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Constitution Assembly Of India - Volume VIII
Dated: May 27, 1949
The article as it stands is in my humble judgment, not happily worded. For the first time since we commenced the article by article consideration of the Constitution we have come across an article which lays down that a particular organ of the State shall meet at a particular place. We have passed already important and articles such as article 69 fixing the venue of meetings of the House of Parliament and article 48(4) fixing the official residence of the President. I am sure there are other articles concerning the place where certain bodies or organs of State are supposed to meet. But none of these articles specifies the mane of any particular place where that organ of the State should meet. Why, may I ask Dr, Ambedkar, does he feel it necessary to specify in this article that the Supreme Court shall meet in Delhi? The entire Constitution is silent on the point of India's capital. There is nowhere any mention of the capital of our country in the Constitution. There was even an amendment in this House, which however was not moved, but I am told that my friends are pursuing that matter in another way. There have been frequent references to the necessity of desirability of a change in the capital of India. Anyway, without prejudice to that, notwithstanding any attempt that may be made in this direction, I propose to deal with this question here purely on merit. When the whole Constitution is silent on this point, why should we import this mention of the capital, of Delhi, in this article? It is not far more desirable or happier to leave the choice of the venue of the Supreme Court to the Chief Justice and the President of the Indian Union? Certainly they are best fitted to judge this matter and I am sure that under the Constitution where we are going to elect a President of the India Union and have an eminent legal and juristic authority for the Chief Justiceship, I see no reason why we should specify in the Constitution that the Supreme court should meet at a particular place. There is no valid reason at all for specifying Delhi in this article for that purpose. It may be that the Supreme Court might meet in another place; even if Delhi is to be the capital, they may decide for various reasons that they should meet in another place, I therefore think that the mention of Delhi in this article is unnecessary.
Just another point, Sir, The article as it stands reads as follows:
What the Supreme Court will be and will not be are matters which have been exhaustively dealt with in the preceding and succeeding articles. The term "court of record" is a borrowed phrase and we need not use it here. Therefore my amendment lays down that the Supreme Court, shall sit at such place or places as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the President, from time to time appoint. Sir, I move my amendment and commend it for the acceptance of the House.
Mr. President: There is an amendment to this article, No. 3 of List No. 1, notice of which has been given by Mr. Gadgil.
(The amendment was not moved.)
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Mr. President, Sir, I move:
"That for amendment No. 1891 of the List of Amendments, the following be substituted:-
Sir, after the general debate, I will say why the amendment that I am moving is necessary.
(Amendments Nos. 1892, 1893 and 1894 were not moved.)
Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor: Mr. President, Sir, I beg to move:
Should, however, this amendment not meet with the approval of the House, I would like to move, in the alternative,-
It my fist amendment is accepted, the amended article would read thus:
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: Will the honourable Member please make it clear whether there should be a stroke or a hyphen after 'and'.
Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor: There should be a line between the two. If my second amendment is accepted, the article would read thus:
Sir, my reason for moving this amendment is that I believe that the proposed article 108-A does not really convey the meaning which it is intended to convey, and if it dies, them I think it is obvious that an anomalous position is created thereby and the capital city of Delhi is being treated in a very unfair manner. The proposed article, as it stands, means that the Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi or at any other place in the alternative, which of course implies that it shall not then sit in Delhi at all. It means further that even if the Supreme Court holds its sittings in half a dozen places in the country, Delhi shall not be one of those places. Delhi and other places would, therefore, be mutually exclusive for the purposes of the sittings of the Supreme Court. I believe it is not the intention of the Honourable Dr. Ambedkar or even of Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari who appears to be the joint author of this amendments, that this article should be capable of this interpretation. Then, Sir, as regards the anomaly that arises out of it, I have to submit that it means that so long as the Supreme Court sits in Delhi, it will not have the right or the privilege to hold a circuit court anywhere else in the country. The Chief Justice may consider it necessary in the interests of his work of in order to give necessary facilities to the litigant public to hold circuit courts in different parts of the country. Even if the Chief Justice thinks that in view of the fact that large number of cases have accummulated, say from Madras or Bombay and in order to dispose of those cases or in order to give necessary Excilities to the litigants so that they may not be put to the inconvenience of coming all the way to Delhi, it is necessary to hold circuit courts in Madras or Bombay, it will not be open to the Chief Justice to do so. Of course, if he is so disposed he can resort to a little device but then it will be so inconvenient and even ridiculous. He can shift the Supreme Court to a place very near Delhi, say Shahdra or some other new refugee township if the honourable the Minister for Rehabilitation is so disposed to accommodate the Chief Justice, and after shifting the Supreme Court to place nearby, he can of course hold circuit courts in Bombay, Madras, or Calcutta as necessity may arise. Now, Sir, I submit that this anomalous position should not be allowed to stand. With regard to the injustice to Delhi itself, I submit that the present draft implies that even if the Supreme Court holds its sittings in half a dozen place it shall not be open to the Supreme Court to have even a circuit court in unfortunate Delhi. It means that either Delhi will have the privilege of having the sitting of the Supreme Court exclusively within itself, or it will not have even the facility of having a circuit court there. Either Delhi will be the monarch of all it surveys or it shall be thrown into oblivion. Sir, I cannot understand the logic of it, and, may I say, I cannot understand even the absurdity of this position. If behind this article there is the intention of anybody to remove the seat of Supreme Court from Delhi to some other place, I submit it should be said so in a straightforward and frank manner and that proposal should not be allowed to be brought in this rather back-door manner. But I believe, it is perhaps not the intention of the another of this amendment, and I should not, therefore dilate on that aspect of it; and since it is perhaps not the intention of the authors, I would submit that it is necessary that this amendment should be amended in the manner in which I have suggested, so that it should be open to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to arrange for the holding of the sitting of she court either at Delhi or at some other place or places or both at Delhi and at other place or places. I hope, Sir, that this necessary amendment would be acceptable to the Honourable Dr. Ambedkar and also to the House.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: Mr. President, Sir, not being a lawyer, I am rather nervous to contradict my honourable Friend Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor, who has moved an amendment to the amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar. But I think Sir, I do understand this foreign language to the extent that it is possible for a foreigner to understand, and I am afraid that I am unable to appreciate the necessity for making a simple clause, such as 108 happens to be now, into a very complex and difficult clause such as it would be if the amendment of Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor is accepted.
