SERVICE TAX

2020-TIOL-1210-CESTAT-DEL

Vedic Broadcasting Ltd Vs CCE & ST

ST - Issue involved is as to whether the charges paid by the Appellant to M/s Intelsat Global Sales & Marketing Ltd., UK Intelsat are for a service provided by Intelsat (situated outside India) to the Appellant, that would be leviable to service tax under the head 'broadcasting service' in the hands of the Appellant under the reverse charge mechanism.

Facts: [para 5, 6, 9, 10, 11]

+ According to the Appellant, a cumulative reading of the terms of the Agreement as well as the Service Order would demonstrate that the essence of the contract is to secure a dedicated 8MHz bandwidth on the transponder of the satellite belonging to Intelsat and the charges paid for this purpose by the Appellant to Intelsat are not for provision of any service.

+ It was, however, believed by the Officers of the Internal Audit Wing of the Department during the course of audit that the Appellant had received 'broadcasting services' from Intelsat by using the transponder of the satellite owned by Intelsat for up linking and down linking the programme signals through the services of Noida Software Technology Pvt. Ltd. NSTPL and for which the Appellant had been making payments in foreign currency to Intelsat.

+ Accordingly, SCN was issued alleging that the assessee is liable to pay Service tax amounting to Rs.1,06,43,622/- including Edu. Cess and SHE Cess for the period 2009-10 to 2014-15(upto July 2014) at applicable rates on the amount paid to M/s Intelsat for using the transponder of their satellite for down-linking and up-linking of the programme.

+ The Commissionerdid not accept the contentions advanced by the Appellant and confirmed the demand for the period upto June, 2012 but dropped the demand for the remaining period after June, 2012. The Commissioner observed that the activity would fall within the definition of 'broadcasting' under section 2(c) of the PrasarBharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 PrasarBharati Act.

+ The Commissioner also observed that Intelsat was a 'broadcasting agency or organization' under section 65(105)(16) of the Finance Act, 1994 and, therefore, the service provided would be taxable under section 65(105)(zk) of the Finance Act.

+ Commissioner repelled the submissions advanced by the Appellant that allocation of bandwidth was not a service but supply of goods.

Held: [42, 52 to 57, 59, 60, 64, 70, 72, 75, 77, 78, 79]

++ The issuethat arises for consideration is as to whether under the Agreement, Intelsat has leased out 8MHz bandwidth of its transponder or Intelsat is engaged in transmitting signals.

++ The contents of the Service Order and the four Attachments to the Service Order leave no manner of doubt that the Appellant is required to pay a fixed fee of US$ 40,000 per month to Intelsat.

++ The Transponder Segment Service refers to two bandwidths and Attachments 1(a) and 1(b) each refer to allocated bandwidth 4.00 MHz bandwidth, thus making a total of 8MHz bandwidth. It is also clear from clause 1.0 of Attachment 2 to the Service Order that unless otherwise specified in the Service Order, that portion of the service transponder which comprises the Service to the Appellant shall be power and bandwidth limited, consisting of a Transponder Segment equivalent to the amount of bandwidth specified in the Service Order and associated power on the service transponder.

++ Thus, the monthly fixed payment made by the Appellant to Intelsat relates to the lease of space segment capacity of the transponder and has nothing to do with the signals that are transmitted.

++ This apart, the Office Memorandum dated 25 June, 2009 also supports this position. By the said Office Memorandum, the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting conveyed its no objection for remittance of foreign exchange by the Appellant to the extent of US$ 4,80,000 for the period from November, 2008 to October 2009 to Intelsat towards meeting the charges for hiring transponder on IS-10 satellite. It needs to be noted that if the monthly services were dependent on signals, the charges would be variable and not fixed and would, therefore, be calculated at the end of the month.

++ The transmission of signals is as a result of the use of the space segment capacity of the transponder of the satellite. The relay station, as noticed above, is able to uplink the programme signals which are then reflected to the earth by the Intelsat transponder on the footprint area of the earth. This is so evident from the pictorial representation. This is also clear from the procedure described by the two experts that frequency uplinked with a particular power is automatically reflected back by the satellite without any alteration/modification of the programme contents with the help of equipments on the satellite and no human intervention takes place.

++ The definition of 'broadcasting' has three categories. Under the first category, 'broadcasting' has been assigned the meaning as contained in clause (c) of section (2) of the PrasarBharati Act. Section 2(c) of the PrasarBharati Act defines 'broadcasting' to mean the dissemination of any form of communication by transmission of electro-magnetic waves through space intended to be received by the general public through the medium of relay stations.

