2019-TIOL-2984-CESTAT-KOL

Lakhanpur Coal Carriers Pvt Ltd Vs CCE, C & ST

ST - Appellant was awarded two contracts by Mahanadi Coalfields for loading and transportation of coal from quarry beds/coal handling plants/surface stock to different destinations within the mines - SCN issued demanding ST under the category of 'Cargo Handling Services' on the ground that the transportation within the mines are for short distances and not a long haul transportation and the basic thrust in the contract is on loading/unloading for shifting by Tippers to short distances within the mines, hence, the essential character of contract cannot be transportation but loading/unloading - demand confirmed, penalty issued - on appeal, Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the same, hence appeal to CESTAT.

Held: Conclusion of the Commissioner (Appeals) that under the contract the appellant is to transport coal by Tipper for short distances within the mines including loading, hence, it is taxable under "Cargo Handling Service", cannot be countenanced - under section 65(105)(zzp) read with section 65(50a) and section 65(50b) of the Finance Act, 1994, the requirement of provisioning of taxable service to any person by a "Goods Transport Agency" in relation to transport of goods by road in a goods carriage stands satisfied in this case and transport for long or short distances is not the relevant criterion for classification under the category of "Goods Transport Services" - the case of the appellant is covered by the decision of this Tribunal in Sainik Mining Allied Services Ltd. - 2008-TIOL-77-CESTAT-KOL and Final Order No.76815/2018 Dated 11.10.2018 in the case of Sainik Mining Allied Services Ltd. in Appeal No.ST/91/2008-DB  wherein loading and transportation of coal within the mines was held to be not taxable under the category of "Cargo Handling Services" - in view of the above, impugned order is set aside and appeal allowed : CESTAT [para 6, 7]

- Appeal allowed: KOLKATA CESTAT

2019-TIOL-2983-CESTAT-ALL

Lallooji And Sons Vs CCE & ST

ST - During the scrutiny of records of the appellant, it was noticed by revenue that appellant had received around Rs.16.82 crores from District Collector, Nanded against Work Order dated 14.8.2008 for the period from 1.04.2008 to 31.3.2009 for setting up temporary camps at South Nanded and Nerli on the occasion of Gur-ta-Gaddi Tercentenary Celebration - it appeared to revenue that the said service attracted ST on 'Pandal or Shamiana Service' - the contention of appellant was that the occasion for which said service was provided was religious and as per Circular No.79/9/2004-ST dated 17.9.2004 'if the service is provided for religious ceremonies, service tax is not chargeable' - Revenue entertained in a view that the said circular was superseded by a 'Master Circular' issued on 23.8.2007 and, therefore, the appellants were liable to pay ST of Rs.2.07 crore - SCN issued - demand confirmed along with interest, equivalent penalty imposed - appeal to CESTAT.

Held: Allahabad High Court, in the appellant's own case - 2015-TIOL-1696-HC-ALL-ST has ruled that the said CBEC Circular dated 17.9.2004 was still applicable - it is found from the opening sentence of certificate dated 23.10.2008 issued by District Collector, Nanded that the said ceremony called "Gur-ta-Gaddi Tercentenary Celebration" was an event of great religious significance - therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable - therefore, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed : CESTAT [para 5, 6, 7]

- Appeal allowed: ALLAHABAD CESTAT

2019-TIOL-2978-CESTAT-HYD

Swatantra Communications Vs CCE, C & ST

ST - The assessee has entered into an agreement as franchisee of M/s HESL - For acting as franchisee and selling their products, HESL paid commission to the assessee which was sought to be taxed by department as BAS and demand of service tax was raised - The gross value included an amount of Rs.7,11,711/- which according to the assessee was reimbursable expense incurred towards the interior decoration of showroom and other items like telephone and printer - The lower authority confirmed the demand imposed a penalty - On appeal, before the Commissioner (A), the matter was remanded to adjudicating authority to consider these arguments and rework out the tax and penalties - The demand was raised on commission received by assessee under head of BAS which was exempted from 01.07.2003 vide notfn 13/2003-ST until 09.04.2004 when this exemption was confined to exemption on agricultural produce only - This period also covers the disputed amount which according to the assessee was a reimbursable expense and not so according to the department - Accordingly, the demand for the period 01.07.2003 to 09.04.2004 is set aside - As far as the request for setting aside of penalties under section 76 and 78 is concerned, the assessee has made a strong case as to why the penalties need to be waived under section 80 - Consequently, appeal is partly allowed by setting aside demand, interest and penalties for the period 01.07.2003 to 09.04.2004: CESTAT