Sir, I quite agree with the need for a certain amount of elasticity in regard to the place at which the Supreme Court will have to operate in the future: it may, it would operate in Delhi or at some other place, or it would operate in Delhi and at some other place, that is precisely what my honourable Friend, Mr.Jaspat Roy Kapoor wants. If the court is to be fixed at Delhi it must also be possible for the Chief Justice to arrange for sittings elsewhere to make it a sort of peripatetic court, if it is necessary and he thinks that if in the event of the headquarters of the court being changed, it must be possible for the Court to sit at Delhi in the same manner as it would sit in some other place, if the headquarters were Delhi itself. I think that is quite covered by the position of the words at the end of article 108-A as it now stands. It reads: "The Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi and at such other place or places." It certainly does not mean that the Supreme Court shall sit at either Delhi or at such other place; it does not preclude the possibility of the Supreme Court sitting at Delhi and at some other place, and so far as the construction of the wording is concerned, I do not think it is much of a legal technicality, but it is really a matter of language and the fears that are expressed by my honourable Friend, Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor are, I think, entirely unfounded and all the contingencies that he wants to import into a situation that might arise by a construction of article 108-A is provided for as the clause stands today. Sir, I think there is no point in putting "and/or" with which I am very familiar in any contract form or in a bill of lading or some such document covering a commercial transaction, where the possibility of an alternative being provided is very necessary, but it has no legal sanction whatever and I think, we cannot put in "and" and "or" and we cannot put a stroke in between "and" and "or" as an alternative one for the other and we cannot have both "and" and "or" simultaneously as the language would again be defective. I think the House may rest assured that the framers of this amendment had in view the contingencies which Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor has in mind and they felt convinced and they are also assured by persons competent to assure them that the article 108-A as if now stands will cover all possible contingencies. There will be difficulties if the amendment as envisaged by Mr., Jaspat Roy Kapoor is accepted. Sir, I support the amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar.
Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava (East Punjab: General): Sir, I have listened to the argument of Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor as well as the argument of Mr. Krishnamachari. As the words stand, I am of the opinion they are certainly ambiguous and they are not clear. Certainly one could argue that the word "other" qualifies both 'place' and 'places'. This amendment, as it stands can be construed in to saying that the Court shall either sit at Delhi and if it sits at any other place except Delhi, then there can be no circuit court at Delhi. If the word "other" qualifies the word "places" then the court can sit at other places except Delhi. I thought that Mr. Krishnamachari would clear away this ambiguity but after bearing him, I am of the opinion that this amendment is certainly ambiguous. I do not think that the authors of this amendment meant to convey that Delhi shall be a place, which in the words of Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor, will either be a monarchical or a forbidden place. My humble submission as I understand the position today is the Government has not decided to leave Delhi. Delhi is the Capital and today we should make it suer that Delhi will be the place where the Supreme Court shall sit, I do not know if in any other country the Supreme Court of country sits at any place other then the Capital. As long as Delhi is the Capital, the proper place for a Supreme Court is at Delhi. Moreover, it is a court of record; it is a court which must have some permanent seat and Delhi is the proper place where it can have its permanent seat; there can be no doubt about it, but if at any other time the Capital is going to be changed, there will be no difficulty in amending this part of the Constitution or if it is to be provided, even today then it will be better provided if you adopt this amendment along with the second amendment of Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor, because then if will be open to the authorities to see that the place of the capital is changed, and while it is changed, Delhi is not deprived of its right of having a circuit Court, if it is so necessary. I for one do not understand how the Supreme Court will at one and same time sit at Delhi and in any other place or places. In my humble opinion a court can be said to sit at a place where it has got a permanent seat. There is no reason to think that if a Supreme Court sits in a bench o. as a circuit at some other place, it can be said that that court is sitting at that place alone. A court should be deemed to have a permanent seat and to sit at the place where it has got a permanent seat. It is necessary to avoid this ambiguity. If Mr. Krishnamachari thinks that the words 'and/or' can only be used in a conveyance or a contract and he has not seen it in a treaty or a legal document, then, the amendment of Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor is quite clear, and that amendment should be accepted.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Mr. president, the amendment which I have moved covers practically all the points which have been raised both by Mr. Kamath as well as by Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor.
Sir, the new article 108 is necessary because we have not made any provision in the Draft Constitution to define the status of the Supreme Court. If the House will turn to article, 192, they will find exactly a similar article with regard to the high Courts in India. It seems therefore necessary that a similar provision should be made in the Constitution in order to define the position of the Supreme Court. I do not wish to take much time of the House in saying what the words 'a court of record' mean. I may briefly say that a court of record is a court the records of which are admitted to be of evidentiary value and they are not to be questioned when they are produced before any court. That is the meaning of the words 'court of record'. Then, the second part of article 108 says that the court shall have the power to punish for contempt of itself. As a matter of fact, once you make a court a court of record by statute, the power to punish or contempt necessarily follows from that position. But, it was felt that in view of the fact that in England this power is largely derived from Common Law and as we have no such thing as Common Law in this Country, we felt it better to state the whole position in the statute itself. That is why article 108 has been introduced.
With regard to article 108-A, Mr. Kamath raised a point as to why the word Delhi should occur. The answer is very simple. A court must know have a defined place where it shall sit and the litigants must know where to go and whom to approach. Consequently, it is necessary to state in the statute itself as to where to court should sit and that is why the word Delhi is necessary and is introduced for that purpose. The other words which occur in article 108-A are introduced because it is not yet defined whether the capital of India shall continue to be Delhi. If you do not have the words which follow, "or at such other place or places, as the Chief Justice of India may, with the approval of the President, from time to time, appoint" then, what will happen is this. Supposing the capital of India was changed, we would have to amend the Constitution in order to allow the Supreme Court to sit at such other place which Parliament may decide as the capital. Therefore, I think the subsequent words are necessary. With regard to the point raised by my honourable Friend Mr. Kapoor, I think the answer given by my Friend Mr. Krishnamachari is adequate and I do not propose to say any more.
