| SERVICE TAX 2019-TIOL-3488-CESTAT-DEL
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd Vs CST
ST - The assessee-company, engaged in providing telephone services falling u/s 65(105)(b) & Section 65(105)(zzzx), also avails Cenvat credit on input goods, services and capital goods as per the provisions of CCR 2004 - Special audit of assessee's record was conducted for the relevant period, whereupon certain shortcomings were noted - An SCN was issued alleging short payment of service tax as per reconciliation of ST-3 returns and with income shown in accounts and interest thereon; short payment of service tax on proceeds of modem being part of taxable services along with interest thereon; wrong availment of credit on rent-a-cab services with interest thereon; wrong availment of credit on invoices on which service tax registration number are not mentioned; short payment of service tax on telephone service provided to employees and non-reversal of credit u/r 6(3) of CCR 2004 - Hence the SCN proposed to recover duty on all these counts along with appropriate interest and proportionate penalties - Hence the present appeal.
Held - Short-payment of service tax as per reconciliation of ST-3 returns and with income shown in accounts and interest - In this regard, it is seen that document of defence was produced by the assessee before the adjudicating authority reflecting the extra payment of service tax - Such document already was allowed to be placed on record by the Tribunal - The document was prepared as per the ST-3 returns already filed by the assessee during the period of dispute - As the document is in the form of a calculation chart, the matter warrants remand for re-verification of the ST-3 returns and to determine whether the calculation as done by the assessee is in accordance with the record and if there is an excess payment of service tax by the assessee: CESTAT
Held - Short-payment of service tax on proceeds of Modem being part of taxable services - The only point to ascertain is whether the modem is given to customers free of cost or whether its value was included in that of the telecommunication service provided by the assessee - Such question cannot be adjudicated unless there are appropriate invoices proving that no amount was received by the assessee from its customers in lieu of providing them with modem or that supply of modem is purely a trading activity - Without such invoices, the adjudicating authority correctly surmised that the assessee did not pay tax on the gross amount charged from the customers as they have also charged for the modem provided to the subscriber and that the same is justified - As the goods admittedly did not involve payment of VAT, the question of those being purely a trading activity, cannot be ascertained - Hence demand raised on this count is sustained: CESTAT
Held - Wrong availment of credit on rent-a-cab service - Availment of utilization of credit on rent-a-cab service has been acknowledged by the assessee - Admissions are best evidence - The clear cut findings of the adjudicating authority warrant no interference with: CESTAT
Held - Wrong availment of credit on invoices on which service tax registration number/STC of service provider is not mentioned - It is undisputed that the invoices have all details except the PAN-based registration number of service providers - It is also undisputed that all such registration numbers were provided by the assessee - The assessee acknowledged that all service providers apart from one deposited the service tax - The Revenue put forth nothing to falsify the discharge of liability - Hence the demand on this issue merits being set aside in respect of all service providers barring the one which did not pay service tax - The demands be re-calculated accordingly: CESTAT
Held - Non/short payment of service tax on telephone service provided to employees - The telephone service provided to the employees cannot be held to be a service against some consideration which is not in cash but is in kind - The service recipients are the employees of the assessee and the objective behind such service being given to the employees is to ensure their efficiency - There are no separate service recipients other than the employees of the assessee itself - Hence the same classifies as service to self & Section 67(1) of the Finance Act was wrongly invoked, since there is no consideration and no question of taxation arises - The demand on this count is set aside: CESTAT
Held - Non-reversal of Cenvat Credit under Rule 6(3) of CCR 2004 - There is acknowledgment on the assessee's part that the credit was already reversed by it - There is no other submission or documents to falsify the reversal - Hence the order disallowing the credit taken and reversal thereof is upheld: CESTAT
- Assessee's appeal partly allowed: DELHI CESTAT
2019-TIOL-3487-CESTAT-AHM
Chhatariya Dehydrates Exports Vs CCE & ST
