Constituent Assembly Of India - Volume VII

Dated: December 02, 1948

Sir, I do not say that this article is perfectly worded; nor can I maintain that the exceptions to parts of this article provided by clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) do not curtail the liberty and the right conceded to individual citizens in clause (1). But, as a student of politics, I have to realise that there can be no absolute right and every right has got to be abridged in some manner or other under certain circumstances, as it is possible that no right could be used absolutely and to the fullest extent that the words conveying that right indicate. It is merely a matter of compromise between two extreme views. Having got our freedom only recently, it is possible that we want all the rights that are possible for the individual to exercise, unfettered. That is one point of view. The other view is that having got our freedom, the State that has been brought into existence is an infant State which has to pass through various kinds of travail, and what we could do to ensure that the State continues to function un-impaired should be assured even if it entails an abridgment of the rights conferred by this article. I have no doubt in my mind that, though I have had to say something perhaps harsh on certain occasions in regard to what the Drafting Committee has done generally, in this article, the Drafting Committee has chosen the golden mean of providing a proper enumeration of those rights that are considered essential for the individual, and at the same time, putting such checks on them as will ensure that the State and the Constitution which we are trying to bring into being today will continue unhampered and flourish.

Sir, language is always rather a difficult affair. What language conveys to me it may not convey to another person, and as my honourable Friend Dr. Ambedkar put it, we are legislating in a language which is foreign to us, the exact import of which we do not understand. Should we do it in one of our own languages? The difficulty would be all the greater for the reason that the language of one set of people is not the language of another set of people. Besides, precise thinking in our own language so that we could adopt it for constitutional purposes has not yet developed. Actually we have to depend for the interpretation of the particular restrictions that are enumerated herein on the Supreme Court or some other authority that would come into being in the future, to ensure that the peoples' rights are not abridged.

Speaking today in the context of the situation in which we are placed, we cannot but envisage that those rights will be abridged in order to maintain the stability of the State. This State that has now been brought into being has been put to a lot of travail in the first eighteen months of its existence and every Member of this House knows it. Special powers are needed by the Government to meet not merely with the refugee problem, not merely with the fact that there are various forces in this country which do not like this State to grow in the present form, but also with the various economic troubles that now face this country. Are we to build up our Constitution, putting in these restrictions which are necessary today in the light of things that stand as they stand today, or are we to visualise a time when things will be normal and when it will not be necessary for the State to use these powers, is the problem. Again, I think, the Drafting Committee and my honourable Friend Dr. Ambedkar have chosen the golden mean in this particular matter.

There is one other matter on which I would like to lay stress before I sit down. We in this House, though the bulk of us belong to one party, have got different ideas on economic matters. We were all together in one particular fact that the British should go; we are all united in the desire that we should have a stable constitution which will ensure to the common man what he needs most, what he did not obtain in the former regime. But, in the achievement of that goal in the methodology to be adopted for the achievement of that goal our ideas vary considerably, and vary from one end to the other. I am happy to see that the Drafting Committee has chosen to avoid importing into this particular article the economic implications in the enumeration of fundamental rights that obtain in other constitutions. I think it has been a very wise thing. I know a friend of mine in this House has objected to one particular sub-clause (f) of article 13, namely, to acquire, hold and dispose of property. I would like to assure him and those who hold the opinion that he holds that this does not really mean that there is any particular right in regard to private property as such, no more than what any person even in absolutely socialistic regime will desire, that what he possesses, what are absolutely necessary for his life, the house in which he lives, the movables that he has to possess, the things which he has to buy, should be secured to him, which I think any socialistic regime, unless it be communistic, will concede, is a right that is due to an individual.

Actually the economic significance that attaches to any enumeration of Fundamental Rights, such as the rights conceded in the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution and the addition to these in the Fourteenth Amendment, finds no place so far as this particular Constitution is concerned, and I am able to say that that is one of the bull features of this Draft Constitution. We have chosen to avoid as far as possible, in spite of the fact that the vested interests are still with us and they have a certain amount of influence-we have chosen to avoid as far as possible laying that stress on the importance of the economic surroundings which is a significant feature of the American Constitution, and I do hope that my honourable Friend, who objected to a particular sub-clause in this article namely clause (f), will now realise that it has no meaning so far as property rights are concerned except in something that is dear to an individual and which is very necessary to concede in an enumeration of rights of this nature.

Sir, the future, what it is going to be none of us really know, but we almost of us-envisage that the future will be one which will be bright, the future will be one where the State is going to be progressive, where the State is going to interfere more and more in the economic life of the people not for the purpose of abridgment of rights of individuals, but for the purpose of bettering the lot of individuals. That is the State that I envisage, a State which will not be inactive, but will be active and interfere for the purpose of bettering the lot of the individual in this country; and I do feel, Sir, that as it is a well known canon that in any Constitution that is forged there should be a reconciliation of past political thought which will at once pave the way for a new level of thinking, a new level of progressive and critical thinking. I think those conditions are at any rate possible in an enumeration of the Rights such as is found in article 13. Sir, there is no use our comparing this particular article which happens to be the crux of the Fundamental Rights with either what obtains in the commentaries of the English Constitution or what obtains in the text of the American Constitution or any other Constitution, for the reason that the setting is totally different. There is no use anybody saying that a particular feature is not found in the English Constitution. English jurisprudence is something totally different for the reason that English Parliament does not provide for the enumeration of all these rights which is absolutely based on custom on which you cannot depend for ever because Parliament there is supreme and can make laws contravening every recognised custom. They do not have to have a Constitutional amendment for that purpose. Parliament can formulate new laws which might cut right across the conventions, and the usages of the Constitution established over centuries. But so far as the American example is concerned-and certainly there are other examples which are modeled on the American example-there is one distinction between our own way of thinking and what the Founding Fathers in America thought and what was sustained in America until recently, viz., the economic basis of the American Constitution is something totally different from what we envisage to be the economic basis of our Constitution. So any analogy is only applicable up to a point, and therefore any of our friends who seek to import particular provisions of the American Constitution or particular words either in this particular article or in later articles, have to recognize that the bulk of the opinion of this House is something totally different from the economic bias that more or less determined the American Constitution, right at the inception and later on as well, on which bias legal literature has built up several conventions attached to that Constitution.