++ The contention of the Appellant is that it is the Appellant who would fall in the definition of 'broadcasting' and not 'Intelsat' for the simple reason that the activity of dissemination of various forms of communication by transmission of electromagnetic waves through space through the medium of relay stations is at the instance of the Appellant, for which it has deposited service tax under forward charge as a 'broadcasting' service provider.

++ This submission of the Appellant deserves to be accepted. The use of the words 'through the medium of relay stations' is very significant in the definition of 'broadcasting' under section 2(c) of the PrasarBharati Act.

++ For Intelsat to fall in the definition of 'broadcasting', it must necessarily disseminate any form of communication by transmission of electromagnetic waves through space through the medium of relay stations. The definition 'broadcasting' under section 2(c) of the PrasarBharati Act brings within its sweep the provision of broadcasting service by an actual broadcaster by availing the service/facility of a relay station which would be a satellite service provider, as Intelsat is in the present case.

++ The activity of dissemination of any form of communication by transmission of electromagnetic waves through space alone cannot be regarded as 'broadcasting', unless it is intended to be received by the general public through the medium of relay station and not by a relay station. The term 'relay station' has not been defined under the PrasarBharati Act. A relay station would be a fixed station or a mobile station such as a satellite that receives signals and rebroadcasts them at the same or a different frequency to extend the reach of the broadcaster. In the present case, relay station would be Intelsat that receives, amplifies and retransmits the signals to the desired footprint area on the earth. Intelsat, being a relay station itself, therefore, cannot be said to be a “broadcaster” under section 2(c) of the PrasarBharati Act. The Commissioner, therefore, clearly fell in error in concluding that Intelsat would be a broadcaster under section 2(c) of the PrasarBharati Act.

++ The submission of Appellant is that Intelsat has not carried out any activity like programme selection, scheduling or presentation of sound or visual matter on a radio or a television channel that is intended for public listening or viewing. This position is not disputed by the Department and there is no finding also of the Commissioner that the activity undertaken by Intelsat would fall in the first inclusive part of the definition of 'broadcasting' under section 65(15) of the Finance Act. The Department has, in fact, laid emphasis on the second inclusive part definition of 'broadcasting' under section 65(15) of the Finance Act.

++ Second inclusive part of the definition of 'broadcasting' under section 65(15) of the Finance Act deals with broadcasting agency or organization having its head office situated in any place outside India. It is for such a broadcasting agency or organization that the definition of 'broadcasting' includes the activity of selling of time slots or obtaining sponsorships for broadcasting of any programme or permitting the rights to receive any form of communication by transmission of electro-magnetic waves through space or through cables or by any other means to cable operator including multisystem operator or any other person on behalf of the said agency or organization, by its branch office or subsidiary or representative in India or any agent appointed in India or by any person who acts on his behalf.

++ It has, therefore, to be determined whether Intelsat is a 'broadcasting agency or organization' as defined under section 65(16) of the Finance Act. Under this section, 'broadcasting agency or organization' has been defined to mean any agency or organization engaged in providing service in relation to broadcasting in any manner. The contention of Appellant is that unless any 'agency or organization' is engaged in providing service in relation to broadcasting in any manner, it cannot be regarded as a 'broadcasting agency or organization'. The contention, therefore, is that if Intelsat is not a 'broadcasting agency or organization', it cannot be said to be providing any service of broadcasting under the second inclusive part of the definition of 'broadcasting' under section 65(15) of the Finance Act.

++ The second inclusive part of the definition of 'broadcasting' under section 65(15) of the Finance Act is in the context of a 'broadcasting agency or organization' having its head office situated in any place outside India. It is only in the case of a 'broadcasting agency or organization' that the activities mentioned in the second inclusive part of the definition, have to be examined, since 'broadcasting agency or organization' under section 65(16) of the Act means any agency or organization engaged in providing service in relation to broadcasting. It has already been seen that Intelsat is not providing any service of 'broadcasting' under the means part of the definition or the second inclusive part of the definition of 'broadcasting' under section 65(15) of the Finance Act. The meaning of the term 'in relation to' cannot be stretched to such an extent so as to include an activity which is not even covered under the definition of 'broadcasting'.