ST - The assessee is exporter of Dehydrated onion and paying commission to sales agents abroad - Demand has been made in respect of service tax on said sales commission on reverse charge basis - It has been already held by Bombay High Court in case of Indian National Shipowners Association - 2008-TIOL-633-HC-MUM-ST that no demand can be sustained prior to 19.04.2006 as per Section 66A - Therefore the said demand for the period prior to 19.04.2006 is set aside - The assessee claimed the benefit of Notfn 13/2003-ST - It is seen that the said Notfn, as amended, exempts commission paid in respect of sale of agricultural products - It is seen that Dehydrate onion is not covered by the said definition - Dehydrate onion cannot be called as agricultural produce in terms of Notfn 13/2003-ST - Notfn 14/2004-ST is also not applicable in instant situation as the service provided are not covered by any clause of said notfn - The next claim of assessee is invocation of extended period in the second SCN - In this case too, the assessee had resisted supplying documents and data - The facts are not disputed by assessee and in these circumstances, there was suppression of facts and consequently, extended period has been rightly invoked, in the subsequent notice also - The entire demand for the period after 18.04.2006 is upheld - Penalty imposed under Section 78 is also revised as equal to the demand confirmed in the order: CESTAT
- Appeal partly allowed: AHMEDABAD CESTAT
CENTRAL EXCISE
2019-TIOL-2769-HC-MUM-CX
Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd Vs CCE
CX - Assessee is engaged in the manufacture of tractors, tractor skids, IC engines and transmission assemblies and parts thereof. While tractors manufactured by it were exempted from excise duty, the other items such as tractor skids, IC engines, transmission assemblies and parts thereof were dutiable and cleared on payment of duty - The Assessee took Cenvat credit in respect of all inputs which were used for manufacture of tractors as also other dutiable goods without maintaining separate accounts for use of inputs in tractors (exempted goods) and other goods (dutiable goods) - As required by Rule 6(3) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 and the equivalent rule of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, it accordingly paid amounts equal to 8% (upto 9.9.2004) and 10% (from 10.9.2004) of the total price (excluding sales tax and other taxes) of exempted final goods (i.e. tractors) cleared for home consumption - However, these amounts (8% or 10%, as the case may be) were recovered from its customers by the Assessee in addition to the sale price charged - It was the Department's case that these amounts were payable on the entire amount recovered from the customer, that is to say, not just the net sale price, but the sale price plus 8% / 10% duty - Since they were not so paid, demands were raised on the Assessee - Department also found that the Assessee had taken credit in respect of some inputs which were exclusively used for the manufacture of exempted goods and issued show cause notices, accordingly, demanding recovery of the credit wrongfully taken - Commissioner, Central Excise, Mumbai held against the Assessee on all issues - Being aggrieved, the Assessee filed appeals before the CESTAT which partly allowed the appeals - Therefore, the Department and the Assessee are aggrieved by different parts of the order and have filed appeals before the High Court.
Following questions of law are involved in these appeals filed by Assessee as well as Revenue.
Assessee appeal
(i) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, was the Tribunal justified in holding that though auto cess and education cess were duties of excise, yet the goods on which they were paid, continued to be exempted goods as basic excise duty was not payable thereon?
Held:
+ Once it is seen that these cesses and duties are also excise duties and on that basis are included in the Cenvat credit scheme, as indicated by Rule 3 itself, the fact that these are referred to as cesses or duties loses its significance altogether; it is hardly determinative for construing the expression "duty of excise". [para 7(e)]
+ Expression "duty of excise" is used in Cenvat Credit Rules, which themselves include the various duties and cesses referred to therein, including the education cess and auto cess, etc. as part of "Cenvat", which is an equivalent expression to "duty of excise" after the Act was amended by introducing Section 2A therein. The expression "duty of excise" used in Cenvat Credit Rules, thus, does not, by its own force or on its own logic, lend to a distinction between basic duty of excise under the Act and special excise duties or cesses or other duties leviable under other enactments. [para 7(f)]
+ Bench disagrees with the judgment of Uttarakhand High Court in Hero Motorcorp Ltd., to the extent it holds that Rule 6 of Cenvat Credit Rules was intended to cover those cases, where the main duty, which is the basic excise duty, was exempted - the construction of the phrase "duty of excise" in Modi Rubber Ltd. was not a general construction of the words "duty of excise" wherever they were used - It was in particular reference to the expression "duty of excise" used in a subordinate piece of legislation, namely, a notification issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules - Rule 8(1) read with Rule 2(V) specifically covered only duty of excise "under the Central Excises and Salt Act"; and the expression "duty of excise" used in the notification could not be given any extended meaning beyond what it bore under Rule 8(1) itself - substantial question of law is answered in the negative, i.e. in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. [para 7(g), 7(h)]
(ii) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, was the Tribunal justified in holding that the amount of 8% (later raised to 10%) of the price of exempted goods, required to be paid under Rule 6(3)(b) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 & 2004 (for not maintaining separate accounts), was a mere facilitation measure and not in the nature of tax, and therefore not allowable as a deduction to arrive at the assessable value of goods?