Sir, I would like to say this that the amendments proposed by my honourable Friend Dr. Ambedkar particularly to clauses (4), (5) and (6) are a great improvement on the original draft and my own view is that they do take away the lacunae that existed in the original draft. But I should like to lay emphasis on one particular amendment moved by my Friend Mr. Munshi who is not here. The value of that amendment happens to be only, to a very large extent, sentimental. The word `sedition' does not appear therein. Sir, in this country we resent even the mention of the word sedition' because all through the long period of our political agitation that word `sedition' has been used against our leaders, and in the abhorrence of that word we are not by any means unique. Students of Constitutional law would recollect that there was a provision in the American Statute Book towards the end of the 18th Century providing for a particules law to deal with sedition which was intended only for a period of years and became more or less defunct in 1802. That kind of abhorrence to this word seems to have been more or less universal even from people who did not have to suffer as much from the import and content of that word as we did. Just all the same the amendment of my honourable Friend Mr. Munshi ensures a very necessary thing so far as this State is concerned. It is quite possible that ten years hence the necessity for providing in the Fundamental Rights an exclusion of absolute power in the matter of freedom of speech and probably freedom to assemble, will not be necessary. But in the present state of our country I think it is very necessary that there should be some express prohibition of application of these rights to their logical end. The State here as it means in the amendment moved by my honourable Friend Mr. Munshi as I understand it, means the Constitution and I think it is very necessary that when we are enacting a Constitution which in our opinion is a compromise between two possible extreme views and is one suited to the genius of our people, we must take all precautions possible for the maintenance and sustenance of that Constitution and therefore I think the amendment moved by my honourable Friend Mr. Munshi is a happy mean and one that is capable of such interpretation in times of necessity, should such time unfortunately come into being so as to provide the State adequate protection against the forces of disorder.

Sir, one other matter which I would like to mention before I sit down is this. Sub-clause (c) of art. 13 (1) is very important. I do not know if people really realise as they would know in other countries and particularly in U.S. ,labour has had to undergo an enormous amount of trouble to obtain elementary rights on matters of the recognition of their rights, in the matter of the right to assemble together as a Union. I do not think that in my view clause (4) of this particular article unnecessarily abridges the rights conferred by sub-clause (c) of clause (1). My own feeling is that we have more or less sought to cut across the difficulties which the other countries have faced in this particular matter and we have ensured for labour the very legitimate right to come together, to agitate and to obtain for themselves and for the members of their Union the rights that are justly theirs. That I think is more or less a charter for workers in this country and I am happy to see that the vested interests have not tried in any way to abridge this particular right. On the whole, Sir, this particular article with the amendments proposed by my honourable Friend Mr. Munshi and the three amendments proposed for clauses (4),(5) and (6) by Dr. Ambedkar and also the addition of the word `reasonable' which has been brought in by my honourable Friend Mr. Thakur Dass Bhargava, represents in my opinion a fairly reasonable enumeration of our rights and a fairly conservative abridgment of those rights. The working of these particular rights depends upon the genius of our people, upon how we develop ideas of liberty which are still today in a very undeveloped state. It is no doubt true that our leaders are sometimes hasty, they want more powers, when they are faced with difficult situations and they think the only way in which they could deal with them is to have more powers. They do not recognize that they are leaders of the people the chosen leaders of this country each one with a personality of his own and the aggregate effect of their personality and their influence can cut right across the necessity for any drastic powers. That kind of confidence will come only later on-at the moment they merely want to follow in the footsteps of people who preceded us in the government of this country, who had no touch or contact with the people, who could never get on to a platform and persuade the people to do any particular thing, who only wanted powers which could be exercised through the medium of the bureaucracy. That mentality will change, and will surely change, because our leaders are very eminent people. Surely, the House will realise that the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, if they get upon a platform can sway millions of people if they could only get their voices to reach them. It only depends upon the type of leaders that we get for the abridgment of these rights which are enumerated here to become a dead letter, and that is in the lap of the gods. For the time being we have done the very best possible which human ingenuity can devise.

Sir, I support the article before us.

Shri Lakshmi Narayan Sahu (Orissa: General): *[Mr. Vice President, I would like to make an observation with regard to article 13 which is now under discussion. The article confers certain rights on the citizens, but the words 'subject to the other provisions of this article' occurring in the very beginning of the article, serve as a warning to us that the article confers freedom, no doubt, but that it is only within a limited sphere. Moreover the sub-clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) that follow, re-emphasise that unless the freedom granted is enjoyed within the prescribed limits, people would get into great difficulty. I feel, however, that both the words `subject to other provisions of this article' and the sub-clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) should be deleted from the article. We shall be able to visualize the true picture of our freedom only when this has been done. So long as the sub-clauses remain, we can not have a correct picture of our freedom. Moreover I feel that liberty has been considerably narrowed during the drafting process. It is just like the narrowing of the size of a temple as a consequence of its main entrance being made too large during the process of constructing the temple. It is of no use whatever. There is an Oriya proverb which is meant for such a situation. It is-

Ghare na pasuna chal vaguchi Devalku Mukhashala Bil Gala.

It means that it is no use making a house with so small an entrance that one's entry into the house is rendered difficult without striking his head against the door-frame. Though there has been considerable discussion on the article, we wish that we discuss it more thoroughly and that the Drafting Committee gives more consideration to it. Thus, whatever drawback we find in the article should be removed. In my opinion sub-clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6), must be deleted. Unless this is done we shall not have the taste of freedom and shall continue to remain in a condition of fear. Those who till recently were seeking to organise disobedience of laws are, being today, in the seat of power, apprehensive of the violation of laws by other people, and under this apprehension, are seeking to make the law so comprehensive and rigid as to prevent any one outside the ruling group from going beyond its control. I would like to say that article 13 which is now under discussion betrays an un understandable apprehension on the part of authority. The fact is that there are many provisions in this Draft Constitution which would prevent the citizens from committing any disorder. Thus article 25 provides that "The right to move Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this part is guaranteed". I submit, therefore, that all the restrictive provisions contained in article 13 should be deleted. My belief is that article 25 will be as helpful to the government as to good citizens. Unless the restrictive provisions of this article are deleted, we cannot properly enjoy our National Freedom. Moreover it had always been our loud assertion that self-government is better than good government. Now we have grown indifferent to self-government and are raising the slogan of good government. With so many rigid provisions what good government can you have and for whom?

Those who are in power at present are apprehensive that the people and political parties other than those of the ruling group would practise disobedience of laws. That is why so many restrictive provisos have been included in the Draft Constitution. It is precisely why I insist that the Fundamental Rights should be treated as fundamental and inviolable. It is not proper therefore to delimit them by so many restrictive clauses and sub-clauses.