- Appeal partly allowed: HYDERABAD CESTAT

2019-TIOL-2977-CESTAT-BANG

Tishman Speyer India Pvt Ltd Vs CCT

ST - The assessee had entered into an agreement with M/s. Tishman Speyer Properties L.P., New York for supply of technical knowledge, skill, process and other assistance to them in respect of analyzing real estate development, execution and property management - Audit Party has noticed a short/non-payment of service tax based on verification of Balance Sheet and the list of payments of service tax on import of services of assessee for the period from 2005-06 to 2009-10 - On the said allegations, a SCN was issued to assessee demanding the amounts along with appropriate interest under Section 75 and also proposed penalty under Sections 76, 77 and 78 read with Rule 15(3) of CCR, 2004 - The assessee while filing the appeal before Commissioner(A) has annexed documents in support of their submission i.e. ST-3 returns, summary of service tax paid towards alleged import of service, statement of expenditure incurred in foreign currency and also the case laws relied upon by them, but the Commissioner(A) has not considered them but rather observed that the assessee have not filed documents to justify their claim - Further, in the additional submissions filed before the Commissioner(A), assessee have filed all the documents but the same has also not been considered - On account of the mistakes, assessee have short paid the service tax but the mistake was rectified and short payments were made good but there is no finding in the impugned order regarding the short payments made by assessee - Further the principles of neutrality has also not been considered by Commissioner(A) - Since most of the submissions made by assessee along with the documents filed by assessee have not been considered by Commissioner(A), this case is remanded back to the original authority for passing a de novo order after considering all the submissions as well as the documents and the proof of payment of short service tax: CESTAT

- Matter remanded: BANGALORE CESTAT

CENTRAL EXCISE

2019-TIOL-2406-HC-MUM-CX

Alkem Laboratories Ltd Vs UoI

CX - This Petition challenges the order dated 26th July, 2018 passed by Respondent which has confirmed the notice issued under Section 11A of CEA, 1944 demanding an amount of Rs.21.85 lakhs of CENVAT Credit, besides imposing an equivalent penalty - This on the basis that the Petitioner is not entitled to CENVAT Credit of duty paid on that part of Furnace Oil, which was used for generation of steam supplied to its sister concern - It is an agreed position between the parties that the impugned order dated 26th July, 2018 of the Additional Commissioner goes beyond the remand order dated 17th July, 2015 of the Tribunal - This, it re-adjudicates the issue afresh on merits, when the remand order was only to decide the quantum final product cleared by the sister concern on payment of excise duty to determine the CENVAT Credit available - As it is an undisputed position between the parties that the impugned order dated 26th July, 2018 is contrary to the directions of Tribunal in its order dated 17th July, 2015, therefore, the impugned order dated 26th July, 2018 is set aside - The issue of determining the quantification of CENVAT Credit available to the Petitioner is restored to the Respondent for fresh determination in accordance with the directions in order dated 17th July, 2015 of the Tribunal: HC

- Petition disposed of: BOMBAY HIGH COURT

2019-TIOL-2982-CESTAT-MAD

Lucas TVS Ltd Vs Commissioner of GST & CE

CX - Issue is whether the appellants are eligible for credit of ST paid on outward transportation of goods.