Shri H. V. Kamath: May I ask one question, Sir? In the view just now enunciated by Dr. Ambedkar that the litigants should know the place where the Supreme Court will sit, and that the question of capital has not yet been settled and the court may have to sit in some other place or places, what is the point in specifying Delhi at all?
Mr. President: I think the question was put by the speaker in his first speech and it has been answered. Whether he is satisfied with the answer or not is a different question. The question has been answered.
Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor: May I seek a small clarification from Dr. Ambedkar? Will it be open to the Supreme Court so long as it is sitting in Delhi, to have a circuit court anywhere else in this country simultaneously?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Yes, certainly. A circuit court is only a Bench.
Mr. President: I shall now put the amendments to vote.
Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor : I beg leave of the House to withdrawn my amendment, Sir.
The amendment was, by leave of the Assembly, withdrawn.
Mr. President: Amendment No. 126.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: May I suggest, Sir, that as it relates to two articles, it will be better to put them separately?
Mr. President: Yes. I put the first part of amendment No. 126.
The question is:
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: I am putting the second part.
The question is:
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: I think that covers the amendment of Mr. Kamath. I need not put that.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: That covers the entire proceedings so far as this article is concerned.
Mr. President: So, I shall put the article, as amended by Dr. Ambedkar's amendment.
The question is:
The motion was adopted.
Articles 108 and 108-A were added to the Constitution.
* Articles 109 to 114
Mr. President: The motion is:
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I want articles 109 to 114 be held over. The reason why I want these articles to be held over is because these articles while they state general rules, also make certain reservations with regard to the States in Part III of Schedule I. It is understood that the matter as to the position of the States in Part III is being reconsidered, so that the States in Part III will be brought on the same level and footing as the States in Part I. If that happens, then, there will be no necessity to introduce these reservations in these articles 109-114. I suggest these may be held over.
Mr. President: We will pass them over for the present.
* Article 115
Mr. President: The motion is:
The first amendment is No. 1937 of Mr. Kamath. That is negative and it is rules out as an amendment. Amendment No. 1938. Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand, you have given notice of an amendment to this amendment. You have your amendment first?
Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand (East Punjab: General): Mr. President, Sir, the amendment which I am going to move is an amendment to amendment No. 1938 in the List of Amendment Vol. I. According to that amendment to amendment No. 1938...
Mr. President: You may first move the original amendment and then the amendment to the amendment.
Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand: Very well, Sir, I will first will move amendment No. 1938 as printed at page 197:
To this amendment a verbal alteration is suggested, and that is:
This amendment will bring the phraseology of article 115 in line with article 25 which has already been passed by this House in the last session. Article 115, as drafted by the Drafting Committee, reads as follows:-
It will be seen that the article as drafted limits the power of Parliament to invest the Supreme Court with power to issue writs in the nature of those specifically mentioned and to none other. The amendment seeks to make the article more comprehensive so as to enable Parliament to enact laws empowering the Supreme Court to issue writs, directions, orders or writs including those mentioned in the drafted article 115. Hereafter it may be considered necessary to empower the Supreme Court to issue writs other than those which are mentioned in the article. The House will agree that it is not desirable to place such restrictions on the power of Parliament. Moreover as I have already said, in article 25, which deals with the power of the Supreme Court to issue writs, with regard to justiciable fundamental rights, this phraseology has already been adopted. Clause (2) of article 25, as passed by this House reads:
To bring the phraseology of article 115 in line with that of article 25, I move this amendment, and commend it for the acceptance of the House.
Mr. President: Amendment No. 1939, in the name of Dr. Ambedkar.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move:
The words are superfluous.
Mr. President: No. 1940 is the same as the one just now moved and so need not be moved. No. 1941 standing in the name of Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad is also of a drafting nature and need not be moved. No. 1942 is not moved.
I think these are the amendments that we have now.
Does any Member wish to say anything?
We shall now put the amendments.
I will first take Dr. Ambedkar's amendment No. 1939.
The question is:
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: Then I put Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand's amendment to amendment No. 1938.
The question is:
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: That becomes the original amendment now. I put the amendment as amended to the House.
The amendment, as amended, was adopted.
Mr. President: Then I put the article, as amended by the two amendments one of Dr. Ambedkar, and the other of Dr. Tek Chand to vote.
The question is:
The nation was adopted.
Article 115, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
* Article 116
Mr. President: Now, we take up article 116. The first amendment is No. 1943, standing in the name of Mr. Kamath. It is ruled out, being a negative one.
No. 1944 is not even of a drafting nature, being only regarding punctuation.
There is no other amendment to article 116. I shall put the article to the vote of the House.
The question is:
The motion was adopted.
Article 116 was added to the Constitution.
* Article 117
Mr. President: We then come to article 117.
(Amendment No. 1945, was not moved.)
Shri H. V. Kamath: Mr. President, Sir, I move:
So if this is accepted, the article will read thus:
I have no doubt in my own mind that this article does not seek to bind the Supreme Court by its own judgments. What is intended by the article is, I am sure, that other courts subordinate to the Supreme Court in this land shall be bound by the judgments and the law declared by the Supreme Court from time to time. It will be unwise to bind the Supreme Court itself, because in order to ensure elasticity, in order to enable mistakes and errors to be rectified, and to leave room for growth, the Supreme Court will have to be excluded from the purview of this article. The Supreme Court may amend its own judgments, or its own interpretation of the law which it might have made on a previous occasion and rectify the errors it had committed earlier. Therefore I feel that the intention of this article would be correctly and precisely conveyed by saying that the law of the Supreme Court shall be binding on "all other courts" within the territory of India.
Sir, I move.
(Amendments Nos. 1947 and 1948 were not moved).
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, there is one point which I should like to mention. It is not certainly the intention of the proposed article that the Supreme Court would be free to change its decision like the House of Lords. The Supreme Court would be free to change its decision and take a different view from the one which it had taken before. So far as the language is concerned I am quite satisfied that the intention is carried out.
Shri H. V. Kamath: Then why not say "all other courts"?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : "All courts" means " all other courts."
Mr. President: The question is:
The amendment was negatived.
Mr. President: The question is:
The motion was adopted.
Article 117 was added to the Constitution.
* Article 118
Mr. President: Article 118.
(Amendment No. 1949 and 1950 were not moved.)
Mr. President: The question is:
The motion was adopted.