There is one observation I would like to make about the Adibasis. I agree to a certain extent with what Shri Jaipal Singh has said. Adibasis move about with arms. This article lays down that all citizens shall have the right "to assemble peaceably and without arms". We should therefore consider whether or not this clause takes away from the Adibasis their customary right to bear arms. In view of the provisions contained elsewhere in the constitution. I think, this will not affect the right of Adibasis to bear arms. If this view be correct Adibasis need not fear the loss of their right. Though I have no objection to the words "assemble peaceably and without arms" being put in here, yet I feel that nowhere in the Draft Constitution can be found any provision regarding the repeal of the Arms Act and the grant of the right to the people to bear arms-a right which is essential to make our people fearless. Therefore, I would like that a provision for the repeal of the Arms Act and making it permissible to the people to bear arms be include din the Draft. I would not like to say anything more about this matter.

We often talk of minorities today but we should stop this kind of talk now. What is a minority? When we are going to make one and the same provision for all, I fail to see who remains to constitute the minority. It may be said against this view that the Depressed Classes are a minority, the aboriginals are in a minority and the Muslims are in a minority. But once it is conceded that a particular group is a minority there is the danger that many other groups would begin to clam our for being considered as minorities. Formerly in the political sphere the Muslims were considered a minority. But then the Depressed Classes got themselves included in this category. I am afraid that among the Depressed Classes themselves new groups would begin demanding the status of a new minority. The same is, in my opinion, the case of the aboriginals. I would, therefore, like that the word `minority' wherever it occurs in the Draft Constitution should be deleted and the article 13 should be so drafted that all may feel that they have got real Swaraj and that they have no cause for apprehension and that they have as unrestricted a freedom as any one else.]*

Shri Deshbandhu Gupta (Delhi): *[Mr. Vice-President, I have had an opportunity once before of representing my views on the recommendations of the Drafting Committee. I was not at that time in a position to congratulate my Friend, Dr. Ambedkar and the Drafting Committee, on certain of there commendations, which related to the Chief Commissioners' Provinces. But today. I feel that on article 13, which relates to our Fundamental Rights, and particularly after this amendment as it stands, the Drafting Committee deserves our hearty congratulations.

Some of my friends here have objected saying that what has been given by one hand has been taken away by the other. But if you ponder a little, you will find that it is not so. If some one is given a freedom by which the freedom of the other is curtailed, then I would say, that such a demand is not for the right type of freedom. For example, it has been stated that restrictions have been imposed on the movement of people belonging to the criminal tribes. I would like to ask, why should not restrictions be imposed on the movement of the criminal-tribe people, when they are a source of danger to other law-abiding citizens? Could anyone be serious in saying that restrictions and conditions imposed on the criminal tribes should not have been imposed at all? Or that the presence of those restrictions and conditions has in any way curtailed our freedom? Similarly in respect of land, it has been stated that henceforth our Harijan brethren would not be able to purchase any land for themselves and the Land Alienation Act would continue to stand as it is. It is perfectly correct to say that the most objectionable feature of the Land Alienation Act was that certain castes had been mentioned therein. For example, a Bania or a Brahmin or a Harijan could not purchase land. It was wrong. But in fact, that restriction is being swept aside today by the conferment of the Fundamental Right that all citizens shall have the right to acquire property. From now on, if any restriction is imposed, it would have to be proved whether it is proper or improper. That question would be decided, under the provisions of this section, by the Supreme Court. It is a big gain. Formerly, the phraseology of the article was defective, but that defect has been removed by the acceptance of the amendment of my Friend, Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava, which seeks to add the word 'reasonable'. Now, there is nothing to warrant the imposition of any undue restriction. If there would be any, then against that an appeal could be preferred, and that would be decided by our Supreme Court which would be composed of great experts in India. That is why I feel that we should welcome this article and that it would be wrong to give an impression that it curtails our freedom in any sense. We should realise that our country is now a free country. I agree with my Friend, Shri Algu Rai Shastri that, along with rights, certain obligations and responsibilities have also come upon us. If we do not stand by those obligations then our freedom would be the freedom of the jungle. That freedom, I think, would not be such as to merit a welcome from us. Therefore, I think, this article as amended, should be accepted by us. We should realise that it forms the basis of our constitution, and it is a thing of which we can rightly feel proud and which will raise us in the estimation of the whole world.]*

Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar (Madras: General): Sir, I consider article 13 as the most important article, as it deals with some of the fundamental rights which are common to all free countries and all free citizens in the world. A number of amendments have been moved to this article which can all be classified under three heads. Some want to remove all restrictions on the rights that have been set out in clause (1). The fundamental rights guaranteed in clause (1) of article 13 are freedom of speech and expression, assembly and association, right to move freely inside the territory, right to practise any profession, right to reside-these are the fundamental rights that have been guaranteed. There are exceptions to these fundamental rights that have been setout in this clause and they are to be found in the subsequent clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6). Some of the amendments are for the deletion of the clauses; and some to make improvements so that these provisos may not take away the rights that have been guaranteed under clause (1).

Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava has moved an amendment saying that if any restrictions have to be imposed upon these rights that have been guaranteed in clause (1), they must all be reasonable. I believe that that amendment would sufficiently meet the situation.

Regarding freedom of speech we have improved upon the restriction that has been imposed in clause (2). The word sedition has been removed. If we find that the government for the time being has a knack of entrenching itself, however had its administration might be it must be the fundamental right of every citizen in the country to overthrow that government without violence, by persuading the people, by exposing its faults in the administration, its method of working and so on. The word `sedition' has become obnoxious in the previous regime. We had therefore approved of the amendment that the word `sedition' ought to be removed, except in cases where the entire state itself is sought to be overthrown or undermined by force or otherwise, leading to public disorder; but any attack on the government itself ought not to be made an offence under the law. We have gained that freedom and we have ensured that no government could possibly entrench itself, unless the speeches lead to an overthrow of the State altogether.