Held:
+ The amount of eight or ten percent of sales price referred to in clause (b) of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 is an exaction under an enactment. Just because an option has been given to a manufacturer under this clause, the exaction does not cease to be compulsory. The option merely signifies that the exaction, compulsory as it is, applies in certain cases and not in others. [para 8(b)]
+ Whatever be the purpose, if and to the extent the exaction is compulsory (in cases covered by the provision) and is under a statute, it is nothing but 'tax'. And if it is so, it is liable to be deducted from the assessable price for the purpose of computing excise duty, namely, in the present case, auto cess and education cess, which are payable even on exempted goods. [para 8(b)]
+ After payment of ten or eight percent amount, as the case may be, which, is nothing but tax, the assessable value can be derived from such cum-duty price only after making permissible deductions, that is to say, deduction inter alia of the tax component, namely, ten or eight percent of the amount, as the case may be, of the selling price of the goods - question is answered in the negative, i.e. in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. [para 8(d)]
Revenue appeal
(iii) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, was the Tribunal justified in holding that Cenvat Credit could be utilized by the Assessee, where common inputs were used along with non-common inputs in manufacture of exempted goods, as Explanation - III added to Rule 6(3)(b) of Cenvat Credit Rules inserted w.e.f. 16 May, 2005 was prospective in nature? [Explanation - III reads - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the credit shall not be allowed on inputs and inputs services used exclusively for the manufacture of exempted goods or exempted services.]
Held:
+ When the pre-amended provision created a doubt or was ambiguous, the new law explaining it may be treated as curative or declaratory; the legal provision may be implicit in the preamended law and the new Act may simply be designed to make it explicit so as to cast away any doubt or ambiguity in that behalf; If, on the other hand, the prior provision was clear and unambiguous, the new law might not be so treated; it might have to be seen as altering the existing law. [para 9(c)]
+ The Explanation, at least ostensibly, is for removal of doubts and purports to be clarificatory; it starts with the words "For the removal of doubts" and the operative verb used is "clarified". The apparent purpose seems to be to clear any ambiguity in that behalf and declare that in the scheme of things under Sub-rule (3), there is no scope for availment of Cenvat credit for inputs used exclusively for the manufacture of exempted goods. The whole purpose of Sub-Rules (2) and (3) appears to be to deal with a situation where a manufacturer uses common inputs for manufacture of both dutiable goods and exempted goods, and not where he uses inputs exclusively for manufacture of exempted goods. [para 9(f)]
+ In the first place, there is nothing in law to suggest that the rule of construction for ascertaining the nature of an amendment - whether clarificatory or altering the law - is different for fiscal statues (bearing on a fiscal liability) as opposed to others (not involving any fiscal liability). The principle is the same. [para 9(h)]
+ Where the amendment clears a doubt or an ambiguity and makes explicit what is already implicit in the pre-amended statute, it is clarificatory or declaratory. On the other hand, where it introduces a change in the pre-existing law, namely, an element which was not there earlier, even latently, it is altering the earlier law. The former is usually applied retrospectively and the latter prospectively. [para 9(h)]