Article 118, was added to the Constitution.
* Article 119
Mr. President: Amendment No. 1951 is ruled out.
Shri H. V. Kamath: Sir, the point which I wish to raise in my amendment No. 1952 is a simple one. The article contemplates that the Supreme Court should report to the President its opinion or in its discretion it may withhold its opinion. I believe what is meant is that when once the President refers the matters to the Supreme Court for its opinion there is no option for the Supreme Court. If that is not meant then the language is right. But if it is meant that once the President refers a matter to the Supreme Court, it must report its opinion thereon to the President, then the word "shall" must come in. I wanted a clarification on that point.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : The Supreme Court is not bound.
Shri H. V. Kamath: Then I do not move my amendment.
Mr. President: Amendment No. 1953 is ruled out and 1954 is verbal.
Shri H. V. Kamath: Sir, I move:
Sir, I originally sent this as two separate amendments but they have been listed as one. If this is accepted by the House the relevant clause of this article would read as follows:-
If we read carefully clause (i) it will be found that what is referred to is the "opinion of the Supreme Court" on any matter which the President may deem it necessary or fit to refer to that court.......
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : May I request you, Sir, to hold over this article 119, because it has also reference to article 109 to 114 which we have decided to hold over.
Shri H. V. Kamath: Then, Sir, I shall reserve my right to move the amendment late on.
(Amendments Nos. 1956 and 1957 were not moved.)
Mr. President: The question is:
The motion was adopted.
Article 120 was added to the Constitution.
* Article 121
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I would request Sir, that this article be allowed to stand over.
* Article 122
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move:
The object of this redraft is to make a better provision for the independence of the Supreme Court and also to make provision that the administrative expenses of the Supreme Court shall be a charge on the revenues of India.
Sir, there is an amendment to this amendment, which I should like to move at this stage:
Mr. President: There is an amendment of Mr. Kapoor to this amendment.
Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor: It is now covered by the new amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar. So I consider it unnecessary to move it.
(Amendments Nos. 1968 and 1969 were not moved.)
Mr. President: So there is only the amendment of Dr. Ambedkar. I shall first take the amendment he has moved to his own amendment.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: Sir, I would like to say a word. There is one particular point in Dr. Ambedkar's amendment to which I would like to invite the special attention of this House. I refer to clause (3) which makes the administrative expenses of the Supreme Court, including salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the court a charge on the revenues of India. Sir, I want to draw the attention of the House to this particular clause, because it has been the intention of some of us that all items chargeable to the revenues of India should be brought in under one particular article, namely, article 92 if I remember aright. The only reason why this particular clause has been allowed to come in here is the fact that article 92 has been passed over-it has not been considered by the House. So I would like to say that the House might perhaps at the appropriate time, when article 92 is being considered, permit a transposition at that stage of all clause similar to this one-clause (3)-wherever it occurs, whether here, or in the matter of the Speaker's establishment or in the matter of the Auditor-General's establishment or in the matter of the Public Service Commission, should be brought under one head, so that people will know, at any rate the future legislators will know, what are the items which are sacrosanct and which are a charge on the revenues of India.
The second point is this. While I undoubtedly support the amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar, I think it should be understood by the Members of this House, and I do hope by those people who will be administering justice and also administering the country in the future that this is a safeguard rather than an operative provision. The only thing about it is that a matter like the employment of staff by the Judges should be placed ordinarily outside the purview of the Executive which would otherwise have to take the initiative to include these items in the budget for the reason that the independence of the Judiciary should be maintained and that the Judiciary should not feel that they are subject to favours that the Executive might grant to them from time to time and which would naturally influence their decision in any matter they have to take where the interests of the Executive of the time being happens to be concerned. At the same time, Sir, I think it should be made clear that it is not the intention of this House or of the framers of this Constitution that they want to crate specially favoured bodies which in themselves becomes an Imperium in Imperio, completely independent of the Executive and the legislature and operating as a sort of superior body to the general body politic. If that were so, I think we should be rather chary of introducing a provision of this nature, not merely in regard to the Supreme Court but also in regard to the Auditor-General, in regard to the Union Public Service Commission, in regard to the Speaker and the President of the two House of Parliament and so on, as we will thereby be creating a number of bodies which are placed in such a position that they are bound to come into conflict with the Executive in every attempt they make to display their superiority. In actual practice, it is better for all these bodies to more or less fall in line with the regulations that obtain in matters of recruitment to the public services, conditions of promotion and salaries paid to their staff. My own little experience of what is happening in regard to bodies of a similar nature, though not fortified by a constitutional provision of this kind, is that it does not do any good to have separate compartments in public service. What happens usually in this. If promotions and all matters of the nation are confined within the small area or the small ambit of a particular body, it often happens that the person who comes to the top of the Executive position in that body stays put for all time if that particular post is not brought into the cadre of the general services of the State, whether Central or Provincial; there will be a lot of inconvenience in having a sort of bottleneck into which a particular person who rises to the top of this narrow cadre finds that he will not be able to get out of it except by dismissal or removal; whereas, if the establishment of these particular bodies forms part of the general service and person employed therein who is found unsuitable in any one department can be transferred to another sphere of activity. It would stand to reason that it would be better to make it clear in passing that this article would not really operate as a bar to exercising full freedom by the authorities concerned of the powers given under this section. Nevertheless, it should be made clear that it is not the intention of the framers of the Constitution and this House that these bottlenecks should be created and that these bodies should function irrespective of the needs of the time and irrespective of the conditions that operate in the other service. It might happen that in the general service there may be a reduction of salaries, and if the Chief Justice says 'no' to a request of the Executive to fall in line on the ground that what happens to the executive departments is none of his concern, that so far as his department is concerned he will not permit a reduction of salaries, it will mean that we are helping to keep this body apart from the general services and it will be a source of conflict. So as the Executive and the services are much concerned, I do hope that the more fact of putting these special officers like the Chief Justice and the Auditor-General in a privileged position will not mean that they will have to exercise their right in entirety but that such a position is a safeguard against a possible misuse of the power that is given to the Executive when there is need for them to expand their services, or in the matter of recruitment and so on. With these remarks, I think the proposition moved by my honourable Friend, Dr. Ambedkar, might go through.