Then there are certain amendments which have been given for adding to the fundamental rights that have been set out. They require some detailed consideration. The foremost of those amendments relates to guaranteeing that every citizen shall have the right to exercise his personal law. Let us see what this means. We have already discussed personal law at some length in the Directive clause where a direction has been given that a uniform code of civil law must be evolved early or late. Amendments have been moved that unless a provision is made in the Fundamental Rights there is no safety and that the majority community may introduce its own personal law or flagrantly violate the personal law of any community. Let us take the communities. There are three main religions. Let us take Muhammadanism. There is absolutely no provision in the Fundamental Rights that you ought to ride rough-shod over their personal law. The law of the land as it exists today gives sufficient guarantee so far as that is concerned. But our friends who moved the amendments wanted a double guarantee that their personal law ought not to be interfered with. My submission is that it is impracticable, for, in an advanced society, even the members who belong to a particular community may desire their personal law to be changed. Let us take the Muhammad an law. I would only refer to two or three amendments that have been made to that law as set out in the Shariat. As recently as in 1939 the Central Legislature passed a law for enabling the dissolution of Muslim marriages under certain circumstances. You will be pleased to note that under the Muslim Law, a man has got the unilateral right to declare a marriage void by pronouncing the word talak and there is another form of divorce called kulamp. Woman normally has no right to dissolve a marriage. She has to go to a court of law and various matters have to be set out such as impotency and soon. All that has been made easy now. Another consideration is that a woman who cannot lead a family life with the husband in the same household is entitled under certain conditions to separation. These have hitherto not been envisaged nor provided for in the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. As a member of the Assembly I was a member of one of the committees that considered this question. We left the question entirely for the Muslims Members concerned to settle. The Shariat Law was introduced in the Assembly and an Act was passed bringing into line with the Shariat Law the different pieces of legislation in the provinces of India. This was done four years ago. The Wakf Validation Act was passed in 1930. A time may come when members belonging to the particular community may feel that in the interests of the community progressive legislation has to be enacted. But if we make a provision here that the personal law shall not be interfered with, there will not be any right to the members of that community itself to modify that law. Therefore it is not necessary that we should introduce it as a fundamental right. There is absolutely nothing in this Constitution which allows the majority to override the minority. This is only an enabling provision. Without the consent of the minority that is affected, no such law willed framed. I therefore feel it is unnecessary to include it in the Fundamental Rights.

Then my friend, Mr. Kamath wanted that we should have the right to bear arms and that this right should be put in the Fundamental Rights. It is true that for a long time the Congress has been from year to year passing resolutions that we must have the right to bear arms. The situation has changed now. We were then slaves and wanted to equip ourselves sufficiently so that in case of need we can use the arms for getting out of the foreign yoke. But, today in the civilised world I should like to ask my honourable Friend if he feels that everybody should be allowed to fight even to defend himself. Except in extreme circumstances no force should be used. Even when force has to be used, it must be concentrated in the State. The State it is that must stand between man and man and citizen and citizen when they want to fight. No individual citizen ought to be allowed to attack another. Very often the right to bear arms is abused.

Shri H. V. Kamath: Not even in self-defence?

Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar: Very often defence is offence in the hands of strong young men whose blood is very warm like that of my friend. Mr. Kamath's defence very often means offence.

Shri H. V. Kamath: I strongly protest against that remark, Sir.

Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar: I am sorry, Sir.

Mr. Vice-President: He has expressed his regret.

Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar: I have the greatest regard for my young friend and his youthful enthusiasm.

So far as the communal point is concerned, there is an amendment here which requires it to be included as a fundamental right. I am afraid it is not possible to do so. There is provision made in the Penal Code under sections 153 and 155-A for the purpose. That is ample.

As regards freedom of thought, I am surprised to see an amendment moved saying that freedom of thought ought to be allowed. Nobody can prevent freedom of thought. It is a fundamental right. It is only freedom of expression that has to be allowed. Now, freedom of press means freedom of expression. As regards the secrecy of telegraphic and telephonic communications, it is a debatable point and we ought not to allow any change in the existing provision.

Now, therefore, except the amendments which are acceptable to Dr. Ambedkar, the others should not be accepted. They are objectionable and ought not to find a place in the Constitution.

Shri Satyanarayan Sinha (Bihar: General): I move that the question be now put.

Mr. Vice-President: An enquiry was made of me as to how I have tried to conduct the proceedings of this House. I refused to supply the information at that time, because I thought it might be left to my discretion to explain how I conduct the proceedings. I see that I have not been able to satisfy all the members who desire to speak. At the present moment I have here 25 notes from 25 different gentlemen all anxious to speak. There is no doubt that each one of them will be able to contribute something to the discussion. But the discussion cannot be prolonged indefinitely. This does not take into account those other gentlemen equally competent to give their opinion who stand up and who have denied to themselves the opportunity of sending me notes. I have tried to get the views of the House as a whole. If Honourable Members will kindly go through the list of speakers who have already addressed the House they will find that every province has been represented and every so-called minority from every province has been represented. In my view, in spite of what Pandit L. K. Maitra says, Bengalees are a majority. In my view therefore the question has been fully discussed. But, as always, I would like to know whether it is the wish of the House that we should close this discussion.

Honourable Members: Yes, yes:

Mr. Vice-President: Then I call upon Dr. Ambedkar to reply.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (Bombay: General): Mr. Vice-President, Sir, among the many amendments that have been moved to this article 13, I propose to accept amendment No. 415, No. 453 as amended by amendment No. 86 of Mr. Munshi, and amendment No. 49 in list I as modified by Mr. Thakur Dass Bhargava's amendment to add the word 'reasonable'.

Mr. Vice-President: Will you kindly tell us how you propose to accept amendment No. 415.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: The amendment which seeks to remove the words `subject to the other provisions of this article'.

Mr. Vice-President: And then?

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Then I accept No.453 as modified by amendment No. 86, and amendment No. 49 in List I as modified by the amendment of Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava which introduces the word `reasonable'.

Now, Sir, coming to the other amendments and the point raised by the speakers in their speeches in moving those amendments, I find that there are just a few points which call for a reply.

With regard to the general attack on article 13 which has cent red on the sub-clauses to clause (1), I think I may say that the House now will be in a position to feel that the article with the amendments introduced therein has emerged in a form which is generally satisfactory. My explanation as to the importance of article8, my amendment to the phrase "existing laws" and the introduction of the word "reasonable" remove, in my judgment, the faults which were pointed out by honourable members when they spoke on this article, and I think the speeches made by my friends, Professor Shibban Lal Saksena and Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari and Mr. Algu Rai Shastri, will convince the House that the article as it now stands with the amendments should find no difficulty in being accepted and therefore I do not want to add anything to what my friends have said in support of this article. In fact I find considerable difficulty to improve upon the arguments used in their speeches in support of this article.

I will therefore take up the other points. Most of them have also been dealt with by my friend, Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar and if, Sir, you had not called upon me, I would have said that his speech may be taken as my speech, because he has dealt with all the points which I have noted down.