++ Since the entire activity comprising of production of programme content, encoding, modulating, up-linking and subsequent downlinking on the footprint area completes the activity of broadcasting at the end of the Appellant, on which it is depositing service tax, the limited activity of downlinking cannot be again made liable to tax as 'broadcasting' service in the hands of Intelsat, whose role is limited to leasing of space segment capacity on the transponder of its satellite.

++ The mere fact that the assignment of space segment capacity of transponder is fixed at USD 40,000 per month, for contracted 8 MHz bandwidth, whether used or not, would conclusively prove that the said charges are not towards transmission of signals, otherwise the same would have been variable every month, as per the quantum/speed of frequencies transmitted.

++ A satellite has a number of transponders and each transponder has a certain amount of bandwidth. A customer may not take on lease the entire bandwidth of a particular transponder. In the instant case, the Appellant has taken lease of only 8 MHz bandwidth out of the 54 MHz bandwidth of the transponder. This 8 MHz bandwidth allocated to the Appellant is for exclusive use of the Appellant and cannot be allocated to any other user. It is only the remaining bandwidth of the transponder that can be allocated to any other user. It cannot also be denied that Intelsat may be providing Services to many users from its various transponders. It is a particular space segment of a particular transponder that has been taken on lease by the Appellant.

++ Any interruption of service will necessarily refer to the space segment capacity and not transmission of signals. 'Interruption of Service', therefore, would refer to non-functioning of the transponder, as a result of which there would be no transmission of signals. A transponder may not function for various reasons including loss of power. It is in such a situation that a right has been conferred on the Appellant to seek remedies regarding 'outage' credit in accordance with Clause 5.3 of the Agreement.

++ Authorized Representative of the Department laid much emphasis on section 65A of the Finance Act to contend that since the Agreement contains features relating to both allocations of bandwidth and transmission of signals, the activity which gives such a transaction its essential character, has to be determined in accordance with sub-section (2)(b).

++ For section 65A(2)(b) to apply, there has to be a classification dispute between two or more taxable services. In the present case, the lease of space segment capacity of the transponder is not taxable as it is subjected to State VAT, being akin to "transfer of right to use goods". Even if the transmission of signals, as per the impugned order and as per the submissions of the learned Authorized Representative of the Department, is covered under 'broadcasting service', then too the rule of classification contained in section 65A of the Finance Act cannot be applied since it involves only one taxable service and one non-taxable service. Thus, the essential character test cannot be applied in the present case.

++ The inevitable conclusion, therefore, that follows is that the contention of the Department that the down linking of the signals from the satellite is transmission of signals covered by the definition of 'broadcasting' and, therefore, leviable to service tax on the Appellant under a reverse charge mechanism cannot be accepted. The Commissioner, therefore, committed an error in holding that Intelsat has provided 'broadcasting' service to the Appellant and so the Appellant has to pay service tax on a reverse charge mechanism.

++ Impugned order dated November 30, 2015 passed by the Commissioner cannot be sustained. It is, accordingly, set aside and the appeal is allowed.

2020-TIOL-1208-CESTAT-DEL

Triangla Education Service Centre Pvt Ltd Vs CCE, C & GST

ST - COD - The delay condonation application has been perused - It merely mentions that the place of coaching of institute was shifted in a hurry and when assessee came to know about the order dated 24 April, 2018 after getting a copy of the order on 13 March, 2019, the appeal was filed on 24 June, 2019 - The applicant has not mentioned as to when the shifting of office took place and all that has been stated is that when the assessee got copy of the order on 13 March, 2019, it filed the Appeal - No explanation has been given as to how the applicant got a copy of the order - The delay has, therefore, not been sufficiently explained - Application is, accordingly, rejected: CESTAT

- Application rejected: DELHI CESTAT

2020-TIOL-1207-CESTAT-DEL

Hans Travels Vs CCE & ST

ST - Issue involved in this case is confirmation of demand under tour operator service in respect of tourist/contract vehicles being employed by the appellant.

Held: Regarding the demand pertaining to bus rent contract booking, Bench finds that there is a clear discrepancy in the quantification and the impugned order confirmed the demand more than what has been reflected in the Show Cause Notice - Regarding the demand pertaining to luggage booking under Business Support Service is concerned, the same stands decided in favour in their own case vide order of Tribunal being - 2015-TIOL-2098-CESTAT-DEL , therefore, the demand pertaining to luggage booking is not sustainable - amount of demand confirmed under heading bus contract booking needs to reworked out by extending the benefit of exemption Notification 06/2005-ST dated 1.3.2005 - Matter remanded: CESTAT [para 7, 8]

- Matter remanded: DELHI CESTAT

2020-TIOL-1206-CESTAT-ALL

Tirupati Services Pvt Ltd Vs CCE

ST - CENVAT - appellant was availing credit of service tax paid on the free services rendered by other dealers – same was denied and appellant accepts the same, however, seeks waiver of penalty.

