+ A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 9D of the Act makes it clear that clauses (a) and (b) of the said sub-section set out the circumstances in which a statement, made and signed by a person before the Central Excise Officer of a gazetted rank, during the course of inquiry or proceeding under the Act, shall be relevant,for the purpose of proving the truth of the facts contained therein.
+ Para 12 of the Delhi High Court decision in J.K. Cigarettes Ltd. dated 28.08.2009 [ WP (C) No. 1854 of 1992, 1895/1992, 1896/1992, 1897/1992 and 1898/1992] clearly holds that by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 9D, the provisions of sub-section (1) thereof would extend to adjudication proceedings as well.
+ In the absence of the circumstances specified in Section 9D(1), the truth of the facts contained in any statement, recorded before a gazetted Central Excise Officer, has to be proved by evidence other than the statement itself. The evidentiary value of the statement, insofar as proving the truth of the contents thereof is concerned, is, therefore, completely lost, unless and until the case falls within the parameters of Section 9D(1).
+ The consequence would be that, in the absence of the circumstances specified in Section 9D(1), if the adjudicating authority relies on the statement, recorded during investigation in Central Excise, as evidence of the truth of the facts contained in the said statement, it has to be held that the adjudicating authority has relied on irrelevant material. Such reliance would, therefore, be vitiated in law and on facts.
+ It is clear that the adjudicating authority cannot invoke Section 9D(1)(a) of the Act without passing a reasoned and speaking order in that regard, which is amenable to challenge by the assessee, if aggrieved thereby.
+ If none of the circumstances contemplated by clause (a) of Section 9D (1) exists, clause (b) of Section 9D (1) comes into operation. The said clause prescribes a specific procedure to be followed before the statement can be admitted in evidence.
+ There is no justification for jettisoning this procedure, statutorily prescribed by plenary parliamentary legislation for admitting, into evidence, a statement recorded before the gazetted Central Excise officer, which does not suffer from the handicaps contemplated by clause (a) of Section 9D(1) of the Act. The use of the word "shall" in Section 9D (1), makes it clear that, the provisions contemplated in the sub-Section are mandatory.
+ In view of this express stipulation in the Act, it is not open to any adjudicating authority to straightaway rely on the statement recorded during investigation/inquiry before the gazetted Central Excise officer, unless and until he can legitimately invoke clause (a) of Section 9D(1). In all other cases, if he wants to rely on the said statement as relevant, for proving the truth of the contents thereof, he has to first admit the statement in evidence in accordance with clause (b) of Section 9D(1). For this, he has to summon the person who had made the statement, examine him as witness before him in the adjudicating proceeding, and arrive at an opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in the interests of justice.
+ Clearly, if this procedure, which is statutorily prescribed by plenary Parliamentary legislation, is not followed, it has to be regarded, that the Revenue has given up the said witnesses, so that the reliance by the CCE, on the said statements, has to be regarded as misguided, and the said statements have to be eschewed from consideration, as they would not be relevant for proving the truth of the contents thereof.
In fine, the Respondent was directed to adjudicate the Show Cause Notice issued to the writ petitioners by following the procedure contemplated by Section 9D of the Act including the principles of natural justice, in the manner set out in the order.
