+ There is no justification for jettisoning the mandatory procedure stipulated under section 9D, that is statutorily prescribed by plenary parliamentary legislation for admitting, into evidence, a statement recorded before the gazetted Central Excise officer, which does not suffer from the handicaps contemplated by clause (a) of Section 9D(1) of the Act. The use of the word "shall" in Section 9D (1), makes it clear that, the provisions contemplated in the sub-Section are mandatory. Indeed, as they pertain to conferment of admissibility to oral evidence they would, even otherwise, have to be recorded as mandatory. The rationale behind the above precaution contained in clause (b) of Section 9D(1) is obvious. The statement, recorded during inquiry/investigation, by the gazetted Central Excise officer, has every chance of having been recorded under coercion or compulsion. It is a matter of common knowledge that, on many occasions, the DRI/DGCEI resorts to compulsion in order to extract confessional statements. It is obviously in order to neutralize this possibility that, before admitting such a statement in evidence, clause (b) of Section 9D(1) mandates that the evidence of the witness has to be recorded before the adjudicating authority, as, in such an atmosphere, there would be no occasion for any trepidation on the part of the witness concerned.
+ Clearly, the stage of relevance, in adjudication proceedings, of the statement previously recorded before a gazetted Central Excise officer during inquiry or investigation, would arise only after the statement is admitted in evidence in accordance with the procedure prescribed in clause (b) of Section 9D(1). The rigor of this procedure is exempted only in a case in which one or more of the handicaps referred to in clause (a) of Section 9D(1) of the Act would apply. In view of this express stipulation in the Act, it is not open to any adjudicating authority to straightaway rely on the statement recorded during investigation/inquiry before the gazetted Central Excise officer, unless and until he can legitimately invoke clause (a) of Section 9D(1). In all other cases, if he wants to rely on the said statement as relevant, for proving the truth of the contents thereof, he has to first admit the statement in evidence in accordance with clause (b) of Section 9D(1). For this, he has to summon the person who had made the statement, examine him as witness before him in the adjudicating proceeding, and arrive at an opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in the interests of justice.
+ Clearly, if this procedure, which is statutorily prescribed by plenary Parliamentary legislation, is not followed, it has to be regarded, that the Revenue has given up the said witnesses, so that the reliance by the CCE, on the said statements, has to be regarded as misguided, and the said statements have to be eschewed from consideration, as they would not be relevant for proving the truth of the contents thereof.
+ It is clear, from a reading of the Order-in-original that Respondents in the said Orders-in-Original, placed extensive reliance on the statements, recorded during investigation under Section 14 of the Act. He has not invoked clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 9D of the Act, by holding that attendance of the makers of the said statements could not be obtained for any of the reasons contemplated by the said clause. Thus it was not open to Respondent to rely on the said statements, without following the mandatory procedure contemplated by clause (b) of the sub-section. The Orders-in-Original, having been passed in blatant violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 9D of the Act; it has to be held that said Orders-in-Original stand vitiated thereby.