Shri K. M. Munshi (Bombay : General): Mr. President, I heartily support the amendment (No. 1967) moved by my Friend Dr. Ambedkar and take this opportunity once again to emphasise what I said while opposing Professor Shah's amendment the other day, that this Constitution, though it has not accepted the doctrine of the separation of powers, has maintained the independence of the judiciary to the utmost possible extent. Any fear therefore that this independence will not be maintained because we have not accepted the doctrine of separation of powers is an entirely unfounded one. It must be and I hope it will be the duty of the House at all times to maintain the independence of the judiciary.
My friend who spoke last supported the amendment which I also support. But he will forgive me if I do not associate myself with some of the remarks that fell from him. A judiciary is an independent organ of the State. I entirely agree with him that we cannot have kingdoms within kingdoms. The legislature, the executive and the judiciary are all organs of the State which must be maintained in their proper and respective places in a whole some Constitution and therefore it is necessary, as stated in the clause, that the appointments of officers and servants of the Supreme Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of India on such other judge or officer of the court as he may direct. Those officers are doing work in connection with the administration of justice. They are not officers who can be transferred to the executive side or to other Departments and it is essential that the cadre of such officers who are associated with the administration of justice should have its undiluted loyalty to the judiciary which it serves. The qualifications also are likely to be different. In this respect the provision with regard to reference to the Public Service Commission is wholesome. It will mean that there will be no favouritism in the matter of appointments. Once a person is appointed to the staff of the judiciary he must continue to be associated with the department. Therefore clause (1) is very important.
The amendment moved by Shri T. T. Krishnamachari is necessary, because so far as the financial burden is concerned, it can only be decided by the legislature. After all, the Parliament is responsible for the finances of the country and therefore the salaries, allowances and pensions must receive the approval of the President, viz., the party in power. But we must safeguard the matter in this respect in a way that the independence of the judiciary will always be maintained.
In this connection I may draw the attention of the House to the comments made in a Memorandum submitted by the Federal Court and the Chief Justice of the provincial High Courts. What they have stated is this:
Well, the whole provision in this amendment is intended to prevent any whittling down of the status or dignity and the powers that they posses. It is essential that in a democracy the judiciary must be there to adjust the differences between citizen and citizen, between and State and state and even between the Government of India and the State. If that independence is not secured, I am sure we would soon drift towards totalitarianism. I know that the country is passing through a crisis and naturally large powers have to be taken by the executive to preserve our national existence. But, at the same time the line of demarcation between a democratic method of preserving national existence and a totalitarian method should not be lost sight of. In that connection the independence of the judiciary demarcates the line between the democratic method and the totalitarian method. I am sure the provision of this Constitution will sufficiently guarantee the independence of the judiciary. With these words I support the amendment.
Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar (Madras: General): Mr. President, after the speeches of my Friends Messrs. Krishnamachari and Munshi which the House heard just now, very few words are necessary to commend both the parts for the acceptance of the House.
There are two principles involved: One is that you must be able to maintain the independence of the judiciary and unless the judiciary has sufficient control over its own establishment its independence may become illusory. If the establishment looks for preferment or for promotion to other quarters, it is likely to sap the independence of the judiciary. But at the same time, it has to be recognised that the judiciary and its establishment would have to draw their allowances and their salaries from the public exchequer. The ultimate person who will be affected is the taxpayer. Therefore, while on the one hand you must secure the independence of the judiciary, the interests of the taxpayer on the other hand will have to be safeguarded in a democracy. That can only be done by giving sufficient control to the Government of the country which is responsible to the House of the People in the matter of finance. The effect of the present provision is that every time the expenses are not subject to the vote of the House. That is a good thing. It is made a primary charge on the public exchequer. The second effect is that the court concerned will have complete control over its appointments. At the same time this provision safeguards the interests of the public and of the Government in so far as the Government is representative of the public for the purpose of securing the finance of the country. That is, if there is to be an increase in the salary, the Chief Justice or other Judicial authority cannot take a line of his own. The problem actually arose in Madras at the time of the First Congress Ministry. The Chief Justice of the Madras High Court took up the position that the High Court stood on a different footing from the other establishments under the control of the provincial Government. The Cabinet differed from him and decided and he could have complete control over his establishment, but that in regard to the general scale of salaries, etc., he should fall in line with the other. This is a very fundamental principle. Whenever you are dealing with a question of salary or emoluments of a particular functionary you must adjust it to the general financial system of the country.
You cannot secure special privileges for any particular class of the government servants or government officers or even sometimes of judges, without considering the general public economy and finances of the country. All the three principles have been secured by the original proposition as well as by the amendment which has been placed before the House. Under those circumstances I submit that both amendments may be accepted by the House as being consistent with the maintenance of the dignity and independence of the judiciary and at the same time securing the interests of the common taxpayer.
Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar (Madras: General): Mr. President, Sir, it is sometimes said that all the argument were in favour of the plaintiff but the decree has gone against him. That is what I felt when I read the amendments and also heard the arguments of my Friend Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and the other who spoke before him. They want that the Supreme Court should be absolutely independent of the Executive and that the salaries of the judges ought not to be left to the vote of the legislature from time to time. This article 122 gives the jurisdiction to the Chief Justice for fixing of the salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Supreme Court. This is sought to be modified by this amendment. Here in the clause as it stands, the Chief Justice need not take the approval of the President. It says "in consultation with the President". Therefore the Chief Justice is at liberty, consistent with his own independence and the independence of his officers to fix his own independence and the Independence of his officers to fix their salaries and allowances. The word "consultation" is deliberately used here. Now they have given this amendment to remove the word "consultation and put in the word "approval", "Approval" is quite different from "consultation". It is now open to the President to block it. But who is the President to do it? Under the Government of India Act the Governor-General need not consult anybody and it was absolutely in his discretion to do anything he liked. Here in this Constitution the President means "in consultation with his Ministers". Therefore what really will happen is the Chief Justice will have to dance to the tune of the Minister for the time being. It may be said that the Cabinet as a whole will advise the President. In the Cabinet the Minister of charge of Law or Law and Order will have the Secretary. Therefore the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court will have to dance to the tune of a mere Secretary in the Home Department or the beck and call of the Ministry and so-called independence of the judiciary will be taken away. Therefore I do not see how this amendment is consistent at all with the principle of the independence of the judiciary and I do not see the wisdom of it. After this clause was originally framed, the framers have changed their opinion and they want to bring this clause into line with the provision in the government of India Act. Section 216 of the Government of India Act as adapted refers to this matter.