Held: There can be a bonafide belief on the part of the assessee while availing credit and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, no malafide can be attributed to them – penalty set aside: CESTAT [para 2]

ST - Service tax of Rs.3,20,028/- stands confirmed in respect of the commission earned by the appellant from the insurance companies - Revenue has held that the same falls under the category of 'Business Support Services' and is chargeable to service tax - Appellants have contended that such services were taxable in the hands of the insurance companies on reverse charge basis.

Held: To qualify under the category of insurance auxiliary services, the agent providing insurance services must be appointed by the insurance company - There is nothing on record to show that the appellant was an appointed agent and licensed by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority, therefore, he cannot be held to be a insurance agent - in the light of the law declared in the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Ashok & Co. Pan Bahar Ltd. - 2015-TIOL-2409-CESTAT-DEL , demand stands confirmed – however, since the dispute is a bonafide issue of interpretation of law, penalty is not imposable, hence set aside: CESTAT [para 4]

- Appeal disposed of: ALLAHABAD CESTAT

CENTRAL EXCISE

2020-TIOL-1209-CESTAT-KOL

Tata Steel Ltd Vs CCE & ST

CX - Main issue involved in the instant case is whether Notification No. 65/95-CE is a notification which grants exemption "absolutely" as envisaged under Section 5A(1) of the Act and consequently sub-section (1A) of Section 5A is attracted and, therefore, the appellant was bound to avail exemption granted by the said notification and the Cenvat credit availed was irregular, being impermissible as per Rule 6(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules.

Held: Notification No. 65/95-CE grants exemption from duty (a) if the excisable goods are manufactured in a workshop; (b) the workshop is situated within the factory; (c) the said goods are used within the factory; (d) the said goods are used for repairs or maintenance of machinery installed in the factory - All of these conditions have to be satisfied for applicability of the said notification and for eligibility to exemption thereunder - In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the said notification is unconditional and absolute - The said notification is circumscribed by four conditions, all of which have to be satisfied for an assessee to be eligible to exemption thereunder - Hence, the reason contained in the impugned order that since the appellant had a workshop in the factory, the goods were manufactured therein and were used for maintenance and repair of machinery in the said factory, the exemption granted under Notification No. 65/95-CE was absolute and not conditional in the case of the appellant, is erroneous and not supported from Section 5A of the Act - It is settled by decisions of Courts and the Tribunal that in case of a conditional notification, an assessee has the option of either availing or not availing the benefit under the subject notification - In the premises, the finding in the impugned order that availment of Cenvat credit by the appellant during the material periods was by contravening the provisions of Rule 6(1) of the said Rules is incorrect and unsustainable - There is no irregularity or wrong availment of Cenvat credit by the appellant - There is no material to evidence that the appellant has collected any amount by way of duty than assessed/determined and paid by it in respect of the subject goods - Further, since Notification No. 65/95-CE is conditional and the appellant has chosen not to avail the exemption thereunder, it cannot also be said that the appellant has collected any amount as representing duty on goods which are wholly exempt from duty or are chargeable to nil rate of duty - Hence, there can be no application of Section 11D in the instant case - and, therefore, the appropriation of Rs. 24,66,98,505/- and Rs. 2,66,46,006/- respectively by the impugned order is also erroneous and cannot be sustained - Impugned order dated 30.08.2012 of the Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Jamshedpur is set aside and the appeals are allowed with consequential relief: CESTAT [para 6, 7.2, 7.5, 7.6, 7.6.4, 8.1, 8.2, 9]