Now, the only point which I had noted down to which I had thought of making some reference in the course of my reply was the point made by my friend, Professor K. T. Shah, that the fundamental rights do not speak of the freedom of the press. The reply given by my friend, Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, in my judgment is a complete reply. The press is merely another way of stating an individual or a citizen. The press has no special rights which are not to be given or which are not to be exercised by the citizen in his individual capacity. The editor of a press or the manager are all citizens and therefore when they choose to write in newspapers, they are merely exercising their right of expression, and in my judgment therefore no special mention is necessary of the freedom of the press at all.

Now, with regard to the question of bearing arms about which my friend Mr. Kamath was so terribly excited, I think the position that we have taken is very clear. It is quite true and everyone knows that the Congress Party had been agitating that there should be right to bear arms. Nobody can deny that. That is history. At the same time I think the House should not forget the fact that the circumstances when such resolutions were passed by the Congress no longer exist.

Shri H. V. Kamath: A very handy argument.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: It is because the British Government had refused to allow Indians to bear arms, not on the ground of peace and order, but on the ground that a subject people should not have the right to bear arms against an alien government so that they could organise themselves to overthrow the Government, and consequently the basic considerations on which these resolutions were passed in my judgment have vanished. Under the present circumstances, I personally myself cannot conceive how it would be possible for the State to carry on its administration if every individual had the right to go into the market and purchase all sorts of instruments of attack without any let or hindrance from the State.

Shri H. V. Kamath: On a point of clarification, Sir, the proviso is there restricting that right.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: The proviso does what? What does the proviso say? What the proviso can do is to regulate, and the term `regulation' has been judicially interpreted as prescribing the conditions, but the conditions can never be such as to completely abrogate the right of the citizen to bear arms. Therefore regulation by itself will not prevent a citizen who wants to have the right to bear arms from having them. I question very much the policy of giving all citizens indiscriminately any such fundamental right. For instance, if Mr. Klamath's proposition was accepted, that every citizen should have the fundamental right to bear arms, it would be open for thousands and thousands of citizens who are today described as criminal tribes to bear arms. It would be open to all sorts of people who are habitual criminals to claim the right to possess arms. You cannot say that under the proviso a man shall not be entitled to bear arms because he belongs to a particular class.

Shri H. V. Kamath: If Dr. Ambedkar understands the proviso fully and clearly, he will see that such will not be the effect of my amendment.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: I cannot yield now. I have not got much time left. I am explaining the position that has been taken by the Drafting Committee. The point is that it is not possible to allow this indiscriminate right. On the other hand my submission is that so far as bearing of arms is concerned, what we ought to insist upon is not the right of an individual to bear arms but his duty to bear arms. (An Honourable Member: Hear, hear.) In fact, what we ought to secure is that when an emergency arises, when there is a war, when there is insurrection, when the stability and security of the State is endangered, the State shall be entitled to call upon every citizen to bear arms in defence of the State. That is the proposition that we ought to initiate and that position we have completely safeguarded by the proviso to article 17.

Shri H. V. Kamath: (rose to interrupt).

Mr. Vice-President: You do not interrupt, Mr. Kamath. You cannot say that I have not given you sufficient latitude.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Coming to the question of saving personal law, I think this matter was very completely and very sufficiently discussed and debated at the time when we discussed one of the Directive Principles of this Constitution which enjoins the State to seek or to strive to bring about a uniform civil code and I do not think it is necessary to make any further reference to it, but I should like to say this that, if such a saving clause was introduced into the Constitution, it would disable the legislatures in India from enacting any social measure whatsoever. The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of life, from birth to death. There is nothing which is not religion and if personal law is to be saved, I am sure about it that in social matters we will come to a standstill. I do not think it is possible to accept a position of that sort. There is nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we shall not extend beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious. It is not necessary that the sort of laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or laws relating to succession, should be governed by religion. In Europe there is Christianity, but Chistianity does not mean that the Christians all over the world or in any part of Europe where they live, shall have a uniform system of law of inheritance. No such thing exists. I personally do not understand why religion should be given this vast, expansive jurisdiction so as to cover the whole of life and to prevent the legislature from encroaching upon that field. After all, what are we having this liberty for? We are having this liberty in order to reform our social system, which is so full of inequities, so full of inequalities, discriminations and other things, which conflict with our fundamental rights. It is, therefore, quite impossible for anybody to conceive that the personal law shall be excluded from the jurisdiction of the State. Having said that, I should also like to point out that all that the State is claiming in this matter is a power to legislate. There is no obligation upon the State to do away with personal laws. It is only giving a power. Therefore, no one need be apprehensive of the fact that if the State has the power, the State will immediately proceed to execute or enforce that power in a manner that may be found to be objectionable by the Muslims or by the Christians or by any other community in India.

We must all remember-including Members of the Muslim community who have spoken on this subject, though one can appreciate their feelings very well-that sovereignty is always limited, no matter even if you assert that it is unlimited, because sovereignty in the exercise of that power must reconcile itself to the sentiments of different communities. No Government can exercise its power in such a manner as to provoke the Muslim community to rise in rebellion. I think it would be a mad Government if it did so. But that is a matter which relates to the exercise of the power and not to the power itself.

Now, Sir, my friend, Mr. Jaipal Singh asked me certain questions about the Adibasis. I thought that was a question which could have been very properly raised when we were discussing the Fifth and the Sixth Schedules, but as he has raised them and as he has asked me particularly to give him some explanation of the difficulties that he had found, I am dealing with the matter at this stage. The House will realize what is the position we have laid down in the Draft Constitution with regard to the Adibasis. We have two categories of areas,-scheduled areas and tribal areas. The tribal areas are areas which relate only to the province of Assam, while the scheduled areas are areas which are scattered in provinces other than Assam. They are really a different name for what we used in the Government of India Act as `partially excluded areas'. There is nothing beyond that. Now the scheduled tribes live in both, that is, in the scheduled areas as well as in the tribal areas and the difference between the position of the scheduled tribes in scheduled areas and scheduled tribes in tribal areas is this: In the case of the scheduled tribes in the scheduled areas, they are governed by the provisions contained in paragraph V of the Fifth Schedule. According to that Schedule, the ordinary law passed by Parliament or by the local Legislature applies automatically unless the Governor declares that that law or part of that law shall not apply. In the case of the scheduled tribes in tribal areas, the position is a little different. There the law made by Parliament or the law made by the local legislature of Assam shall not apply unless the Governor extends that law to the tribal area. In the one case it applies unless excluded and in the other case, it does not apply unless extended. That is the position.