Section 242(4) proviso (b) reads:
They want to copy that provision. The Governor General as representing the King, wanted to have absolute jurisdiction over all departments in this country. including judges of the High Courts and the Federal Court. Why should we copy that provision? I am not in favour of this amendment. This amendment is not consistent with the principle of the separation of the judiciary from the executive, to which we are all committed and by which all of us stand.
Then, Sir, as regards clause (2) making the expenses of the Supreme Court including all salaries, etc., chargeable on the revenues of the Union, there was some doubt raised in some quarters whether it should be chargeable only in respect of the salaries of the judges or in respect of the salaries, etc., of other officers and servants also. It was claimed that if this is done, there will be many islands, various autonomous authorities created. The Supreme Court is an autonomous body, regulating its own affairs, including the salaries and pension of its officers. This is one set. The Auditor-General is the second set. The Public Service Commission is the third set. Therefore some people who wanted that Parliament should have control from time to time wanted to remove this clause also. I do not agree with that view. This clause ought to stand, for this reason that when with the one hand you have allowed the Chief Justice to regulate the salaries and pensions, with the other hand you cannot allow Parliament to interfere with these from time to time. If you do that, the whole thing will become nugatory. Even now, it is not too late and I would urge the honourable the Mover to reconsider this decision. If, however, he thinks that it should stand, I am not opposing this amendment. I am agreeable to this amendment.
Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: *[Mr. President, Sir, I oppose the amendment regarding the approval by the President.
Every constitution provides for three basic requirements, viz., firstly, an independent judiciary; secondly, a legislature, and thirdly an executive. It would be a mistake for one to ask as to which of the three is of greater or lesser importance, because all the three, though independent in their respective spheres are component parts of the body politic of the State. A constitution, wherein a fully independent judiciary is not provided for, can never guarantee individual liberty to the people. However, we should examine the power we have provided for the judiciary in our constitution and this would enable us to know whether it is proper or not to give such power to it. If you refer to article 109 which has not bean taken into consideration as yet, you will find its wording to be rather significant. It confirms the provision that the Government of India will itself appear before the judiciary either as plaintiff or as defendant. Naturally it is clear from the words of that article that the Federal Government and the States would be appearing as parties to suits before the Supreme Court. Besides, if we refer to the other articles in the constitution, if we read the articles 7-20 dealing with Fundamental Rights or go through various other articles, it will be clear to us that the Supreme Court is the foundation stone of our liberty. It would never be right and proper to subordinate to powers of the Supreme Court to an individual entrusted with the powers of an executive nature. The previous article 102 has stated in plain words "The salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Supreme Court shall be fixed by the Chief Justice of India in consultation with the President." I would respectfully submit Sir, if the words 'approval of the President' are added here, it will destroy the independence of the judiciary. It can never be desirable to do so. The demand for the addition of these words betrays a fear that the judiciary might increase to such an extent the salaries of its employees as may not be acceptable to the Government. But I can say that similar apprehensions may be expressed by the offices of the judiciary with regard to the use of his powers by the President. Again it may be suspected with equal force that the legislature would arbitrarily increase the number of Ministers. To entertain such doubts about the President or the Chief Justice indicates that we do not have complete confidence in them. I beg therefore, to submit that it is not proper to trifle with the powers of the Chief Justice in this way. I appeal Sir, that the judiciary must be given the same status that the Legislature and Executive have got. On their co-ordination depends our future, our liberty and every other thing which we want to develop in our hand. If we trifle with the powers of any of them it may land us in a number of difficulties. The judiciary might negative all our liberty; the legislature might enact laws which might cripple the judiciary and similar apprehensions might arise in respect of the executive. Our welfare, therefore, lies in their co-ordination. There is no cause for suspicion in this respect which can justify the addition of the words 'with the approval of the President'. As regards the provision in Section 242 of the Government of India Act, I would submit that we are not concerned with that the old Government wanted to do. What we are concerned with today is that our judiciary should be entirely independent so that we can rely on it. For that it is essential that it should work independently and the President or the Legislature may not be able to interfere with it. It is, therefore, essential that its rights should not be reduced. As we are providing that the salary of the President would be a charge on the Government revenue, so also the salary of the Chief Justice should be a charge on the revenues of India. Similarly the expenses incurred on all the officers, whose independence is essential for the proper working of this Constitution, should also be charged on the revenues. Once you have provided a sum for them, the Chief Justice should have power to spend it as he likes, and the Legislature and Executive should not be able to interfere in that.
You have just passed the Directive Principle in which you have laid down that you want the separation of judiciary and the executive. I want to ask as to how you can effect it, if you do not allow the Chief Justice and his Department full liberty to spend. Do you want that for every petty post the Chief justice will have to say it is essential and then send the proposal to the President, who ultimately means the Prime Minister and his Chief Secretary in that ministry and the Secretary etc. will comment as to whether the posts are necessary or not? Will it be proper that the Chief Justice should write for every post like this? There is not reason for you suspect that the on person in whose hands you would place the duty of maintaining the independence of India would not be duly discharging his duties. I respectfully submit that the underlying idea of these amendments is that we are apprehensive that the Chief Justice may spend too much money or contravene the constitution. There is no cause for such suspicion. We have seen in India that even under the British rule when the Judiciary was their own, it did not care for the executive. Do we not know that our Federal Court had invalidated section 26 of the Public Safety Act? If you wish that in this country we should have the same freedom as we have has hitherto, or rather that we should have more independence it is essential that the status of the judiciary should not be lower than that of the Executive or Legislature.
The Members of the Assembly might remember that at the time of discussion on article 15, the question had arisen whether the judiciary would have the right to say, once a law has been enacted by the Legislature, that it is in accordance with justice of not, as is the convention in America where the judiciary can express its opinion whether a law of the Legislature is legal or not so far as the life and personal liberty of an individual is concerned. At that time the question under consideration was whether the judiciary should be given so much power that it can even declare that any law enacted by the Legislature is not proper and valid. As such questions arise before you and as the House was, in a way, in favour of the proposal, I hope that in future too when any question arises, in this connection, the House would support the rights of the judiciary. When we want to give so many rights to the judiciary, I respectfully submit, that we should also not, owing to any fear, provide that for the posts of petty servants, the Chief Justice will have to depend on the Executive. This amendment is not proper and I oppose it.
Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor: Mr. President, Sir, I must confess that I do not feel happy either at the phraseology of this article 122, or at the idea underlying it. Sir, I yield to none in my desire that the judiciary of the country should be absolutely independent of the executive, but I think the independence of the judiciary must be confined only in respect of the administration of justice and other the garb of the independence of the judiciary, we should not go on empowering the judiciary to do things which fall ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the Executive or the Parliament. According to article 122, we are going to invest the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice and such of its other judges as may be nominated by the Chief Justice, as also some subordinate officers of the Supreme Court as may be nominated by the Chief Justice, with the right and authority of appointing many important persons, of filling up many important posts in the Supreme Court. I do not think Sir, there is any necessity for investing the Supreme Court with powers in respect of all these appointments. Then, Sir, we are not only going to invest the judiciary with this power, but we are going to give this power in an absolutely unfettered manner. Let us see what clause (1) says: "Appointments of officers and servants of the Supreme Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of India or such other judge or officer of the court as he may direct." and then it goes on: "Provided that the President may be rule require that in such cases as may be specified in the rule, no person not already attached to the court shall be appointed to any office connected with the court, save after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission."
Now, Sir, it is well and good that this proviso is being incorporated herein, but I feel, that in the place of the word `may', there should have been the word `shall'. The proviso should have definitely provided for consultation with the Union Public Service Commission. As I interpret it, it is liable to mean that the President may or may not make rule providing for consulting the Union Public Service Commission. For, it says, `Provided that the President may be rule require........'. It does not mean that in all cases the Public Service Commission must necessarily be consulted. I would, therefore, have very much wished that it should have been made obligatory that the views of the Public Service Commission shall always be taken into consideration.
Coming to clause (2), we find that in the proviso it is laid down that the salaries, allowances and pensions payable or in respect of such officer, etc., shall be fixed by the Chief Justice of India in consultation with the President. Of course, wisely enough I should say, Sir, the Honourable Dr. Ambedkar has today moved an amendment to the effect that in place of the words "in consultation with", we should have the words `with the approval of' the President. This after-thought of course is a welcome thing. But, I submit that it would have been much better if all these appointments were originally to be made by the President himself. The proviso, as it stands, means that at the outset it is the Chief Justice or some other person nominated by him, who shall apply his mind to this subject. He will select some persons, fix their salaries and allowances and he shall, thereafter, simply put the whole thing before the President for his approval. Now, Sir, this is placing the President in a rather awkward and embarrassing position. If a proposal comes from such a high dignitary as the Chief Justice, the President will feel great delicacy in not readily accepting those suggestion. Ordinarily therefore, he will think, "why should I come in conflict with the Chief Justice in these matters? Let him have his own way", though, if it were originally left to the President, his decision may have been probably very much different. I think, therefore, that it would have been much better that in this provision we should have had it laid down that all these things shall be decided by the President himself, and not by the Chief Justice with the approval of the President.
Then I come to clause (3) of this article. According to this clause, the rights and privileges of the Parliament are being encroached upon. The clause lays down: "The administrative expenses of the Supreme Court including all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the court, shall be charged upon the revenues of India and any fees or other moneys taken by the court shall form part of those revenues." I specifically draw the attention of the honourable Members of the House to the words, `shall be charged upon the revenues of India'. The implication of this clause is very serious, and of a far reaching character. It means that Parliament shall have absolutely no voice in this matter, and whatever the monetary proposals in respect of these appointments they shall not at all come before Parliament, and they shall stand accepted by the Government automatically, and the Parliament shall have absolutely no voice in the matter, and that this will not be subject to the vote of the Parliament at all. I see absolutely no justification why these salaries and allowances, etc., should not be subject to the vote of Parliament. I can quite understand that we should have such a provision with regard to the salaries and allowances of the Judges. That we have already provided when we passed the relevant articles in respect thereto. But, so far as event the ordinary punka-pullar of the Supreme Court is concerned, his salary shall not be subject to the vote of Parliament. Why? We should not suspect others; but we should trust ourselves too. If we are asked to trust others, let us not be told that we should not trust ourselves. We trust the Judges of the Supreme Court in many important respects; let us trust the Parliament also to do the right thing in the matters of fixing salaries etc. If a power is not necessary to be conferred on the Judges of the Supreme Court, why should we thrust it upon them and divest our selves of our own rights and privileges? The salaries of its subordinate officers should certainly be subject to the vote of Parliament and should not be out of the jurisdiction of Parliament. Take for instance, the chief Justice of the Supreme Court places before Parliament............
Mr. President: The honourable Member has taken much time. I do not think it is necessary to prolong the discussion. We are nearing twelve o'clock.
Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor: I am finishing, Sir, Supposing Court places a huge budget extending over a crore of rupees or more. If Clause (3) stands as it is, Parliament shall have absolutely no control over that and the whole amount would have to be granted to the Supreme Court. It is said that we should not expect the Supreme Court to make such absurd proposals. I admit they will not indulge in absurdity. But, there are certain things which are within the special knowledge of Parliament which may not be within the knowledge of the Supreme Court. The financial position of the country is within the special knowledge of the Parliament. The Supreme Court Judges being ignorant of the actual financial position of the country may draw up budgets involving very huge expenses. For these reasons, I submit that this article is not very well conceived, nor properly worded.
Shri Krishna Chandra Sharma: (United Provinces:General): Sir....
Mr. President: I hope the honourable Member will not take more than five minutes. I want to close the discussion of this article today.