Held: At the time of hearing, the appellants have furnished detailed documents showing that the sale is on F.O.R. destination - the very same contention was raised by the appellants from the stage of reply to the SCN itself and the evidences were placed before the lower authorities for consideration - however, the lower authorities have erred in holding that the place of removal is the factory gate - as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Roofit Industries Ltd. - 2015-TIOL-87-SC-CX , when the sale is on FOR basis, the freight charges have to be included in the assessable value for discharging of excise duty and, if so, the place of removal is the buyer's premises - due to the above reasons, the place of removal in the present case is the buyer's premises and in such circumstances, the disallowance of credit on the ST paid on GTA Services cannot be sustained - disallowance of credit is unjustified - the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed : CESTAT [para 5, 6]

- Appeal allowed: CHENNAI CESTAT

2019-TIOL-2981-CESTAT-AHM

Laxman Metal Sawing Company Vs CCE & ST

CX - The HUF Proprietor Firm M/s. Laxman Metal Sawing Co. is engaged in the manufacture of excisable goods and using the brand name 'Laxmen' - Shri Sanjay Umrania is a Karta of said HUF Proprietor concern - he has another unit in the name of M/s. Lalita Machines Tools wherein he is proprietor - M/s. Lalita Machines Tools is using the brand name of 'Laxmen' - the case of the department is that the brand name 'Laxmen' belongs to Sanjay Umrania, therefore, use of brand name by M/s. Laxman Metal Sawing Co. was use of brand of another person, accordingly, the appellant is not entitled for the SSI exemption – appeal to CESTAT.

Held: There is no dispute of the facts that the brand name 'Laxmen' was being used by M/s. Lalita Machines Tools, proprietorship concern of Shri Sanjay Umrania and also by M/s. Laxman Metal Sawing Co which is a HUF proprietorship concern and Shri Sanjay Umrania is Karta of said HUF, therefore, there is no dispute that both the firm belong to the same family members - in this position, it cannot be said that one is using the brand name of others - this issue has been considered by this Tribunal in the case of  Shreeji Enterprise and other Vs. CCE & ST- Ahmedabad vide final Order No. A/12244-12245/2018 dated 11.10.2018 , wherein Tribunal held that if the brand name is used by the firms of the same family member, it cannot be said that one is using the brand name of other person - considering the said decision of this Tribunal, the appellant is entitled for SSI exemption - accordingly, the impugned order is set aside - appeal is allowed : CESTAT [para 4, 5]

- Appeal allowed: AHMEDABAD CESTAT

2019-TIOL-2975-CESTAT-HYD

Priyanka Refineries Pvt Ltd Vs CCE, C & ST

CX - The assessee is engaged in refining crude vegetable oil into refined vegetable oil which is their final product and is exempted - During the process, certain other products viz., gums and spent earth/ wax/ fatty oil emerge which they sell to soap manufacturers for consideration - It is the case of revenue that these goods merit classification under CETH 1522 00 20 and 1522 00 90 and are liable to Central Excise duty - The assessee, however, did not pay Central Excise duty claiming the benefit of exemption notfn 89/1995 which exempts "waste, parings and scrap" arising in the course of manufacture of exempted goods and falling within the schedule to CETA, 1985 - The case of revenue is that these products are by-products and not waste or parings or scrap and are therefore not entitled to the benefit of exemption notfn 89/1995- CE - The issue in hand is identical to the issue before Larger Bench of Tribunal in case of Ricela Health Foods Ltd - 2018-TIOL-3625-CESTAT-DEL-LB - The short point to be decided is whether the fatty acids/ wax/ gums which arise while crude vegetable oil is refined should be considered as waste or as by-product - If these are considered as waste, they are covered by exemption notification 89/1995-CE - If, on the other hand, these are considered as by-products, as asserted by department, they are not entitled to the benefit of this notification - The matter has been decided by Larger Bench of Tribunal in Ricela Health Foods and it has been held that these products are not intentionally manufactured but only arise during the process of refining of crude vegetable oil and therefore should be considered as waste and they are entitled to the benefit of exemption notfn 89/1995-CE - Respectfully following the decision of the Larger Bench, the impugned order is unsustainable and is set aside: CESTAT

- Appeal allowed: HYDERABAD CESTAT

Shalu Synthetics Vs CCE

CX - Interest on refund already sanctioned to the assessee - The refund has been granted following the ratio of High Court decision in case of Slovak India Trading Company Pvt. Ltd. - 2006-TIOL-469-HC-KAR-CX honouring judicial discipline - The refund is, therefore, not sanctioned under any express provision of law - When the refund is not under any provisions of Central Excise Act, the provisions of the act relating to interest do not apply to the facts of the case - The appeal is, therefore, dismissed: CESTAT