+ Secondly, merely because Sub-rule (3) opens with the words "Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-rules (1) and (2)", it cannot be said to be an exception separately to sub-rules (1) and (2). It is possible for the legislature or a rule-making body to provide, when an exception is carved out in a rule, say, Rule 2, to Rule 1 and exception to Rule 2 in, say, Rule 3, that rule 3 is 'notwithstanding what is contained Rules 1 and 2' . That does not carve out cases independently of Rule 2 from Rule 1. It is very much conceivable, in such a case, that Rule 2 carves out a separate class out of what is covered by Rule 1, whilst Rule 3 carves out a separate class out of Rule 2. And that is precisely what appears to be the case here. [para 9(h)]
+ There is nothing particular about Sub-rule (1) referring to 'exempted goods' as against Sub-rule (3) which refers to a 'manufacturer'. They both deal with the same subject, namely, "manufacture" of exempted goods and apply to one and the same entity, namely, "manufacturer" of such goods. [para 9(h)]
+ Though Sub-rule (1) mandates against availment of Cenvat credit in respect of inputs used for manufactrue of exempted goods, what it effectively does is to provide against use by manufacturer of exempted goods of Cenvat credit in respect of inputs used for such manufacture. Sub-rule (2) culls out a subset out of this larger set of manufacturers of exempted goods, and that subset is of those manufacturers who manufacture both exempted goods and dutiable goods. [para 9(h)]
+ Two further sub-sets are then made from out of these latter manufacturers - one of those who maintain separate accounts of receipt, consumption and inventory of inputs going into exempted goods and those going into dutiable goods, and the second of those manufacturers who do not do so, but observe the conditions either in clause (a) or clause (b) of Sub-rule (3). The first sub-set is covered under Sub-rule (2), the second under Sub-rule (3). [para 9(h)]
+ It is in this sense that Sub-rule (3) applies "notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-rules (1) and (2)". This makes it clear that Sub-rule (3), applies only to those cases, where the manufacturer in question uses common inputs for manufacture of dutiable as well as exempted goods; it does not apply to a manufacturer of exempted goods, who uses exclusive inputs for such manufacture. This is implicit in Rule 6, read in the light of all its sub-rules together. [para 9(h)]
+ Explanation III merely underscores this position. It makes explicit what was already implicit. It is purely and simply clarificatory or declaratory; it does not alter the old law in any manner or, in other words, introduce a new element in it which did not exist earlier. It must apply, accordingly, retrospectively. [para 9(h)]
+ Question is answered in the negative, i.e. in favour of the Revenue and against the Assessee. [para 9(i)]
- Appeals allowed: BOMBAY HIGH COURT
2019-TIOL-3490-CESTAT-ALL
Dharampal Premchand Ltd Vs CCE
CX - The assessee-company manufactures excisable goods such as chewing tobacco and perfumery compounds, using packing machines installed in its factory - The goods manufactured by it were notified goods u/s 3A(1) of the CEA 1944 - When the Chewing Tobacco and unmanufactured Tobacco Packing Machine (Capacity Determination and Collection of Duty) Rules, 2010 came into force, the manufacturer of notified goods was required to file declaration in Form 1, declaring the number of packing machines installed, so as to calculate duty for a particular month in respect of such operating packing machines and to pay the duty on monthly basis - As the assessee manufactured such notified goods, it filed declarations as per Rule and declared the product as Chewing Tobacco falling under CETH 2403 99 10 - The Revenue opined that the correct classification of the product is Jarda Scented Tobacco, falling under CTH 2403 99 30 - Demand for differential amount of duty was raised on account of the change in classification - Such classification adopted by the adjudicating authority as well as the duty demand raised were sustained by the Commr.(A) - Hence the present appeals.
