By TIOL News Service

HYDERABAD, SEPT 30, 2016: ASSESSEE filed this appeal before the High Court, inter alia with the substantial question of law - Whether the impugned order failed to see the fact that speed post is not one of the authorized mode of services u/S.153 and thus the impugned order is a nullity?

Claiming that they acquired knowledge of the passing of the order of adjudication only on 12-12-2013, when they received a mail from Clearing House Agent, about a demand made on them, the appellant filed a statutory appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). By an Order-in-Appeal dated 15-4-2014, the Commissioner dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appeal was barred by time. As against the said order, the appellant filed an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), South Zonal Bench, Bangalore. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the Commissioner (Appeals) had no power to condone the delay beyond 30 days and that the service of the copy of the Order-in-Original,by speed post was a valid mode of service under Section 153 of the Customs Act, 1962. Therefore, the appellant is before the High Court.

After hearing both sides, the High Court held:

++ In the decision of the single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in SUPER HOUSE LTD., there is no discussion as to how the speed post is different from a registered post. In any case, the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in MIRZAPUR ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES LTD should be taken to have overruled impliedly, decision of the single Judge in SUPER HOUSE LTD. Therefore, the same is not of any assistance to the appellant.

++ AMIDEV AGRO CARE PVT. LTD. which is a decision of the Bombay High Court, arose under Section 37(C) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. In that case, the provisions of Section 37(C)(1)(a) did not contain the words Speed Post before the amendment. After the amendment, the words were specifically incorporated. Therefore, the Bombay High Court was compelled to come to the conclusion that when the Parliament sought to make an amendment to the existing law on the realization that there was something missing, any interpretation given by the Court should also be in tune with such change of law.

++ As a matter of fact, the Orissa High Court alone appears to have gone into the question as to what the words Registered Post appearing in Section 153(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 would connote. The Orissa High Court had referred to Section 28 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, which provides for registration of postal articles. The Orissa High Court further pointed out that Speed Post service was introduced, by way of an amendment to the Indian Post Office Rules, 1933, by a Gazette Notification issued by the Ministry of Communications (Department of Posts),Government of India, dated 24-7-1986. After taking into account Section 28 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 and Rule 66B of the Indian Post Office Rules, 1933, the Orissa High Court came to the conclusion that the Speed Post is nothing but another method of registering an article through the Postal Department under Section28 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898. Therefore, the only decision out of all the decisions which we have referred to above, which can be said to have laid down a ratio decidendi is that of Orissa High Court. The views expressed by the orists High Court are agreed with.

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal.

(See 2016-TIOL-2304-HC-AP-CX)