Now, coming to the question of the scheduled tribes and as to why I substituted the word "scheduled" for the word "aboriginal" the explanation is this. As I said, the word "scheduled tribe" has a fixed meaning, because it enumerates the tribes, as you will see in the two Schedules. Well, the word "Adibasi" is really a general term which has no specific legal de jure connotation, something like the Untouchables. It is a general term. Anybody may include anybody in the term `untouchable'. It has no definite legal connotation. That is why in the Government of India Act of 1935, it was felt necessary to give the word `untouchable' some legal connotation and the only way it was found feasible to do it was to enumerate the communities which indifferent parts and in different parts and in different areas were regarded by the local people as satisfying the test of untouchability. The same question may arise with regard to Adibasis. Who are the Adibasis. Who are the Adibasis? And the question will be relevant, because by this Constitution, we are conferring certain privileges, certain rights on these Adibasis. In order that, if the matter was taken to a court of law there should be a precise definition as to who are these Adibasis, it was decided to invent, so to say, another category or another term to be called 'Scheduled tribes' and to enumerate the Adibasis under that head. Now I think my friend, Mr. Jaipal singh, if he were to take the several communities which are now generally described as Adibasis and compare the communities which are listed under the head of scheduled tribes, he will find that there is hardly a case where a community which is generally recognised as Adibasis is not included in the Schedule. I think, here and there, a mistake might have occurred and a community which is not an Adibasi community may have been included. It may be that a community which is really an Adibasi community has not been included, but if there is a case where a community which has hitherto been treated as an Adibasi Community is not included in the list of scheduled tribes, we have added, as may be seen in the draft Constitution, an amendment whereby it will be permissible for the local government by notification to add any particular community to the list of scheduled tribes which have not been so far included. I think that ought to satisfy my friend, Mr. Jaipal Singh.

He asked me another question and it was this. Supposing a member of a scheduled tribe living in a scheduled area or a member of a scheduled tribe living in a tribal area migrates to another part of the territory of India, which is outside both the scheduled area and the tribal area, will he be able to claim from the local government, within whose jurisdiction he may be residing, the same privileges which he would be entitled to when he is residing within the scheduled area or within the tribal area? It is a difficult question for me to answer. If that matter is agitated in quarters where a decision on a matter like this would lie, we would certainly be able to give some answer to the question in the form of some clause in this Constitution. But, so far as the present Constitution stands, a member of a scheduled tribe going outside the scheduled area would certainly not be entitled to carry with him the privileges that he is entitled to when he is residing in a scheduled area or a tribal area. So far as I can see, it will be practically impossible to enforce the provisions that apply to tribal areas or scheduled areas, in areas other than those which are covered by them.

Sir, I hope I have met all the points that were raised by the various speakers when they spoke upon the amendments to this clause, and I believe that my explanation will give them satisfaction that all their points have been met. I hope that the article as amended will be accepted by the House.

Mr. Vice-President: I shall now put the amendments which have been moved, which number thirty, to the vote one by one. Amendment No. 412. The question is:

"That for article 13, the following be substituted:-

"12. Subject to public order or morality the citizens are guaranteed-

(a) freedom of speech and expression;

(b) freedom of the press;

(c) freedom to form association or unions;

(d) freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms;

(e) secrecy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications.

13-A. All citizens of the Republic shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the whole of the Republic. Every citizen shall have the right to sojourn and settle in anyplace he pleases. Restrictions may, however, be imposed by or under a Federal law for the protection of aboriginal tribes and backward classes and the preservation of public safety and peace."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 415. I understand it has been accepted by Dr. Ambedkar.

The question is:

"That in clause (1) of article 13, the words "Subject to the other provisions of this article" be deleted".

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. Vice-President: Second part of amendment No. 416.The first part of the amendment has been already blocked as amendment No. 415 has been accepted.

The question is:

"That in clause (1) of article 13, after the words "all citizens shall have" the words "and are guaranteed" be added."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 420.

The question is:

"That before sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of article 13, the following new sub-clause be inserted:-

"(a-1) to freedom of thought;"

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 421.

The question is:

"That in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of article 13, after the word "expression", the words "of thought and worship; of press and publication;" be added."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 422.

The question is:

"That at the end of sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of article 13 the words "both in the Press and the Platform" be inserted."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 428.

The question is:

"That at the end of sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of article 13, the words "for any lawful purpose" be inserted."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 429.

The question is:

"That in sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of article 13, after the words "move freely" the words "in a lawful manner" be inserted."

Mr.Vice-President: Amendment No. 430.

The question is:

"That in sub-clause (e) of clause (1) of article 13, after the words "and settle" the words "in a lawful manner" be inserted.'

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 482.

The question is:

"That in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 13, after the words "or business" the words "in a lawful manner" be inserted."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 438 as modified by amendment No. 79 of List II.

The question is:

"That for amendment No. 438** of the List of amendments, the following be substituted:-

"That after sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 13, the following new sub-clause be added:-

"(h) to keep and bear arms;"

and the following new clause be added after clause (6):-

"(7) Nothing in sub-clause (h) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, imposing, in the interests of public order, peace and tranquility, restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 440.

The question is:

"That after sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 13, the following new sub-clause be added:-

(h) to follow the personal law of the group or community to which he belongs or professes to belong.

(i) to personal liberty and to be tried by a competent court of law in case such liberty is curtailed."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 502.

The question is:

"That after clause (6) of article 13, the following new clauses be added:-

"(7) Nothing in clauses (2) to (6) of this article shall affect the right guaranteed under sub-clause (h) of clause (1) of this article.

"(8) Nothing in the clauses (2) to (6) shall affect the right guaranteed under sub-clause (i) of clause (1) of this article.

"(9) No existing law shall operate after the commencement of the Constitution so far as the same affects adversely the right guaranteed under sub-clause (i) of clause (1) of this article and no law shall be passed by the Parliament or any State which may adversely affect the right guaranteed under sub-clause (i) of clause (1) of this article ."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 445. I shall explain one thing. Honourable Members will note that I am calling out the amendments in the order in which they were moved. That is why the numbers are not consecutive. Amendment No.445.

The question is:

"That the following new clause be added after clause (1) of article 13:-

"Liberty of the person is guaranteed. No person shall be deprived of his life, nor be arrested or detained in custody, or imprisoned, except according to due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 447.

The question is:

"That clauses (2) to (6) of article 13 be deleted and the following proviso be added to clause (1):-

"Provided, however, that no citizens in the exercise of the said right, shall endanger the security of the State, promote ill-will between the communities or do anything to disturb peace and tranquility in the country."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 453 as modified by amendmeant No. 86 of List IV. I understand it has been accepted by Dr. Ambedkar.