- Appeal dismissed: AHMEDABAD CESTAT

Sanjeev Mahajan Vs CCE & ST

CX - The Excise duty demand was confirmed on the goods purchased by assessee in auction and subsequently sold by dismantling the same as waste and scrap - It is an admitted fact that the assessees are neither manufacturer of any excisable goods nor they have used purchased goods for manufacturing other goods - They have only carried out the dismantling of waste factory goods - In this fact, assessee has neither manufactured excisable goods nor even there an issue of availment of Cenvat Credit on such purchased goods - In this effect, when the assessee is admittedly not a manufacturer of excisable goods, no duty can be demanded under section 11A (i) if at all there is any duty liability in respect of goods purchased by assessee, it is the manufacturer who is supposed to pay the duty and if at all there is any liability, it will arise against M/s Gujarat Narmada Auto Ltd. - Since the assessee have purchased the goods in auction, the department is free to settle their excise duty with Official Liquidator and not from the assessee - It is also not the case of department that dismantling of capital goods is amount to manufacture - Therefore, there is no basis in the department's proceedings to demand any Excise Duty from the assessee - As regard limitation, the entire facts of purchase of goods under auction and sale thereof were well within the knowledge of the department - Therefore, the department if at all was of the view that any duty liability arise, they were free to issue a SCN well within the normal period of limitation provided under section 11A (1) - However, after having all the facts within the knowledge of the department, they have delayed in issuing SCN and the SCN was issued after more than one year from the relevant date - Therefore, the demand is clearly hit by time bar - The impugned order is not sustainable and the same is set aside: CESTAT

- Appeal allowed: AHMEDABAD CESTAT

CUSTOMS

2019-TIOL-2408-HC-MUM-CUS

Adani Enterprises Ltd Vs UoI

Cus - Issue is whether the Respondent Directorate of Revenue Intelligence has legally and validly commenced the investigation against the petitioner into alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 and whether or not, based on the said investigation set into motion, it is entitled to take recourse to the provisions of Section 166-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for issuance of the Letter of Rogatory by the Magistrate.

Held:

+ It is trite that the Code of Criminal Procedure regulates the procedure for investigation/ inquiry and trial for the offences not only under the Indian Penal Code but also of special offences but in case of latter, application of Cr.P.C is subject to provision (if any), of such special law relating to inter alia, the procedure for investigating, inquiry, trial or otherwise - The special enactment may also specify the nature of the special law offence i.e. whether it is cognizable or non-cognizable, or bailable or non-bailable - Offences under the Indian Penal Code, in terms of Section 4(1) are to be investigated inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure - All offences under the special law would also be dealt with the same provisions but subject to any provisions contained in the special enactment for the time being in force, regulating the manner of investigation/ inquiry or trial or otherwise dealing with such offence.

+ Careful examination of the provisions of the Act would reveal that whenever the legislature intended a departure from the procedure contemplated under the Code, it expressly provided so - As a necessary corollary, if an offence is cognizable, then, it is either made bailable or non-bailable under Part-I of Schedule-I of Cr.P.C. - Under the Customs Act, though the offence punishable under Section 135 are made cognizable, it is also made bailable - In case of a cognizable offence, which in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an offence in which a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force arrest without warrant - A non-cognizable offence in terms of Section 2(l) of the Code of Criminal Procedure means an offence in which a police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant.

+ In case of an offence which is made cognizable under the Customs Act, the procedure contemplated under Section 154 and in case of an offence which is non-cognizable, the procedure under Section 155 would thus become imperative. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 which acts like an exemplar would govern the manner of investigation under the Custom Act by the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure in absence of any special provision in the Customs Act prescribing the manner of investigation.

+ Ratio that flows from apex court decision in Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Deepak Mahajan & Ors 1994(3) SCC 440 is that it in unequivocal terms lays down that in absence of any special procedure being carved out in the special enactment, the provisions contained in the Code and continue to govern the area of investigation, inquiry and trial of the offences under the Customs Act.

