+ The petitioner (and interveners) complains that initiation of circumvention proceedings is factually unfounded and also legally indefensible. It is also common ground that anti circumvention measures can be taken under Rule 25-26 of the Anti-Dumping Rules. The petitioners rely on the observations- repeated at least in two proceedings, by the DA, about the technical and commercial unviability of importing 1250 mm or more wide CRSS and then cutting or slitting it to smaller width for use in India.
+ An anti-dumping proceeding, leading to a determination as to whether any injury exists and if so, its margin, involves examination of "the causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry".
+ In the case of anti-circumvention proceedings under Section 9A(1A) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, the procedure for which is prescribed in Rules 25-28 of the Anti-Dumping Rules, the object is entirely different. Section 9A(1A) contemplates enquiry into whether there is circumvention of anti-dumping duty imposed under Section 9A(1), either by alteration of the article's description or its composition, or by its import "in an unassembled or disassembled form". However, in the case of an anti dumping investigation, the methodology adopted is geared to see if there is injury on account of the dumping practice.
+ Anti circumvention proceedings are part of the larger scheme of anti dumping procedures. They are premised not only on the fact that there is an anti dumping duty and the existence of injury, but that despite such levy, there is an attempt by some importers to thwart and escape the levy (on the product, by resorting to other methods).
+ The procedure that is to be followed is the same (mutatis mutandis) as the procedure involved before levying anti dumping duty.
+ The petitioner is correct in contending that the DA had gone into the question, and returned specific findings with respect to the improbability of importation of CRSS strips wider than 1250 mm and their size reduction for use as articles that are the subject of ADD. The nature of materials considered during those investigations focused on all those elements that make up the injury.
+ However, in circumvention proceedings, the trajectory of the inquiry is altogether different . It is whether, given the existence of ADD (and the established existence of injury), there is any behavior – in the form of import of other products, which can be adapted or altered for use as the product or articles that are subject to ADD.
+ Whilst the decisive nature of the observations of the DA in past instances is facially compelling for a court to hold that there should not be a fresh inquiry, yet one cannot be oblivious to the nuanced nature of the circumvention procedure. The power to resort to it should be based on objective material. In the present case, the information, which the respondents rely upon is the stagnancy in demand of the article which is subject to ADD, and the pattern of increase in import of CRSS that is wider than 1250 mm. The Petitioners' argument that the subject matter of the previous orders and observations are the same in circumvention proceedings is unpersuasive to this court.
+ A superficial analysis no doubt could lead one to conclude it to be so; however, for doing that, this court would have to assume that reduction of size from 1250 mm width to lower than that, is not a process of assembling or making of a new article. That would involve interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Customs Tariff Act and the relevant entries to the schedule, which impose the duty.
+ The inquiry of the process of slitting and cutting of a steel strip, as well as if it amounts to "assembling" a disassembled or incomplete article, would then become an issue in respect of which neither party addressed arguments on merits, nor presented the necessary facts. Given the fact that this would be the subject matter of inquiry and arguments before the competent forum, a ruling in this proceeding is neither desirable nor warranted having regard to the established limitations of judicial review under Article 226 , which is confined to questions of legality, procedural regularity, fairness and a reasonable decision.