2020-TIOL-1205-CESTAT-KOL

TATA Steel Ltd Vs CCE

CX - The assessee is engaged in manufacture of various iron and steel products at their integrated Steel Plant situated at Jamshedpur - In addition to clearance of their final products on payment of duty to their buyers, a part of the goods manufactured, such as, billets, ingots and TMT bars were diverted for captive consumption for construction activities within the factory as well as to their captive mines - The issue arises regarding valuation to be adopted for various goods manufactured by assessee, but captively consumed for use within the factory as well as captive mines for various activities, such as, construction, repair and maintenance activities - The assessee cleared such goods for captive consumption after payment of duty on the assessable value determined in terms of Rule 8 of CEVR, 2000 - This involved the computation of value on the basis of 110% of cost of production of goods ascertained on the basis of CAS-4 specification - However, the Department was of the view that the clearances to independent buyers were available on record for the period of dispute and as such, such value can be adopted for the clearances made captively - The ratio of Larger Bench's decision in case of Ispat Industries Ltd. 2007-TIOL-245-CESTAT-MUM-LB has been subsequently followed by various Benches of the Tribunal - As such, during the disputed period, the valuation is required to be adopted in terms of Rule 4 ibid, on the basis of value of clearances to independent buyers - Accordingly, the issue is decided on merit in favour of Revenue - Assessee has made a strong plea for grant of benefit of time bar - It is on record that the assessee has kept Department informed about their proposal for captive clearance of goods manufactured for purposes of civil constructions, repair and maintenance - The Department will not be justified in alleging suppression against assessee and invoking extended period of limitation - As such, the demand raised by SCN is to be restricted to normal period of time limit - The second SCN is within time - No justification found for imposition of penalty, same is set aside: CESTAT

- Appeals partly allowed: KOLKATA CESTAT

2020-TIOL-1204-CESTAT-KOL

CCE Vs Rasoi Ltd

CX - Interest - The claim was made in three parts - In respect of claim for interest for the period upto March 16, 2005 the duties were not payable by assessee in cash but it was permissible for it to utilize the credit balance in RG-23B Part II Register for paying the same - This legal position was settled in favour of assessee right upto the Supreme Court - The said duties were paid in cash by making deposits vide TR-6 challans and then entered in PLA - The said duties were paid due to insistence on Department's part who prevented assessee from utilizing the credit lying in RG-23B Part-II Register, although entitled to - The Department is bound to pay assessee interest, as has been correctly held by Commissioner (A) - In so far as assessee's claim for interest on duties of Rs. 4.10 crores for the period from three months after the date of filing the refund application till the date of refund, the Revenue has challenged the order of Commissioner (A) allowing refund of interest claim on the ground that the amount lying in PLA was not central excise duty so as to attract Section 11BB of Central Excise Act - Tribunal is unable to accept this contention - The amounts in question were paid as excise duties in cash vide TR-6 challans as "Basic Excise Duties" - The said amounts were used for paying the duties due to insistence of Department and after the matter was decided in favour of assessee right upto the Supreme Court, the duties were allowed to be credited back to the PLA - Since Vanaspati manufactured by assessee became exempted from duty in the meantime, it filed application for refund of said duties, which was ultimately refunded - Furthermore, the refund application filed under Section 11B was rejected by Assistant Commissioner on the ground of alleged unjust enrichment - Thus, these amounts were all along the duties of excise and treated as such by both the parties - Moreover, refund of deposits lying in the Account Current is specifically covered by Section 11B(2)(b) of CEA, 1944 - As held by Madras High Court in Rajalakshmi Textile Processors (P) Ltd. 2007-TIOL-788-HC-MAD-CX and by Gujarat High Court in Reliance Industries Ltd. 2010-TIOL-928-HC-AHM-CX , when the refund application was filed under Section 11B and was allowed under Section 11B(2), as in the instant case by Commissioner (A), the provisions of Section 11BB are automatically attracted for payment of interest - The Commissioner (A) has correctly allowed the claim for interest for the period April 19, 2006 to December 23, 2009 on the duty amount of Rs. 4.10 crores - The third part of the claim for interest, being the subject matter of appeal filed by assessee, is a claim for interest on delayed payment of interest - This issue is no more res integra - It has been held by Supreme Court in case of Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals 2013-TIOL-47-SC-IT-LB explaining its decision in Sandvik Asia Ltd. 2006-TIOL-07-SC-IT , that it is a misinterpretation of this case that the Revenue is obliged to pay interest on interest in the event of its failure to refund the interest payable within the statutory period and that in the said case, considering the inordinate delay in payment, the Supreme Court had directed the Revenue to pay compensation for the same and not an interest on interest - The Commissioner (A) had rightly rejected the claim of assessee for interest on delayed payment of interest - No infirmity found in the impugned order of Commissioner (A) and the same is upheld: CESTAT