+ Though the Customs Act, 1962 classifies the offence punishable thereunder as cognizable/non-cognizable, it does not lay down any set of procedure for dealing with the information received by the Custom Officer for proceeding under the provisions of the Act - It also does not define the term "cognizable/non-cognizable" and in absence of such a definition, the terms take the meaning assigned in the Code of Criminal Procedure - In absence of any set of procedure for commencing the so-called 'investigation', though the statute applies the phrase 'inquiry' for commencing conducting and culminating a valid investigation into the distinct classes of offences, the position that would therefore emerge is to resort to sub-section (2) of Section 4 in relation to an investigation into an offence under the special statute and in absentia of any provision setting out the modalities for commencing, conduct and culmination of investigation - In absence of any overriding provision in the Customs Act, stipulating any contrary procedure, relating to an information received and the manner in which the Custom Officer, who for limited purpose possesses the power of a police officer, by virtue of Section 4(2) of the Code, the respective provisions in the Code relating to dealing with the information requiring an inquiry/investigation into the offences classified as cognizable/non-cognizable shall necessarily follow.

+ The position of law as could be discerned from the judgment in the case of Deepak Mahajan (supra) by virtue of Section 4(2), the provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C are made applicable to the investigations by the Enforcement Directorate - What follows from the judgment of the Apex Court in Deepak Mahajan is the ratio that by combined operation of Section 4(2) and 26B of the Code, the offence complained of should be investigated or inquired into or tried according to the provisions of the Code when the Customs Act do not create a special procedure.

+ Section 166A which opens with a non-obstante clause "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code" are not the only guiding words of the said section but the decisive words of the said section i.e. 'In the course of investigation'. The section came to be inserted by Act No.10 of 1990 and the statements of objects and reasons of the said Amendment Act inter alia states - "the investigating authorities in India were handicapped in collecting evidence in a foreign country or a place in respect of a crime committed by a citizen of India outside the country, due to the absence of a specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."

+ Section 166A cannot be read in isolation and it will have to be read as a part of Chapter XII of the Code to be invoked and applied where the investigation is commenced either under Section 154 or 155 in the manner prescribed therein and it is necessarily an investigation under Chapter XII, which in case of a cognizable offence, commenced with lodging of an information with the police station officer and the police officer following the procedure set out in Section 154 and in case of a non-cognizable offence, by obtaining an order of the jurisdictional Magistrate in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 155, without obtaining such an order from the Magistrate under Section 155(2) - The valid investigation cannot be said to be commenced and continued and therefore, recourse to section 166A without obtaining the necessary permission in respect of an investigation of a non-cognizable offence cannot be justified - The DRI has commenced the investigation into a non-cognizable offence without obtaining the necessary permission from the Magistrate and in such circumstances, the Letter Rogatory (LR) issued by the Magistrate do not meet the test and is not compliant of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. since it do not precede the mandatory requirement of initiation of investigation, as prescribed in Chapter XII.

+ The guidelines issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Internal Security Division on 31st December 2007, relating to the issue of Letter of Rogatory (LRs) for causing investigation abroad contemplate that in order to obtain proposal from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Investigating Agency is expected to send certain documents which include the brief facts of the case, incorporating the allegations, name of the accused and particulars of the offences committed and a copy of the FIR and it is even the Ministry has understood and reflected when an investigation is set in motion and it is only in the backdrop of these circumstances, according to the guidelines, the Court may issue a letter of Rogatory.

+ We have only dealt with the contention as to whether it was permissible for the Magistrate to issue such a Letter of Rogatory without following the procedure mandated by sub-section (2) of Section 155 and whether the letter of Rogatory was issued on initiation of a valid investigation under Chapter XII of Cr.P.C. - Since we are of the express opinion that Section 166A is not an independent island on which any investigating/inquiring authority can jump on without taking recourse to Section 154/155, we hold and declare that the action of the respondents in giving effect to the letter of Rogatory issued by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai in relation to the import of coal of Indonesian origin cannot be sustained and it deserves to be quashed and set aside.

+ Bench makes it clear that it has not gone into the merits of the letter of Rogatory issued by the Magistrate.