The question is:

"That for clause (2) of article 13, the following be substituted:-

"(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of this article shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating or libel, slander, defamation or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State."

The motion was adopted.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 449.

The question is:

"That after clause (1) of article 13, the following new clause be inserted:-

"(1-A) Nothing in sub-clause (a) shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent any State from making any law relating to sedition or conspiracy.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 450.

The question is:

"That clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of article 13 be deleted."

Mr. Vice-President: The second alternative in amendment No. 451.

The question is:

"That the following words be inserted at the beginning of clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of article 13:-

"Without prejudice and subject to the provisions of article 8."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 452.

The question is:

"That clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of article 13 be deleted."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 458.

The question is:

"That in clause (2) of article 13, after the word "sedition" the words "communal passion" be inserted."

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 465.

The question is:

"That clauses (3) and (4) of article 13 be deleted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 478.

The question is:

"That clauses (5) of article 13 be deleted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 454 as modified by amendment No. 49 of List I. I understand it has been accepted by Dr. Ambedkar.

The question is:

"That with reference to amendment No. 454 of the List of amendments-

(i) in clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) of article 13,after the words "any existing law" the words "in so far it imposes" be inserted, and

(ii) in clause (6) of article 13, after the words "in particular" the words "nothing in the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law, be inserted."

The motion was adopted.

Mr. Vice-President: The question is:

"That in clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) of article 13,before the word "restrictions" the word "reasonable" be inserted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 485.

The question is:

"That in clause (5) of article 13, the word "affect the operation of any existing law, or" be deleted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 467.

The question is:

"(1) That in clause (3) of article 13, after the word "restrictions" the words "for a defined period" be added."

I think the `Ayes' have it.

But before I declare the result finally I must point out that there is some kind of misunderstanding. Let me read the amendment. It was moved by Mr. Syamanandan Sahaya:

"That in clause (3) of article 13, after the word "restrictions" the words "for a defined period" be added."

I definitely remember that several people spoke against it. I am going to put the amendment once again. Amendment No.467.

The question is:

"(1) That in clause (3) of article 13, after the word "restrictions" the words "for a defined period" be added."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: I trust that in future, honourable Members will take more care before they give their verdict.

Mr. Vice-President: I put amendment No. 474 to vote.

The question is:

"That in clauses (4) of article 13 after the word" restrictions" the words "for a defined period" be added."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 476.

The question is:

"That in clause (4) of article 13, for the words "the general public" the words "public order or morality" be substituted.'

The amend meant was adopted.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 483.

The question is;

"That in clause (5) of article 13, after the words "existing law" the word "which is not repugnant to the spirit of the provisions of article 8" be inserted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: I put No. 485 (second part), to vote.

The question is:

"That in clause (5) of article 13, for the word "State" the word "Parliament" be substituted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 489.

The question is:

"That in clause (5) of article 13, the word `either' and the words `or for the protection of the interests of any aboriginal tribe' be omitted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 491.

The question is:

"That in clause (5) of article 13, for the word "aboriginal" the word "Scheduled" be substituted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment No. 497.

The question is:

"That in clause (6) of article 13, for the words "morality or health" the words "the general public" be substituted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. Vice-President: I put amendment No. 500 to vote.

The question is:

"That after clause (6) of article 13, the following new clause be added:

'(7) The occupation of beggary in any form or shape for person having sound physique and perfect health whether major or minor is totally banned and any such practice shall be punishable in accordance with law.'"

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. Vice-President: The question is:

"That article 13 in the form in which it emerges after the different amendments which have been passed here stand part of the Constitution."

Article 13, as amended, was adopted.

Article 13, as amended, was added to the Constitution.

Article 14

Mr. Vice-President: We come to new article 14.

(Amendment No. 504 was not moved.)

Shri H. V. Kamath: What about 13-A? That is, amendments 89, 90 and 92 of List V.

Mr. Vice-President: That has been held over. I was referring to No. 504.

Now the motion is:

"That article 14 form part of the Constitution."

Honourable Members have been supplied with a list which indicates the manner in which I propose to conduct the proceedings of the House. No. 505 has been disallowed as being verbal. 506 may be moved.

Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava: May I take the liberty of pointing out that my amendment (No. 505) is not mercy verbal? It is an amendment of substance also.

Mr. Vice-President: Then I will give my ruling later on. Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad will carry on his work.

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad (West Bengal: Muslim): Mr. Vice-President, I beg to move:

"That in clause (1) of article 14, after the words "greater than", the words "or of a kind other than" be inserted."

Sir, clause (1) provides-I am reading only the material part-

"No person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law at the time of the commission of the offence."

It guards against any punishment `greater than' is provide to be inflicted upon a person. I have attempted to insert after the words `greater than' the words `or other than' that which might have been inflicted. There are many cases where a punishment of fine only is provided. Suppose a man is fined one lakh of rupees. An Appellate Court may turn it to an imprisonment during the sitting of the Court. That will violate the provision that where fine alone is provided for, an imprisonment may be substituted on the ground that it is not greater than that. My amendment seeks to limit the powers of Courts to inflict punishment not only as to the extent but also to the kind. There are different kinds of punishments-fine, imprisonment, whipping, forfeiture and hanging and the like where only a particular kind of punishment is specifically provided, you should not award any punishment other than that. That is in short the effect of this amendment. Where whipping alone is provided. You cannot award a fine. Where fine alone is provided, you cannot award imprisonment or whipping or forfeiture. Where forfeiture of movables only a provided, you cannot forfeit immovables. Where forfeiture of articles relating to which crime has been committed is provided, you cannot forfeit other kinds of things. So if we leave the powers of the courts as in the clause it gives the Court the power to give any punishment not sanctioned by law. If clause (1) is to be retained, the Court should also be limited to the class of punishment provided. To me it seems that there is here a lacuna-rather oversight which should be corrected.

Mr. Vice-President: As regards amendment No. 505, I can allow the Member to move the second part of it. Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava.

Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: Sir, I beg to move.

"That in clause (1) of article 14, for the words `under the law at the time of the commission' the words `under the law in force at the time of the commission' be substituted."

Sir, if you kindly examine the definition of the expression 'law in force' as given in the explanation under article 307, it would appear that the words `the law' and the words 'the law in force' have different meanings. Moreover as the words in the previous part of the article also appear as 'law in force', it is very necessary and proper in this juxtaposition that the amendment that I have suggested should be accepted. That is all I have to submit.