- Appeals dismissed: KOLKATA CESTAT

2020-TIOL-1203-CESTAT-KOL

Nalari Ferro Alloys Pvt Ltd Vs CCE

CX - The impugned period under appeal is April 2008 to January 2010 for which SCN was issued - The impugned O-I-A has upheld the entire demand which was alleged by invoking extended period of limitation - On merit, for the demand pertaining to the normal period, November 2009 to January 2010, the first dispute on identical issue has already been decided by this Bench of Tribunal vide Final Order dated 14.12.2018 - The appeal thus stands covered by the said order of this Bench passed recently after detailed verification and examination of the matter and the demand thus stands liable to be quashed - Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside: CESTAT

- Appeal allowed: KOLKATA CESTAT

CUSTOMS

2020-TIOL-1211-CESTAT-MUM

Usha Shipping Agency Vs CC

Cus - Matter has been remanded twice by the tribunal, for reconsideration after following the principles of natural justice - When the matter is remanded for following the principles of natural justice, it needs to be considered in entirety after following the principles of natural justice - If the issue is to be adjudicated by just reiterating the findings and decisions recorded in the previous order in original which has been set aside by tribunal, then the adjudicating authority has failed in task assigned to him for reconsideration of matter - It is not desirable that the adjudicating authority while deciding the case in de-novo proceedings refers to the order of predecessor adjudicating authority and concludes stating that he will not discuss the issue (conspiracy hatched by Didwania) as the same has been diligently analyzed by the predecessor adjudicating authority - The order of predecessor adjudicating authority, when set aside by the appellate authority (Tribunal), is set aside for all purpose and ceases to exist - By application of doctrine of merger the order of adjudicating authority gets merged with the order of appellate authority - The observations recorded by the Commissioner to the effect that predecessor adjudicating authority had decided the case after allowing natural justice to the noticees' is contrary to the findings recorded by tribunal while remanding the matter - Such an order which has been passed with preconceived mind on the basis of the order which has been set aside by the appellate authority cannot be sustained - In result the matter needs to be remanded back to the adjudicating for denovo consideration after following the principles of natural justice - adjudicating authority should complete the denovo proceedings and pass the fresh adjudication order within four months: CESTAT [para 4.4, 4.6, 4.7, 4.9, 4.10, 5.1]

- Matter remanded: MUMBAI CESTAT

2020-TIOL-1202-CESTAT-AHM

Witteneia Multitrading Pvt Ltd Vs CCE & ST

Cus - The present appeal and early hearing application is filed against the impugned order communicated by Deputy Commissioner whereby the provisional release order was passed in respect of goods valued Rs. 1,95,62,941/- with the condition of execution of bond for full value with bank guarantee of Rs. 60,60,600/- - There is prima-facie case of malafide on the part of assessee to claim exemption fraudulently - However, this is not the conclusion on merits of the case as the detailed investigation is pending - Assessee requested for provisional release for re-export of the goods - In that case, a lenient view can be taken - Needless to say that the assessee shall clear the goods on payment of duty as assessed by Customs - Assessee deserve for some leniency as regards to terms of provisional release of seized goods - Accordingly, goods may be provisionally released on furnishing bond of total value with bank guarantee of the amount of 50% of total duty - Thus, the appeal is partly allowed: CESTAT

- Appeal partly allowed: AHMEDABAD CESTAT

2020-TIOL-1201-CESTAT-ALL

CC Vs TI Industries

Cus - The assessee had imported CRGO Secondary/Defective Electrical Grade Steel Strips of Irregular Shapes & Sizes - They filed two Bills of Entry for clearance of the same - The goods were assessed by Customs Authorities and were given out of charge - In the meantime, Ministry of Steel issued prohibitory orders w.e.f. 01.07.2014 for import of secondary/defective/old and used CRGO sheets and strips - Therefore, a question arose, as to whether the said restriction was applicable to the goods imported by assessee - The Commissioner (A) has held that the restrictions were not applicable to the goods imported - He has relied on law laid down by Supreme Court in case of Priyanka Overseas Pvt. Ltd. 2002-TIOL-676-SC-CUS and held that the restrictions were not applicable on the impugned goods - Revenue has simply stated that the relied upon case laws are not applicable in the present case - How the said case laws are not applicable has not been stated - Therefore, no reasons found to interfere with the impugned order: CESTAT

- Appeal rejected: ALLAHABAD CESTAT