Held - The issue at hand is whether the assessee's product declared by it as Chewing Tobacco is actually tobacco or the same is Jarda Scented Tobacco falling under CTH 2403 99 30, attracting higher rate of duty - The assessee manufactured goods under the brand name of Baba and filed declarations describing the product as Chewing Tobacco - It is seen that another unit of the same group manufactured an identical product using similar ingredients and having the same manufacturing process, which was declared as Jarda Scented Tobacco falling under CTH 2403 99 30 - The sample of the product manufactured by the other unit was drawn and tested by the chemical examiner - Though the assessee contended that the samples were drawn from its other unit and not from its own unit, it did not contest that both products were marketed under the same brand name or that the manufacture process is identical - Once goods enter the market under the same brand name, the consumer would not bother about the manufacturer & the goods were traded as one, whether manufactured in one factory or the other - The brand name Baba is associated with the assessee and two products have not been shown as being different products - Hence the opinion of the chemical examiner, holding the product was composed of tobacco, silver flecks, fragrance and has the characteristics of scented tobacco would equally apply to the product being manufactured by the assessee - Besides, the statement of the General Manager admitting to have added silver & scented flavor to other ingredients of the product manufactured and sold under the brand name of Baba, supports the opinion of the Chief Chemist - Hence the reference and reliance on the test report of the Chief Examiner cannot be faulted - Besides, the Commr. has not mechanically followed the test report of the chemical examiner without discussing the ingredients and examined the issue independently - As such, there is no merit in the contention that merely because the final product was accepted as Chewing Tobacco falling under Heading 2403 99 10, the correct classification cannot be considered for future clearances - Besides, the duty demand only relates to the period when the classification of the assessee's final product was classified as Zarda - A cumulative reading of Rule 6 of Chewing Tobacco and unmanufactured Tobacco Packing Machine (Capacity Determination and Collection of Duty) Rules, 2010 and the language used therein leads to conclusion that the declarations in the rule were for determining correct annual production capacity of a particular unit - While passing orders in terms of these Rules, by approving the declarations, the correct classification of the product being manufactured, is required to be examined - Without determining the correctness of the description of goods declared by the party, it is impractical to determine production capacity and duty liability: CESTAT
Held - It is seen that Chewing Tobacco and Jarda Scented Tobacco are different products classifiable under different tariff items - The test report of the chemical examiner clearly revealed that the product is question is Jarda Scented Tobacco - Such ingredients were revealed by the test report of the chemical examiner, supported by the statements of the General Manager - Considering the decision of the High Court in Mishra Zarda Traders vs. State of Orissa, the the assessee's final product declared by them as Chewing Tobacco is essentially Jarda Scented Tobacco and stands correctly classified under Tariff Items No 2403 99 30 - The orders being challenged merit being upheld: CESTAT
- Assessee's appeal dismissed: ALLAHABAD CESTAT
2019-TIOL-3489-CESTAT-MUM
CC, CE & ST Vs Deputy Executive Engineer
CX - The present appeals arise from the dismissal of two applications for refund of Excise duty discharged by the Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) of the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited, arising from the ex post facto claim of eligibility for exemption afforded by Notfn No 74/1993-CE which was intended for goods manufactured in a factory belonging to any State Government - Thereafter, the jurisdictional Asst Commr passed an order pronouncing the assessee to be qualified to benefit from the exemption, whereupon the refund claims were filed - The original authority rejected such refund claims on grounds that the order passed by the Asst. Commr., not having retrospective eligibility, would not suffice to overcome the bar of limitation and the second claim on the ground that the Tribunal had not rendered a decision on the Revenue's challenge - On appeal, the Commr.(A) allowed partial relief only - The Revenue's appeal against the relief of such amount was dismissed as well - The assessee claimed interest for delayed payment u/s 11BB of the Act which while rejected by the original authority, found favor with the Commr.(A) - Hence the present appeals by the Revenue.
Held - As the rejection of the second claim for refund was upheld in the order by drawing on such authority, the court is bound by the precedent afforded by the Larger Bench in discarding the claim of organizations such as that of the assessee, to belong to the State Govt and more importantly, being a Department of the Govt - Hence the order upholding the duty liability merits being sustained - Regarding the appeal against the acceptance by the Commr.(A) of the exclusion from duty liability for a limited period that is presumed by Revenue to be a decision on merits, it is seen that such order is not so - The exercise of jurisdiction by any appellate forum is restricted to the dispute before that authority and the effect of the order is limited to that - There was no appeal of the Revenue against the rejection of the claim in its entirety in the order of the original authority - In absence of such appeal, the decision of the Commr.(A) is but a decision that presuming the validity of eligibility in the order of the Asst. Commr., on the bar of limitation - While it was earlier held that the claim of eligibility for the earlier period was not valid in law, the challenge to the eligibility for exemption for the period thereafter, would be decided in context in which the claim was accepted - Besides, the Revenue's appeal against the modification of rejection by the original authority does merit attention as the Commr.(A) was bereft of the law as settled by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in Assistant Engineer (Civil) v. Commissioner of Central Excise which negated the presumption that the clarificatory O-i-O passed by the Asst Commr. had attained finality and that the dispute before the Commr.(A) lay within the narrow compass of limitation - However, the conformity thereof must be tested before any relief is granted - Hence the Revenue's appeal is allowed by way of remand to the Commr.(A) - The eligibility to consequential relief including interest for delayed disbursal is dependent on this determination: CESTAT
- Case remanded: MUMBAI CESTAT
CUSTOMS
2019-TIOL-2768-HC-MAD-CUS
Skyline Exports Vs DCC
Cus - Drawback claims - Petitioner did not respond to the queries/defects raised by public notice during the observance of 'Drawback Arrears Clearance Month' - Petitioner made a representation to the Grievance Committee and they received a response that the drawback claims had been reduced to zero and disposed - Writ petition filed since further representations were not responded to - later petition withdrawn to pursue matter with the Chief Commissioner who rejected the claims endorsing the view of the first respondent - petition filed on the groound that the order was non-speaking order but same was dismissed as not maintainable and hit by res judicata - writ appeal too was dismissed - supplementary claims were filed but the same were rejected and the same is challenged in the present petition.
