when they are only ornaments, we have given them sufficient luster by the salary of Rs. 4,500, other emoluments, sumptuary allowances, official residences and such other things. On the other hand, the Professor wants to give those Governors even additional things, so that they might live princely lives even after they have retired.
I am opposed to it and I do not see any justification in giving these additional things to these Governors who would be merely titular heads and denuded of all authority in the provinces or States.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That after article 135 the following new article 135-A, be added :-
'135-A. Every Governor shall, on completion of his term of office and retirement, by given such pension or allowance during the rest of his life as the State Legislature may by law Provide;'
'Provided that during the life-time of any such Governor who has retired, the pension or allowance granted to him small not be varied to his prejudice;'
'Provided further that such pension shall be allowed only on condition that any such Governor in retirement does not hold any other office of profit in the State or under the Government of India.'"
The amendment was negatived.
* Article 136
Mr. President: There is an amendment of which we have received notice, by Dr. Ambedkar. It is No. 2104. There are other amendments which are more or less of a similar nature.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : My amendment in List 2-No. 132-follows more or less the wording of article 49 which this House has passed.
Mr. President: Let the amendment be moved first: then we can take up amendment No. 132. Dr. Ambedkar, I take it that you have moved amendment No. 2104?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:
"That in article 136 for the words "in the presence of the members of the Legislature of the State' the words 'in the presence of the Chief Justice or, in his, absence, any other judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the State' be substituted."
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : Sir, I move:
"That for amendment No. 2106 of the List of amendment, the following be substituted:-
"That in article 136, for the words 'in the presence of the members of the Legislature of the State' the words 'in the presence of the Chief Justice of the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the State or, in his absence the senior most judge of that Court available' be substituted.
This does not need any explanation for the reason that it follows, as I said, the wording of article 49 which the House has adopted. At any rate it would not be proper in view of the different method of selection of the Governor now decided on that he should take the oath before the Legislature. It is only proper that the Chief Justice of the High Court, exercising jurisdiction in relation to the State, should perform the function the function, or in his absence the senior-most judge of the Court.
Sir, I move.
(Amendment Nos. 2105 and 2107 were not moved.)
Shri H. V. Kamath :- Sir, I move:
"That in article 136, for the words I, A.B., do solemnly affirm (or swear) the following "That in article 136, fir the words I, A.B., do solemnly affirm (or swear) the following be substituted:-
swear in the name of God'
"I, A.B, do solemnly affirm.
This follows the amendment which was accepted unanimously by the House about the oath or affirmation to be made by the President under article 49 of the Draft Constitution. You, Sir, were unfortunately not in the Chair on that occasion. You were lying ill at Wardha from which illness happily by the grace of God you recovered rapidly and we are fortunate to have you again in this House to preside over its deliberations.
I do not propose to make any speech, because I have said what I had to say on that occasion. I would only say this that we would be true to our heritage and true to our spiritual genius if we adopt an amendment of this nature, with regard to the oath or affirmation to be made by the Governor of a State. I commend this amendment for the acceptance of the House.
Mr. President: As amendments Nos. 2107, 2108 and 2109 are not, I understand, being moved, does Dr. Ambedkar wish to make any reply to the amendments moved?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir, I accept the amendment moved by Shri T. T. Krishnamachari and also the one moved by my Friend Mr. Kamath.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That for amendment No. 2104 of the List of Amendments, the following be substituted :-
"That in article 136, for the words 'in the presence of the members of the Legislature of the State' the words 'in the presence of the Chief Justice of the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the State or, in his absence the senior-most judge of that Court available' be substituted.'"
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
"That for amendment No. 2106 of the List of Amendments, the following be substituted :-
"That in article 136, for the words 'I, A. B., do solemnly affirm (or swear') the following be substituted:-
swear in the name of God"
'I, A, B, do. solemnly affirm
The amendment was adopted.
Pandit Hirday Nath Kungru (United Provinces : General) : How does the oath read? Is it, "I do swear in the name of God, or I do solemnly affirm," or not? The question is this : some people may think that the Governor should take oath in the name of God. There may however be people in this country who are atheists. (Interruptions) (Mr. President read out the oath) I see that there is an alternative. That is what I wanted to know. Nobody should be compelled to swear in the name of God if-he does not want to do so.
Mr. President: No, no. The question is:
"That article 136, as amended, stand part of the Constitution."
The motion was adopted.
Article 136, as amended, was added to the Constitution. The Assembly then adjourned till Eight of the Clock on Wednesday, the 1st June 1949.
GJPD-Lines S-40 C. A. Deb- 9.8.49.