Mr. Vice-President: Amendment Nos. 507, 508 and 511 are of the same import. The most comprehensive one, i. e, No.507, may be moved.

(Amendments Nos. 507, 508 and 511 were not moved.)

Amendments Nos. 509 and 510 are of similar import and may be moved together. They are in the name of Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad.

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad: Sir, I beg to move:

"That at the end of clause (2) of article 14, the words "otherwise than as permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898" be added."

Sir, I am moving these amendments with considerbale anxiety in my mind. The first anxiety is that I may perhaps overstep my time limit; they second anxiety is that there are a large number of observant and powerful eyes directed against me and I am afraid that a point of order may betaken at any time; and the third anxiety is the huge `No' against me will be echoed by honourable Members and this will reverberate as thunder clap under which my feeble `Aye' will be lost.

Then the other difficulty is that I have to crave the indulgent attention of the Honourable the Chairman of the Drafting Committee to the point I am raising. I shall restrict my point strictly to the limits of relevancy.

Sir, the words which I seek to insert deals with an important principle of criminal procedure. Clause (2) which I seek to amend runs as follows:

"(2) No person shall be punished for the same offence more than once."

A very sacred sentiment has prompted the introduction of this clause; but considered from the point of view of criminal law, it has its loop-holes.

Clause (2) seems to be rather sweeping. There are cases where a man may be legally punishment twice for the same offence, and I shall submit the circumstances, with the relevant laws. Sir, the principal which deals with this subject finds a place in section 403, sub-section (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The point of this. The law of punishment twice has been enacted.

Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: Sir, on a point of order. Can any Member of this House move an amendment referring to an enactment made by a legislature subordinate to this House? I am afraid the amendment itself is out of order.

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad: Anything else may be out of order, but not the amendment. We have already referred to and saved `existing laws'-enactments of subordinate legislatures in article 9 and in other places. I was only referring for handy consideration to the Criminal Procedure Code. I cannot pretend to submit that Section 403, or any principle embodied in it, or any sound principle even is binding upon this House, not even the soundest of propositions, because this is a sovereign House.

I was submitting for consideration certain principles of the Criminal Procedure, not that I suggested at all that they will be binding on this House, but only that they worthy of consideration.

Sir, it often happens-I shall submit examples from general principles because I think they would be more acceptable to Mr. Krishnamachari-it often happens that a man is punished by a Court which has no jurisdiction; It is a very ordinary experience in criminal Courts that the Judge on appeal or the High Court or the Privy Council-and now the Federal Court and later on the future Supreme Court-may and does find that the conviction is without jurisdiction. Meantime, the man has been convicted. If you say that he cannot be convicted twice, then orders of re-trial by appellate and revisional Courts would be absolutely out of the question. If a man is tried by a Magistrate or a Court having no jurisdiction, and if he is punished, that is the first punishment.

And then if it is found that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case, what is often done is that there is a re-trial. But if you enact the principle of clause (2) that a man shall not be punished for the same offence more than once, the effect would be that if a man is punished by a Court of competent jurisdiction but there is a lacuna in the trial, or by a Court of competent jurisdiction the result will be to shut out any further trial at all. Are-trial after a conviction is an ordinary incident of daily experience in criminal Courts.

Sometimes, Sir,............

(After a pause)

Sir, I desire to monopolise the attention of the Honourable Member the Chairman of the Drafting Committee; otherwise it will be useless to argue. If he says "No", the whole House will echo him.

Mr. Vice-President: Dr. Ambedkar, Mr. Naziruddin demands your wholehearted attention. He says that if you say "No", the House will say "No". (Laughter).

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad: The point which I was submitting is a point of general importance. The point is that if a man is convicted by a court of law-that is the first conviction-it may be that there is some lacuna in the trial. The accused appeals to the Court of Sessions. The Court finds that there was a lacuna in the trial or that the Court had no jurisdiction. But it may order a re-trial. Clause (2) which would effectively prevent further trial because it may involve a second conviction. There may be a first conviction of an offender in the hands of a Court, and this clause will effectively prevent a re-trial order by a superior court. This is one of the simplest examples. The principle should be not merely convicted, but the principle should be that a man cannot be tried again, tried twice, if he is acquitted or convicted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, while the conviction or acquittal stands effective. In fact, it is not the first conviction that is important; it is the ultimate legality and finality of the conviction that has to be respected; the finality should attach not only to conviction but also to acquittal. What are you going to do with regard to a person who is finally acquitted after a fair trial, and when the acquittal is not set aside and is therefore final and binding? You say nothing about that. You simply say that a man should not be convicted twice for the same offence. A man acquitted shall also not be liable to be tried again. You say nothing about that but confine you attention to the bogey of double punishment. I submit that the so-called theory of double punishment is not all and does not give a complete picture. Take for example, a man fined Rs. 50 for an offence by a Magistrate having no jurisdiction; then he appeals to an appellate Court. The appellate Court will, by virtue of clause (2) be precluded from sending it for re-trial on any technical ground, even on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction.

The relevant section which caused some amount of suspicion in the mind of a distinguished Member of the House, Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari, I shall with his permission and with your permission, Sir, and with the permission of the House, read. Not that it is binding, but it is a crystallised wisdom which has been handed down to us from generation to generation. Sub-section (1) of section 403 says:

"A person who has been once tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence, shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence".

I think, Sir, this is the proper form. It may be argued that the Criminal Procedure Code is a sufficient safeguard against injustice, but if you introduce it here it is a justiciable right, and we have already provided that any violation of any fundamental right is justiciable and would nullify all existing laws contrary, and therefore it will have the effect of abolishing or rather nullifying the wholesome law as laid down in sub-section (1) of section 403. I submit that the clause has got to be very carefully considered and, if necessary, should be re-drafted.

I submit that double punishment for the same offence in such cases does not in fact work injustice. What happens in such cases is that the punishment already suffered or inflicted is taken into account or adjusted in giving the final punishment in a re-trial. That is the effect of this amendment.

Mr. Vice-President: Do you intend to move amendment No.509?

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad: No, Sir. It deals with the same principle and I do not wish to move it.

Mr. Vice-President: I have found from the last two days' experience that 9.30 A.M. is too early an hour for many Members of the House. They seem to think that others will come at the proper time and they need not come, with the result that there is difficulty in starting our work at the proper time. I have therefore decided that from tomorrow we shall start at 10 A.M. and break up at 1.30 P.M.

The Assembly then adjourned till Ten of the Clock on Friday the 3rd December, 1948.