+ Writ Petition therefore stands allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). [para 13, 16, 17, 24, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35]

- Petition allowed: BOMBAY HIGH COURT

2019-TIOL-2405-HC-MAD-CUS

Cus - Maintainability of Petition - It is true that against the Order-in-Original, an appellate remedy is available before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) - However, it is well settled that availability of such alternative remedy itself cannot be a bar for the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is purely a discretionary one - If the facts are in dispute, which require further enquiry, consideration and findings on the same, certainly this Court will relegate such exercise only to the next fact finding Authority, viz., Appellate Authority - In the present case, Bench does not find any factual disputes between the parties except on the nomenclature of the amount paid by the petitioner, pursuant to the order of assessment - according to the Revenue, the amount collected from the petitioner was only a 'deposit' and not a 'duty' qualifying application of Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1962 - Therefore, this Court is of the view that in order to decide the nature of the amount so collected and subsequently refunded to the petitioner, as to whether it is the 'duty' or 'deposit', this Court can exercise its jurisdiction and decide the same, so as to further decide as to whether the consequential benefit of interest on the belated refund is payable or not - Writ petition is, therefore, maintainable: High Court [para 8]

Cus - Refund, Interest - Section 27, 27A of Customs Act, 1962 - Liability to pay interest would commence from the date of expiry of three months from the date of application for refund and not on the expiry of the said period from the date on which the order of refund was made - In this case, admittedly, the refund application was made by the petitioner on 20.09.2012 and the said application was rejected by the Original Authority and the same was confirmed by the Appellate Authority - However, before the CESTAT, the petitioner succeeded and got the matter remanded back to the refund sanctioning authority, who ultimately granted the refund on 02.07.2018 - Merely because the petitioner has not succeeded before the Original and Appellate Authority, it does not mean that the date of his application for refund gets altered as the one in pursuant to the order of the CESTAT - In other words, his application for refund dated 20.09.2012 was ultimately considered and granted on 02.07.2018 and, therefore, the interest under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1962 is liable to be paid to the petitioner from the date of expiry of three months from the date of receipt of their refund application - Adjudicating Authority has erroneously rejected the interest claim by misconstruing the payment as deposit instead of duty and also by misinterpreting the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ranbaxy 2011-TIOL-105-SC-CX case - Order of the respondent, impugned in this writ petition, cannot be sustained - Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside - Consequently, the respondent is directed to pay interest with permissible percentage under law, from the date of expiry of three months from the date of receipt of the refund application dated 20.09.2012 - Such exercise shall be done within a period of four weeks: High Court [para 21, 22]

- Petition allowed : MADRAS HIGH COURT

2019-TIOL-2976-CESTAT-MAD

Calimaa World Logistics Pvt Ltd Vs CC

Cus - The appellant is a Customs broker who filed BoE on behalf of a company which imported heavy melting scrap on high sea sale basis - On examination, some quantity of MS Iron plates were found concealed along with the remaining cargo declared as heavy melting scrap - SCN was issued to the parties along with the appellant, alleging there to be mis-declaration of the goods - It was alleged against the appellant that it had not obtained any authorization or document from the importer - On adjudication, the declaration of discription given in the BoE was rejected, penalty was imposed u/s 112(a) along with penalty u/s 114AA of the Act was imposed - On appeal, the Commr.(A) upheld the penalty imposed u/s 112(a) but reduced the quantum of penalty imposed u/s 114AA - Hence the present appeal.

Held - In the SCN, the allegation is that the appellant did not obtain documents from the importer - There is no allegation of the appellant knowingly or intentionally abetted any misdeclaration of goods - Perusal of the O-i-O shows that though the appellant abetted making false declaration in the BoE, there is no evidence furnished by the Revenue in support of such conclusion - Besides, another firm which originally imported the goods, described as to how the uncut MS Plates came to be shipped to India - Considering all facts and evidences, there is nothing to establish that the appellant knowingly or wilfully abetted to make false declaration in the BoE - Hence the penalty imposed u/s 112(a) is not sustainable - The penalty u/s 114AA is attracted only if the person knowingly or intentionally makes, signs or uses, or causes to be made, signed or used, any declaration, statement or document which is false or incorrect - As the appellant abetted no mis-declaration, no penalty is imposable u/s 114AA - Hence the O-i-A in challenge merits being set aside: CESTAT

- Appeal allowed: CHENNAI CESTAT