HELD: Publication of defect memo would not satisfy the specific requirement of Rule 13(3) of Customs, Central Excise Duties and Service Tax Draw Back (Amendment) Rules, 2006, which states that a defect memo should be served on the assessee/exporter calling for rectification of the defects - Admittedly, no defect memo has been issued to the petitioner pointing out to it the defects that ostensibly arise in its drawback claims - Had this Rule been complied with, the petitioner might well have rectified the defects, thus paving the way for a timely disposal of its drawback claims - flaw has occasioned at the door of the Department by the violation of principles of natural justice, specifically Rule 13(3) of the Rules - This aspect of the matter has been considered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Balaji Impex = 2011-TIOL-444-HC-MUM-CUS where, in the context of a similar Public Notice, the Bench has said that 'merely because there was a special drive to clear a backlog of matters, that would afford no justification for the department not to comply with the fundamental principles of natural justice - Efficiency in the disposal of the quasi judicial proceedings is important but, that cannot be at the cost of overriding fundamental principles known to the law of the land - Not doing so would frustrate the spirit, object and intention of the drawback scheme itself, which is a scheme that has been brought in as a benefit to exporters - rejection of representation dated 05.11.2004 on the ground that all drawback claims were brought to nil is flawed - petitioner should not be denied the benefit of drawback based merely on a Public Notice, particularly when the petitioner has satisfied all other requirements under the relevant Notification/Scheme, thus frustrating the object of the scheme itself - claim of rebate in relation to the twelve transactions denied under the impugned order shall be sanctioned and paid over to the petitioner within a period of six weeks - Writ Petition is allowed: High Court [para 7, 8, 9, 11]
- Petition allowed: MADRAS HIGH COURT
2019-TIOL-3491-CESTAT-MUM
CC Vs Madura Industrial Textiles
Cus - Respondent herein had imported "N-6 Tire Cord Grade Spin Drawn Filament/Nylon-6 High tenacity Nylon Filament yarn" - imported nylon yarns were of 840/1260/1680 deniers - The appellant had claimed the benefit of Notification No. 5/2006-C.E., dated 01.03.2006 as amended by No. 58/2008-C.E., dated 07.12.2008 for concessional rate of 4% of duty but the same was disallowed by the adjudicating authority – Commissioner(A) allowed the appeal by holding that arithmetic formula for determination of the multiples, for classification of the goods under a different chapter than as claimed by the respondent cannot be adopted – Revenue in appeal before CESTAT.
HELD: Aforesaid notifications grant concessional rate of duty of 4% in respect of all goods, other than nylon filament yarn of 210 deniers or in the multiples thereof, with tolerance of 6% - The issue is not in dispute that the imported nylon yarns are not of 210 deniers and thus, by referring to the definition of the said goods as per the HSN, the benefit of concessional rate of duty was extended by the Commissioner (Appeals) in favour of the respondent - Further, Bench also do not find any specific submissions being made by Revenue in support of denial of the benefit of concessional rate of duty claimed by the respondent – no infirmity in the impugned order – Revenue appeal dismissed: CESTAT [para 4, 5]
- Appeal dismissed: MUMBAI CESTAT | 
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