Shri Krishna Chandra Sharma: Much has been talked about the independence of the judiciary. I do not quite understand where that question arises. There is nothing to restrict the independence of the judiciary so far as the article of the amendments are concerned. The original article 122 was that the Chief Justice of India will fix the salaries and allowances, etc., in consultation with the President. The amendment seeks only to substitute the word `approval' for consultation. As my honourable Friend Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor said, it is not a question of independence or dignity of the Chief Justice of India. It is simply a question of the finances of the country. The President knows much better about the finances of the country and in accordance with the finances of the country, he will fix the salaries and allowances. There are other people in the administration of the country who would be putting in almost the same amount of labour, with the same capacity and qualification. Necessarily the same type of work with the same capacity, ability and qualification should carry similar salaries, allowances, pensions and other emoluments. So the question of independence of the Judiciary does not arise at all. The appointment of the officers of the Court is entirely in the hands of the Supreme Court Judges and that should be so, because they have got to get work from these officers. In certain cases, when the President shall think fit, he is empowered to lay down rules that in certain classes of services, the Public Service Commission would be consulted, and there is no question here also of doing anything derogatory to the dignity and prestige of the Chief Justice. It is a question of State Policy, for the administration of the whole country. And so I commend both the amendments, for the acceptance of the House.
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Mr. President, Sir, I would just like to make a few observations in order to clear the position. Sir, there is no doubt that the House in general, has agreed that the independence of the Judiciary from the Executive should be made as clear and definite as we could make it by law. At the same time, there is the fear that in the name of the independence of the Judiciary, we might be creating, what my Friend Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari very aptly called an "Imperium in Imperio". We do not want to create an Imperium in Imperio, and at the same time we want to give the Judiciary ample independence so that it can act without fear or favour of the Executive. My friend, if they will carefully examine the provisions of the new amendment which I have proposed in place of the original article 122, will find that the new article proposes to steer a middle course. It refuses to create an Imperium in Imperio, and I think it gives the Judiciary as much independence as is necessary for the purpose of administering justice without fear or favour. I need not therefore, dilate on all the provisions contained in this new article 122, because I find that even among the speakers, who have taken part in the debate on this article, there is general agreement that certain clauses of the new article 122 are unexceptionable, that is to say, clause (1), clause (3) and even clause (2). The only point of difference seems to be on the proviso to clause (2). In the original proviso, the provision was that with regard to salaries, allowances and so on and so on, the Chief Justice shall fix the same, in consultation with the President. The amendment proviso provides that the Chief Justice shall do it with the approval of the President, and the question really is whether the original provision that this should be done in consultation with the President or whether it might be done with the approval of the President, which of these two alternatives we have to choose. No doubt, the original draft, "consultation with the President," left or appeared to leave the final decision in the hands of the Chief Justice, while the new proviso with the words "approval of the President" seemed to leave, and in fact does, and is intended to leave the final decision in the hands of the President. Now Sir, in deciding this matter, two considerations may be taken into account. One is, what is the present provision regarding the Federal Court? If honourable Members will refer to Section 216, sub-clause (2) of the unadapted Government of India Act, 1935, they will find that the provisions contained therein leave the matter to the approval-I am sorry it is section 242 sub-clause (4)- leaves the matter to the approval of the Governor-General. From that point of view, we are really continuing the position as it exists now. But it seems to me that there is another consideration which goes to support the proposition that we should retain the phrase "with the approval of the President" and it is this. It is undoubtedly a desirable thing that salaries, allowances and pensions payable to servants of the State should be uniform, and there ought not to be material variations in these matters with regard to the civil service. it is likely to create a great deal of heart-burning and might impose upon the treasury an unnecessary burden. Now, if you leave the matter to the Chief Justice to decide, it is quite conceivable- I do not say that it will happen-but it is quite conceivable that the Chief Justice might fix scales of allowances, pensions and salaries very different form those fixed for civil servants who are working in other department, besides the Judiciary, and I do not think that such a state of things is a desirable thing, and consequently in my judgment, the new draft, the new amendment which I have tabled contains the proper solution of this matter, and I have tabled contains the proper solution of this matter, and I hope the House will be able to accept that in place of the original proviso.
There is one another matter which I might mention, although it has not been provided for in my amendment, nor has it been referred to by Members who have taken part in this debate. No doubt, by clause (3) of my new article 122 we have made provision that the administration charges of the Supreme Court shall be a charge on the revenues of India, but the question is whether this provision contained in clause (3) is enough for the purpose of securing the independence of the judiciary. Now, speaking for myself, I do not think that this clause by itself would be sufficient to secure the independence of the Judiciary. After all, what does it mean when we say that a particular charge shall be a charge on the consolidated funds of the State? All that it means is this, that it need not be put to the vote of the House. Beyond that it has no meaning. We have ourselves said that when any particular charge is declared to be a charge on the revenues of India, all that will happen is that it will become a sort of non-votable thing although it will be open to discussion by the Legislature. Therefore, reading clause (3) of article 122, in the light of the provision that we have made, all that it means is this, that part of the budget relating to the Judiciary will not be required to be voted by the Legislature annually. But I think there is a question which goes to the root of the matter and must take precedence and that is who is to determine what are the requirements of the Supreme Court. We have made no such provision at all. We have left it to the executive to determine how much money may be allotted year after year to the judiciary. It seems to me that that is a very vulnerable position and requires to be rectified. At this stage I only wish to draw the attention of the House to the provisions contained in section 216 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which says that the Governor-General shall exercise his individual judgment as to the amount to be included in respect of the administrative expenses of the Federal Court in any estimates of expenditure laid by him before the Chambers of the Federal legislature. So that if the executive differed from the Chief Justice as to the amount of money that was necessary for running properly the Federal Court, the Governor-General may intervene and decide how much money should be allotted. That provision now of course is incompatible with the pattern of the constitution we are adopting and we must therefore, in my judgment, find some other method of securing for the Chief Justice an adequacy of funds to carry on his administration. I do not wish for the moment to delay the article on that account. I only mention it to the House, so that if it considers desirable some suitable amendment may be brought in at a later stage to cover the point.
Mr. President: I shall first put to the House Dr. Ambedkar's subsequent amendment to his original amendment.
The question is:
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: Now I shall put Dr. Ambedkar's amendment No. 1967 as amended.
The question is:
"That for the existing article 122, the following be substituted:-
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
The motion was adopted.
Article 122, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
Mr. President: The consideration of article 123 will stand over for the reason for which Articles 109 to 114 have been held over.
The Assembly then adjourned till Eight of the Clock on Monday, the 30th May, 1949.
* Translation of Hindustani speeches.